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ABSTRACT 
The fifth Fä. imid Imam/Caliph, al-cAziz billäh, is viewed in 
a number of primary sources as being the best of the Fätimid 
sovereigns. Yet, this particular Fa , imid ruler 
has hitherto 
received little attention either from scholars in the Arab 
world, or in the West. This thesis seeks to remedy this 
neglect and aims to conduct a thorough study of the reign of 
al cAziz billäh. 
After an initial survey of sources and a political overview 
of the reign of al-CAziz, the thesis undertakes an analysis 
of his religious policies vis-ä-vis his Muslim subjects and 
the ahl al-Kitäb. The relations of al-CAziz with his three 
powerful neighbours - the Büyids and the cAbbäsids at 
Baghdad, the Byzantine Empire and the Umayyads of Andalusia 
- are then examined. 
As a result of these investigations, al-"-Aziz billäh emerges 
as an extremely competent, yet humane sovereign with whom 
even the most powerful potentates of his time, including the 
great cAcüd al-Dawla, sought to establish diplomatic 
relations. 
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NOTE ON TRANSLITERATION 
The system of transliteration of Arabic that has been adopted 
throughout this work is the one employed by the Encyclopaedia of 
Islam with the following modifications. 
j instead of dj for 
11 11 kh It 
ý 
91 11 1ý 
11 
ai it to ay 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
I Survey of the Sources 
A comprehensive review of the sources is an integral part of 
research. In a work of a historical nature, however, a survey of 
the sources assumes paramount importance. For it is a tool which 
enables the researcher to evaluate the information available to 
him as well as to determine its authenticity. A resurgence of 
academic interest in the Fä. t, imids has to some extent helped to 
bridge the gaps in our knowledge of this dynasty. As with other 
dynasties of the Islamic period, Fätimid history has suffered from 
the fact that not all the major events or personalities of that 
dynasty have been researched at all, let alone studied in depth. 
This is not, however, the case for all aspects of Fdtimid studies. 
As Lev has pointed out, there are many illuminating studies on the 
religious aspects of the Fgýimid phenomenon. The social and 
economic aspects of Fätimid history, especially of the later 
Fätimids, are other areas which have received serious attention 
from some scholars. 1 Fd, imid art and architecture have also been 
the focus of some recent, informative studies by art historians. 2 
The political history of the Fätimids is one area, however, which 
needs to be thoroughly researched, since a majority of the 
monographs on this dynasty are either outdated or uncritical in 
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their approach. There are, of course, works which are exceptions 
to this rule and which will be discussed further on in the survey. 
Nonetheless, the need to undertake meticulous research in the 
field of political history still remains. 
As Lev has already produced a comprehensive survey of the primary 
sources and research literature available on the F4 imids, it 
seems futile to repeat the exercise here. The attention of the 
reader is particularly drawn to Lev's painstaking research on the 
identification and analysis of the works of tenth-century writers 
who were contemporary to the F4. . imids, and those compiled 
by much 
later writers. The latter works are, nevertheless, very valuable 
as they often incorporate information from earlier works which are 
not, themselves, extant. 3 
In this thesis, then, the survey of sources will be limited to 
those which shed light on; directly or indirectly, the Fätimid 
Caliph al cAziz billäh. Moreover, all those works that were 
sufficiently well discussed by Lev will not be analysed here. 
There are, however, some sources that Lev did not mention. This 
is to be expected, as Lev's topic of research was different from 
that of the present thesis. Occasionally, Lev's evaluation of a 
particular work is at variance with my own opinion of it. In both 
these cases the sources concerned will be discussed and analysed. 
In addition, Lev did not pay sufficient attention to the Ismädili 
sources that are available. This chapter will attempt to redress 
this weakness in respect of the reign of al-cAzlz. 
3 
Ii Primary Ismäcill Sources 
Whilst historians of Isms'ilism, such as Ivanow, may be generally 
right in assuming that "Ismäcilism never developed a taste for 
historiography", 4 there are in the case of al cAziz at least four 
Ismä, 9ili works which have proved to be rather informative. Their 
value lies in the fact that they provide a contemporary Fätimid 
partisan's view of various events. Accordingly, they often 
incorporate in their works information which is not to be found in 
general historical works. 
Ii1 Contemporary Treatises 
The first work that needs to be mentioned in connection with the 
reign of al-CAziz is the Sirat al-Ustädh Jawdhar. 5 These memoirs 
were written during the reign of al-CAziz by a scribe6 of the 
chamberlain of the fourth Fätimid Caliph, al-MuCizz. The 
chamberlain, Ustädh Jawdhar, was of Slavic origins. He served the 
first four Fätimid Caliphs in various capacities. He did not 
reach Egypt, however, for he died on the way at Barqa in 363/973. 
Although the Sira was written in a1-cAziz's time, no amendments 
were made in the text to adjust to the political realities of 
al-CAziz's reign. From a historian's point of view, this is the 
strength of the Sira. The work provides an intimate account, for 
instance, of the appointment of Amir CAbd Alläh, the second son of 
al-MuCizz as heir apparent - an event which a number of the other 
historians omit. It is true that the language and the style of 
4 
the Sira are both geared to the extolling of the principal 
character, Ustädh Jawdhar. But in doing so, it also provides an 
historical insight into the key political issues of the time. 
For, besides being the chamberlain of al-Mudizz, Ustädh Jawdhar 
was also a close confidant of his. 
The Diwän7 of al-MuCizz's eldest son, Tamim, 8 is another work 
which is contemporary with the reign of al CAziz. Like the Sirat 
Jawdhar, the Diwan, too, provides insight into certain events 
within the Fatimid court, of which the other historians appear to 
be totally 4 are. It sheds light on the crucial issue of 
succession; in particular, the reasons why Tamim, though the 
first-born of al-MuCizz, was bypassed by the latter in favour of 
his second son CAbd Allah; and then by Nizär, who, upon his 
accession, adopted the title "al-cAziz billah". On a personal 
note, the D1wAn also provides information on the cordial 
relationship that existed between al-CAziz and his elder brother 
Tamim. The poet's verses composed on significant occurrences of 
al-CAziz's reign, moreover, contribute to our knowledge of these 
events and the manner in which they were celebrated. 
The Risäla i1ä iamaCatahl al-Raw is a work written by the däci, 
Abu'l-Fawäris al-i3asan b. MuIammad al-Mimädhi. 9 He was sent, in 
the time of al-CAziz, to propagate the IsmäCill daCwa in Rayy. On 
his arrival there, however, he met with such hostility that he had 
to flee the town. It was then that he wrote the Risäla, addressed 
to the people of Rayy. The Risäla, consequently, provides a 
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contemporary account of the IsmäCili mission in Rayy during the 
reign of al-CAziz. Undoubtedly, the d cIl s work offers a rather 
personal and emotional point of view. Nonetheless, the fact 
remains that it provides some first-hand information on the daCwa 
in a particular area. 
One of the works of A$mad b. Ibrähim (or Mu$ammad) al-Nisäbüri, 
who lived during the reigns of al-cAziz and al-i}äkim, needs to be 
mentioned in this section. It is called al-Risäla al-Mauiaza 
al-Käfiya fi 5däb al-duCät. lO The treatise deliberates on the 
hierarchical structure of the FAtimid dacwa. It also provides an 
exposition on the qualities and functions of a däcl. The value of 
the work lies in the time when it was composed, for it is a 
portrayal of the dacwa mechanism as it was understood and perhaps 
practised in the time of al-CAzlz. 
The above survey of Ism&1111 literature contemporary with the time 
of al-CAziz is by no means exhaustive. There were other, 
prominent people who wrote in this period, viz JaCfar b. Man§ür 
al-Yaman, Abu'l-Faraj YaCqüb b. Yusüf b. Killis and Abü YaCqüb 
al-Sijistäni. 11 The focus of their writings is on non-historical 
subjects such as esotericism and jurisprudence. As a result, they 
do not contribute to this particular piece of research. 
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Ii2 Later Writings 
An important historical source that belongs to a much later period 
is the cUyün al-Akhbär wa Funün al-Äthär. 12 Its author, CImäd 
al-Din Idris (d. 872/1468), belonged to the Tayyibi Ismä'ili. daCwa 
circles in Yemen. 13 Idris could not have chosen to live in a 
place more conducive than Yemen for compiling his historical work, 
for it is well known that, after the fall of the Fätimid 
Caliphate in Egypt, Yemen became the repository of Ffitimid 
literature. Idris's work consequently contains information that 
is based on the earliest of the Fätimid sources, a great number of 
which are not extant. 
The overall value of the work notwithstanding, it must be admitted 
that for some of the political events of al-cAziz's reign, Idris 
relies on standard Sunni biographical and historical works such as 
Ibn Khallikän's Kitäb Wafayät al-cAygnl4 and Ibn al-Athir's Kitäb 
al-Ka-mil fi'l-Ta'rikh. 15 In this aspect, then, his work makes no 
significant contribution. The other point that needs to be made 
concerning Idris's coverage of the reign of al-cAziz is that the 
author shows a marked bias towards the Fätimids and against the 
cAbbäsids and the Umayyads of Spain. It must be borne in mind, 
however, that the tendency to take sides with one dynasty or 
another was quite common among historians of the medieval times, 
especially those that belonged to a particular religious group, as 
Idris did. The value of his work should not be underrated on that 
count alone, therefore. 
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Ii3 Supplementary sources 
The single, most prolific IsmäCI1I writer whose historical works 
span the eras of the first four Fätimid sovereigns is al-Qäcýi Abü 
I1lanifa al-NuSman. 16 The Qa4l belonged to a learned family in 
Qairawä. n. It was in 313/925 that he began his long career at the 
Fatimid court. He was appointed to a variety of posts, such as 
the keeper of the palace library, judge of Tripoli and 
al-Man$%iriya, reaching the apogee of his career in the time of 
al-Mueizz, in whose reign he also died in Jump II 363/March 974. 
The Q611 wrote on an impressive array of subjects. He is most 
renowned, however, for his works on Fätimid-Ismä'ili 
jurisprudence, of which he is regarded to be a key exponent. The 
wide range of the Qäc1I's literary output can be judged from the 
fact that Poonawala, in his Biobibliography of Ism5fill Literature 
records sixty-two of his works. 17 Of these, eight deal with 
history, and are, therefore, of particular relevance to this piece 
of research. It must be admitted, however, that not all of the 
works of al-Nurmänn are extant. Moreover, not all the historical 
writings are of an equal standard. 
One particular historical work of his that needs to be reviewed 
oºl. M's CI L 
here is the Kitäb al-Maiälis li-din Allah wa can abä'ihi. 18 Stern 
states that this work of al-Nucmän "contains here and there 
precious pieces of information. "i9 but, according to Lev: 
even these grains of historical information are problematic 
... [as] the information [in the work] is divorced from its historical context so that the previous circumstances and 
8 
subsequent ramifications of the events are not considered. 
20 
In my view, this is the very strength of the Mai lis. It is when 
an author discusses the "previous circumstances" and "subsequent 
ramifications" that he begins to advocate his own opinion of the 
event. What the Maji lis offers, instead, is a collection of, for 
instance, the correspondence between al-Mucizz and the Byzantine 
governor, or between the Fätimid sovereign and other Islamic 
rulers, or with his own dAlls. To be sure, the Q4I does not 
often mention the dates when these exchanges took place, but these 
dates can be ascertained from other contemporary sources. The 
usefulness of the MaiRlis lies in the fact that in it the Q5 1 
presents a faithful account of what he witnesses. When studying 
Byzantine-Fatimid relations during the reign of al-CAziz, for 
example, the MaiRlis provides excellent background material, in 
the form of correspondence exchanged between his predecessor and 
the Byzantine Emperor. The Q54l's account of Fä. imid-Byzantine, 
or for that matter Fätimid-Umayyad, relations during his time, 
moreover, provides a useful insight into the official Fätimid 
viewpoint of these issues. 
One other work that needs to be mentioned under this subsection is 
the Diwan of Ibn Hari' al-Andalusi. 21 This most celebrated poet of 
the Maghrib, known as "Mutanabbi al-Maghrib", began his career at 
the Umayyad court in Spain. He soon had to flee from there, 
however, because of his pro-Fätimid sympathies. He eventually 
arrived at the Fätimid court in North Africa, where he lived until 
his death, on his way to Egypt, in 362/973. The poet's first-hand 
9 
knowledge of Spain and North Africa and his personal awareness of 
the relations between the Fätimids and the Umayyads are two 
aspects of his work that make it a useful book to consult as 
background for one of the chapters of this thesis, namely "Fätimid 
Policies in the Maghrib under al-cAziz billäh: Animosity with the 
yy, v 
It may be appropriate to conclude the section on IsmäFIli sources 
by pointing the reader's attention to two reference manuals on 
IsmäCIll works in recent years: the Biobibliography of Ismä--IlI 
Literature by I. K. Poonawala22 and A Catalogue of Manuscripts in 
the Library of the Institute of Ismäcill Studies. 23 Both these 
informative works enable the student of history to locate the 
Ismä Ill sources and to get a gist of their contents -a task that 
is rendered all the more useful as Ismälill sources are not as 
well-known and consequently, not as well utilised, as their Sunni 
counterparts. 
I ii Non-IsmädIli Primary Sources 
I ii 1 Eleventh-Century Writers 
The Chronicle of Ya1yä b. Said al-Antaki is an extremely valuable 
eleventh century source which escaped Lev's attention and needs, 
therefore, to be discussed here. 24 Yal? yä was a Melkite Christian 
born in Egypt in 380/990, during the reign of al-CAziz. A 
physician by profession, YaIyä also possessed the skills of a 
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historian. Yahyä wrote his chronicle, Dhail al-Ta'rikh as a 
continuation of the Nazm al-Jaudhar by the Alexandrian Patriarch 
Eutychius (d. 328-9/940), known also as Sacid b. Bitriq. The 
Dhail spans over a century, dealing with events between 324/936 
and 425/1034, mainly in Syria, Egypt and the eastern zones of the 
Byzantine Empire. It also relates events concerning Iraq until 
381/991. 
Yaliyä's Dhail is useful on a number of counts. It is one of the 
few eleventh-century Arabic historical writings to have survived 
in its original form today, while most of the other material 
contemporary with the Dhail has usually been abridged and 
incorporated into the works of subsequent writers. Secondly, the 
information that Ya1yä provides is, as pointed out by Forsyth, 
factual and objective to an exceptional degree. Thirdly, Yat}yä 
wrote on subjects that have generally been ignored by other 
historians. The greatest strength of the Dhail, however, is that 
it is an "unrivalled source of Byzantine-Arab political 
relations. "25. It consequently forms the backbone of the chapter 
on "Fätimid-Byzantine Relations during the Reign of al-CAziz 
billEh The work also provides vital information on the position 
of the Christian minorities in Islamic, particularly Fätimid 
lands. It is to be regretted, however, that whereas in the Dhail 
Yaiiyä provides a much more substantial coverage of al-1kim and 
his Caliphate, he has relatively little to say on al-cAziz. 
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Two other well-known eleventh-century writers whose works have 
yielded useful information for this thesis but Who were not 
mentioned in Lev's survey are Ibn Miskawaih's Tai rib al-Umam26 
and al-Thaldlibi's Yatimat al-Dabr f3 Mabäsin ahl al cAsr. 
27 
The 
usefulness of the Taii rib lies in the fact that Ibn Miskawaih (d. 
421/1030) occupied an eminent position at the Büyid court. As a 
result, the Taji rib gives a first-hand account of Fätimid-Büyid 
relations, albeit presenting the Büyid view of it. It has 
consequently proved to be an important work for studying the 
relations between these two powerful dynasties during the 
Caliphate of al-cAziz. Al-Thacälibl's Yatima, on the other hand, 
sheds light on the literary talents of the Fätimid sovereign 
al cAziz. A1-Thacälibi (d. 429/1037-8) classifies al cAziz as one 
of the well-known literary personages of his time and even 
includes some of the poetical compositions of al-cAziz in his 
biography. 
I ii 2 Historians of the Fourteenth Century 
Lev has dealt extensively with the rest of the historians who are 
relevant to this piece of research. Only three eighth/fourteenth 
century writers, whose writings were, in all probability, beyond 
the scope of Lev's thesis, but which, nonetheless, are important 
for the present study, remain to be mentioned. Chronologically, 
the first of these works is Kitäb al-Bay-En al-MLLqhrib f! 
(ikhtisFir) akbb. 3r Mulük al-Andalus wall-Mgghrib by Ibn cIdhiri 
al-MarrRkush128 (fl. 717/1312) and the second one is al cIbar 
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wa'l-Mubtadä' by Ibn Khaldün29 (d. 808/1406). Both these works 
report at length on the Maghrib and Spain. They, therefore, 
provide valuable information on Fä. imid policy in North Africa 
during the reign of al-CAziz and also the latter's relations with 
the Umayyads of Spain. 
The third and final work that ought to be mentioned in this survey 
of primary sources is al-Nu. jjm al-7.. ähira f3 Mulük Misr wall-Qähira 
by Abu'l-Mal} sin Ibn Taghr! Bird! (d. 874/1470). 30 This work 
encompasses the history of Egypt from 20/641 to the author's own 
times. Notwithstanding the fact that the composition of the work 
postdates the reign of al-cAziz by almost five centuries, 
nonetheless, in speaking of the latter's time Ibn Taghr! Birdi 
utilises sources that were contemporary to the Fätimids, but which 
are today not extant. The value of the Nujimº also lies in the 
fact that while it at times corroborates reports found in other 
primary sources of the F44imids, such as IttiCäz al-i3unafä'31 of 
al-Magriz3, at other times it provides information that is not 
available in other sources. The detailed information that the 
Nuitmi imparts on Fätimid-Biyid relations in al-cAziz's time is, 
for example, unmatched by any other extant sources. 
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I iii Review of Research Literature 
I iii 1 Introduction 
As Lev has already conducted a thorough survey of secondary 
sources' on the Fätimids, it is pointless to repeat a similar 
exercise here. It would be much more worthwhile to provide, 
instead, a supplement and an update to Lev's work on published, 
present-day works on the Fätimids. 
Another genre of material that will be reviewed in this section 
are the unpublished PhD theses that have been written in the last 
decade and which have proved to be particularly useful for this 
study. Admittedly, one does not generally come across a review of 
unpublished theses in a study such as this one. There are, in my 
opinion, however, some very good reasons for including a review of 
such works. The standard, albeit unvoiced maxim held in the 
academic world is that "if a work is of sound academic quality, it 
gets published". It follows then that those studies that do not 
get published are perhaps not of much academic value. Yet, 
nothing could be further from the truth. There may well be a 
number of reasons - which have no bearing on the academic worth of 
a work - for which it does not get published. Certainly, each of 
the theses included in this survey had a significant contribution 
to make to the present study on al-CAzlz. 
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I iii 2 Published Works 
0 
Mention must be made in this category of the corpus of literature 
on the Fdýimids by well-known scholars such as Madelung, 
32 
Hamdani33 and Halm, 34 whom Lev has perhaps inadvertently missed 
out in his review of research literature. Their works, in my 
opinion, make a significant contribution to our knowledge of the 
Fätimids. More recently, the articles of academics such as Lev, 
on the political, military, administrative and socio-economic 
aspects of early Fätimid rule in Egypt further adds to oiür 
knowledge of this dynasty. 35 Moreover, articles of art historians 
such as Bloom36 and Williams37 provide a useful and interesting 
insight into the fascinating world of Fätimid art and 
architecture. 
In addition to the host of present-day writers mentioned by Lev, 
who have dealt with the Fäiimids in Arabic, must be added some 
more names. Sayyid - for his important study of FdVimid source 
material38 and his edition of the extant portion of al-Mu$abbib! 's 
Ta'rikh; 39 Kurd CAli - who edited a book on predatory birds 
written by an author contemporary to al-CAziz and dedicated to 
him; 40 al-Khoury - for his article on the hhizänat al-Kutub (the 
library of al-cAziz); 41 Ghälib, for his general historical works 
on the Fät. imids42 as well as his critical edition of the D1wän of 
Tamim b. al-MuCizz. Mention must also be made of the two modern 
biographers of al CAzlz in Arabic - CAll al-Kharbu, 1143 and cirif 
T5mir. 44 Both of these biographies, particularly the one by the 
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latter, share similar academic weaknesses in that they do not 
utilise the sources available on al-cAziz critically. Very often, 
moreover, they do not acknowledge in their notes where they have 
derived the information that they have incorporated in their text 
on al-cAziz. 
Finally, the writings of 7, ähid 'All on the Fätimids, in Urdu, must 
be noted. The author wrote a two-volume work on Ta'rikh FätimiYin 
Misr encompassing the reigns of all the Fdtimid Caliphs. 45 He 
also included in this work socio-economical, military, 
administrative and architectural aspects of the Caliphate. ? ähid 
'All also wrote a doctrinal work on the IsmäCilis (of whom the 
Fätimids were the Imams) called Hamäre IsmäCill madhhab ki 
Ijaglgat our uskä nizäin. 46 
I iii 3 Unpublished Research 
Chronologically, the first thesis that needs to be noted here for 
its relevance to the present piece of research is Burkhard May's 
"Die Religionspolitik der Ägyptischen FR timiden 969-1171". 47 As 
indicated in its title, the work deals with the religious policies 
of the Fätimid Caliphs in Egypt. The two main components of 
society that May deals with are the ahl al-dhimma and the ahl 
al-sunna. He also speaks about the Fdtimid Caliphs' dealings with 
the Ismä'ili daCwa within as well as outside their domains. When 
dicussing specifically the religious policies of the F 4. imid 
sovereign al-CAziz, May's work provides a rather useful overview 
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on the issue. 
The next piece of unpublished research to which attention is drawn 
is John H. Forsyth's thorough and painstakingly researched work on 
"The Byzantine-Arab Chronicle of Ya1yä b. Sacid al-An. aki 
(938-1034)". 48 The merits of al-Anfäki's chronicle have already 
been highlighted. Suffice it to say, then, that Forsyth's work 
makes a significant contribution to the history of Egypt and Syria 
in the fourth/tenth-fifth/eleventh centuries. More specifically, 
it proved invaluable in piecing together the F44imid-Byzantine 
scene in al-CAziz's time. 
Yacov Lev's thesis, "A Political Study of Egypt and Syria under 
the Early Fätimids 358/968-386/996", is another work that deserves 
comment. 49 Although since writing his thesis, Lev has published a 
number of articles on various aspects of the Fdtimid era, 
nonetheless, the value of the thesis still remains. Particularly 
since the first two chapters of the thesis speak about the two 
regimes immediately preceding the Fä, imids - the 'j'Uünids and the 
Ikhshidids. Lev's work therefore provides an important insight 
into the Fätimid takeover of Egypt. Lev's chapter on Fätimid 
policies in Syria under its first two sovereigns - al-MuCizz and 
al-CAziz - is another useful feature of the thesis. The rest of 
the chapters on the Fdtimids can be classified as providing an 
overview of the various aspects of the new regime - giving rather 
useful background reading - rather than an in-depth study of it. 
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The chapter on Fätimid-Byzantine relations during al cAziz's time 
has also been well served by the doctorate of Wasam A. Faraj, 
"Byzantium and its Muslim Neighbours during the Reign of Basil II 
(976-1025)". 50 It is a coincidence of medieval history that 
al-CAzIz and Basil II, the two most powerful of the FRtimid and 
Byzantine rulers, respectively, were contemporaries. The relations 
between these two esteemed personalities were, to say the least, 
active. A study focussing on the personality and the reign of 
Basil II is consequently a rather useful asset in determining 
Fätimid-Byzantine relations at the time. 
Paula Sanders's thesis, "The Court Ceremonial of the FAtimid 
Caliphate in Egypt", 51 is yet another worthwhile piece of research 
conducted on the Fätimids in the last few years. What Sanders set 
out to achieve and successfully manages to dog is to establish a 
chronological framework of the development of Fätimid ceremonies 
and to place these within the context of Fä. imid political and 
religious history. Sanders's work provides, for instance, the 
perfect setting in which a meaningful discussion on the aspects of 
al-CAziz's authority as an Ismädili Imäm is made possible. 
Chronologically, the last thesis on the Fätimids which has been of 
value is that written by Gene William Heck, entitled "Cairo or 
Baghdad...? A Critical Examination of the Role of Egypt in the 
Fätimid Dynasty's Imperial Designs. "52 In his work Heck cogently 
argues that once the Fätimids had moved from North Africa to 
Egypt, they did not then endeavour even once to move in a similar 
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way to Baghdad. What they sought to do, however, was to make 
Cairo their headquarters and it was from that city which they had 
r 
founded themselves, that they implemented their imperialistic 
goals. It is difficult to pinpoint the usefulness of Heck's work 
to one particular chapter of this thesis, but the ideas that he 
advocated and proved so analytically have been utilised whenever 
appropriate throughout this thesis. 
II Political Overview of Al-CAziz's Reign 
The fifth Fatimid sovereign, al-cAziz billah, acceded to the 
Caliphate in 365/975. He was the first member of his dynasty to 
begin his reign in Egypt. Although the Fatimids had conquered 
Egypt in 358/969, just six years prior to al-CAziz's coming to 
power, nonetheless, al-CAziz's predecessor, al-Mu5izz lidin Allah 
(319/931-365/975) was successful in leaving as his legacy for his 
heir a firm Fatimid foothold in Egypt. As a result, al-CAziz was 
unhampered by any political or military upheavals upon his 
takeover in Egypt. On the foundations laid down by his father, 
al-cAziz subsequently built a strong and thriving Fatimid state in 
Egypt. In these effective endeavours of his the Fatimid sovereign 
was assisted by his skilful vizier, Yacqüb b. Killis. It is the 
latter who is credited with laying the cornerstone of the 
acclaimed Fatimid administrative structure in Egypt. 
Syria, however, was one region where the Fätimid political 
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situation was far from stable, when al-cAziz took over the reins 
of government. The instability of Fätimid rule in Syria 
undoubtedly posed the greatest threat to the security of the as 
yet nascent Fätimid state in Egypt. Consequently, Syria was the 
principal area that occupied al-CAziz's attention throughout his 
reign. 
The Fä, imid sovereign's initial objective was to subjugate 
southern and central Syria. Al-CAziz's determination to implement 
his policies concerning Syria led him to march personally against 
the Btiyid ghulä. m, Alptegin, who had installed himself at Damascus, 
just prior to al-MuCizz's death. The former had subsequently 
proclaimed the sovereignty of the CAbbäsids instead of that of the 
Fä%imids. Al-cAziz's triumphant victory over Alptegin in MuI}arram 
368/August 978, did not, however, translate into direct FAjimid 
control over central and southern Syria. That took place four 
years later, in 372/982, when al-cAziz's Turkish general Yaltakin 
conclusively defeated Qassäm and Mufarrij b. Daghfal - the two 
elements who opposed Fätimid authority in the area. That ambition 
achieved, al-CAziz then diverted his attention to northern Syria. 
Unlike central and southern Syria which were in political disarray 
at this time and were consequently up for grabs by any power that 
had the military muscle to do so, the northern region was much 
more politically stable. It was ruled by the 1Iamdänids, who 
although not powerful enough to ward off the major military powers 
of the time on their own, were nonetheless able to do so, with 
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material and monetary assistance from Byzantium. It was with the 
latter that the 11amd5nids had signed a treaty in the 350s/960s 
according to which Byzantium would defend Vamdänid territories. 
ýeAýýtan 
The attraction ofISyria, particularly that of its principal city 
Aleppo, lay in its extremely strategic location from a military as 
well as a commercial point of view. It is hardly surprising, 
then, that al-cAziz coveted control of it. To that end he 
commissioned a number of campaigns aimed at conquering it. 
Fä$imid interest in Aleppo was also the key factor that triggered 
off hostilities between the Fä, imids and Byzantium. For, the 
latter viewed northern Syria as being within their sphere of 
influence. In fact, so crucial was Byzantine hegemony in the area 
regarded by them, that the Byzantine Emperor Basil II personaly 
undertook a campaign in Syria in 385/995, so as to undermine 
increasing Fätimid authority in the region. The FRtimid response 
was not long in coming. Al-5Aziz immediately made preparations 
for a massive war effort in Syria which he was to command in 
person. It was while he was on his way to Syria, however, that 
death overtook him, on 28 Ramac, n 386/14 October 996. 
Iraq's physical proximity to Syria meant that even the Büyids, as 
one of the emergent powers of the medieval Middle East, attempted 
to establish their sway over the Levant. This is particularly 
evident in the heyday of Büyid power, during the reign of cA4ud 
al-Dawla (338-372/949-983). Fätimid-Büyid relations were, 
consequently, coloured by r-A4ud al-Dawla and al-cAziz's policies 
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concerning Syria. Hence Fätimid involvement in Syria had 
implications that were more far reaching in consequence than just 
the politics of that country. It had major repercussions on 
Fätimid diplomatic relations with the other two regional 
superpowers of the time - Byzantium and the Biayids. 
The Fätimids, as heirs to the Aghlabid possessions in North Africa 
had subsequently emerged as a Mediterranean power of considerable 
strength. Consequently, it was inevitable that there would be a 
conflict of interests between the Fätimids and the Umayyads who 
ruled over Andalusia, situated on the other side of the 
Mediterranean. The battleground of these two adversaries was the 
Maghrib, where the Umayyads took up the cause of the Zanäta 
Berbers whilst the Fätimids staunchly supported their Sanhäja 
counterparts. Hence the conflicts between the two major branches 
of the Berbers in the Maghrib often reflected the hostilities of 
the powers backing them up. 
A1-cAziz's policies concerning the Maghrib were not, however, just 
a reaction to Fätimid-Umayyad diplomacy. The very first ruler of 
the Fätimid dynasty, al-Mahdi billäh (297-322/909-934) had come to 
power in North Africa. In fact, as mentioned previously, al-cAzlz 
was the very first Fätimid ruler to begin his reign in Egypt, 
having come to that country just three years previously in 
362/972. It is to be expected, then, that the fifth Fätimid 
sovereign's links with the birthplace of his empire founded by his 
great, great grandfather were rather deep rooted. There were, 
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moreover, sound economic and military reasons for al CAziz 
continuing to maintain regular contact with the Maghrib, despite 
the Fä. imid move to Egypt. 
Territorially the Fätimid empire in al-'Aziz's time was at times 
larger than that of his predecessor. It encompassed central and 
eastern Maghrib, most of the islands of the Mediterranean, 
including Crete and Sicily, Egypt and most of the cities of 
central and southern Syria. Nominal allegiance was also paid to 
the Fätimid Caliph from the pulpits of the two most prestigious 
cities of Islam, Mecca and Medina. In Mu1arram 382/March-April 
992 the ruler at Mosul, Abü Duwäd Mu1aznmad b. al-Musaib al-Ugaill 
had the Fä imid sovereign's name inscribed on coins and banners. 
In addition, the khutba (Friday sermon) was recited in al-cAziz's 
name in Sind, Pfultän, Kirmän, Khw-arazm and in the Yemen. 
Al-cAziz is considered by the sources to be the wisest and the 
best of all the Fä imid monarchs to rule over Egypt. This is 
clearly evident in the tranquillity and prosperity that Egypt 
enjoyed during his twenty-one year reign. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE LIFE OF AL-CAZIZ BILLAH 
Al cAziz billäh, the fifth Fätimid Imam/Caliph, was the first 
ruler of the dynasty to begin his reign in Egypt. In order to 
comprehend al-cAziz's activities as the suzerain of his empire, it 
is interesting to gain an insight into al-CAziz as a person. It 
is also rather useful to establish a chronological framework of 
the major events in the personal life of a monarch like al-cAziz, 
for they have a bearing on other aspects of his reign. In 
addition, a biographical account such as the one undertaken in the 
following pages provides as complete a picture of al-CAziz, as the 
sources permit. He emerges, as a result, not just as a sovereign 
who ruled his empire wisely but also as a humane and cultured 
individual. 
I Birth and Formative Years: 
Born at al-Mahdiya on Thursday, 14 Mu$arram 344/11 May 955, Nizär 
- as al-cAziz was named - was the third of the four sons of 
al-Mu9izz li-Din Allah (319/931- 365/975)). 1 His mother was an 
Arab, an umtun walad called Durzan. 2 The reticence of the sources 
on the Maghribi phase of his life indicates that Nizar was perhaps 
little involved in state matters at the time. Two factors may 
account for this; his youth and the fact that whilst still in the 
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Maghrib, his elder brother cAbd Allah had been appointed wall 
1--ahd. Consequently, the latter was probably being groomed for 
leadership, to the exclusion of all others. What is certain, 
however, is that Nizar was in the retinue of al-MuCizz during the 
latter's journey from the Maghrib to Egypt. Along with the rest 
of his family, Nizär then took up residence at the Caliphal palace 
in Cairo on 7 Ramadan 362/11 June 973.3 The sources continue to 
maintain their silence concerning Nizar for the first couple of 
years after his arrival in Egypt. 
On 23 Jumada. I 364/8 February 975 Amir CAbd Allah - the successor 
designate of al-MuCizz - died after a brief period of illness. 
4 
Amir cAbd Allah's death had major repercussions on Nizar's 
hitherto rather unassuming life. It brought Nizar into the 
limelight of history - both of his own dynasty and of the medieval 
world at large. For, following CAbd Allah's death, it was upon 
Nizar that al-MuCizz's choice fell as his next wall Cahd. That 
despite the fact that the eldest son of al-Mucizz, Tam-1m, 
5 (born 
337/948-9) was still alive. 
II The Issue of Succession: Tamim, cAbd A11äh or Nizär 
A1-Mul--izz's appointment of his son Nizär as his successor meant 
that his first-born, Tamim, was excluded from leadership for the 
second time. Though not unknown, it was rather unusual for a 
ruler to bypass his eldest son in favour of the next one, when the 
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eldest was perfectly capable, physically and mentally, of ruling. 
For al-MuCizz to circumvent Tamim twice, however, clearly reveals 
that the Fätimid sovereign must have had some grave reasons for 
doing so. Unfortunately, the sources pass over the matter without 
any comment. Ibn Khallikän is typical in this respect. He says 
that: 
Tamim was a man of superior talent and a poet, gifted with a 
subtle wit and a refined taste; he did not, however, obtain 
the supreme authority, as the throne devolved to his brother 
al-mAziz in virtue of the solemn covenant by which this 
prince had been recognised, during his father's lifetime, as 
the legitimate successor to the empire. 6 
One of the more usual reasons cited for a monarch favouring some 
sons of his as opposed to others is due to harim intrigue. Often 
an influential wife or a favourite concubine managed to secure the 
successsion of her own male offspring to the throne. No evidence 
can be found, however, to support this contention, in any of the 
pro- or anti-Fä. imid sources. 
The one argument offered by Ibn al-cAbbar for al-Mucizz's 
exclusion of Tamim from Caliphal authority is that the latter had 
no sons. 7 This hypothesis has correctly been rejected by the 
principal editor of the Diwan of Tamlm b. Mucizz, Mul? amnad Kamil 
Iusain. As pointed out by him, Tamim had a son called CAli and in 
fact, it was because of this son of his that Tamim's kun was Abü 
cAli. 8. Moreover, the premise that the wall cahd had to have a 
male offspring prior to his being nominated for succession is 
groundless. A1-cAzlz's own appointment is a case in point. He 
did not father a son until ten years after he had been chosen as 
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the heir apparent by al-Mu9izz. 9 
t 
The most plausible explanation for al-Mucizz's aversion to Tamim's 
involvement in public life is to be found in the latter's own 
diwän. His poems unveil the fact that there was dissension among 
the families of the first, second and third Fätimid Caliphs, 
al-Mahdi, al-Qä'im and al-Man$ür respectively. Some members of 
these families also had their own axes to grind against the 
Fätimid authorities. 10 Tamim's poetry clearly reflects the 
adverse effects that disharmony within the Fätimid clan had on 
him. It also highlights where Tamim's sympathies lay. As with 
any other dynasties, so too, the Fä imids had their own set of 
problems. 
The major cause of discord between the ruling house and the rest 
of the Fgtimids was, as can be expected, the ever present threat 
of contenders to al-MuCizzs authority by the latter's princes. 
Royal aspirants to the throne can, after all, pose the most 
menacing challenge to the dynastic ruler. Revolts led by 
relatives of the Fgtimid Caliphs were not unknown. Ibn al-Athir, 
in fact, reports that soon after the death of the first Fgýimid 
Caliph, al-Mahdi, a certain Ibn Tdlüt al-Qarshi, revolted in the 
region of Tripoli (of the Maghrib). 
11 The basis of his claim was 
that he was a son of al-Mahdi. To keep an eye on the activities 
of the various sections of the royal family, al-Mu9izz restricted 
their movements in various ways. They were, for instance, not 
permitted to mingle freely with the local people. They could not, 
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for example, go to local markets. These impositions provoked 
bitter complaints from the royal family and further embittered its 
members. 12 
That there were close links between Tamim and his agitated and 
"rebellious" clansmen was a matter beyond doubt. Nor was it a 
closely safeguarded secret. Indeed, even al-Mucizz and his chief 
minister, Jawdhar13, were well aware of Tamim's relations with 
these princes. It is extremely likely that the latter were 
planning some sort of an operation against the government, for 
Jawdhar requested al-Mucizz to sanction the arrest of these 
princes. Al-Mucizz restrained his minister by asking how could he 
deal so severely with his own relatives and that further 
investigation into their case was necessary before any firm action 
could be taken-14 Matters did not, of course, end here. In fact 
they took a turn for the worse when the Fätimid governor of 
Sicily, Abmad b. al-Masan al-Kalbi, sought the Fä, imid Caliph's 
permission to have his own son Tähir executed for the latter's 
association with Tamim. 
15 
Ilusain has suggested that perhaps it was the discontented 
relatives of Tamim who encouraged him to revolt against his father 
and who offered him their assistance to help him come to power. 
The question arises, however, as to why Tamim felt the need to 
seize power in the first place. He was, after all, the first-born 
and had he chosen to follow his father's policies, he would, in 
all likelihood, have succeeded him to office. It may well be that 
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Tamim's involvement with his "rebellious" relatives was too 
binding for him to retract when matters went too far. 
Unfortunately, the paucity of information on the issue does not 
permit any conclusive remarks on Tamim's motives. What is 
certain, though, is that Tamim's connections with the 
"malefactors" cost him the Caliphate. 
In 359/969-70 al-MuCizz confided to Jawdhar alone that his second 
son, CAbd Allah, was to be the wall Cahd. Seven months later 
other eminent state officials such as al-11asan b. cUslüj were also 
taken into his confidence and informed of al-Mucizz's decision. 16 
Despite the debarring of Tamim from public office, at a personal 
level relations between father and son seem to have been cordial 
enough for the latter to accompany al-Mueizz to Egypt. 
17 Once in 
Cairo, Tamim lived for some time at the royal palace with the rest 
of his family members. Even in Egypt, however, al-Mudizz remained 
adamant on excluding Tamim from state affairs. When, for 
instance, in 363/973 the Qaramita threatened the Fa%imids on their 
very doorstep, it was CAbd Allah, not Tamim, who was appointed to 
the crucial post of commander-in-chief by al-Mucizz, in order to 
repulse the enemy. 18 
Tamim's exclusion from leadership left him time enough to develop 
his considerable literary potential. He was an accomplished 
poet. 19 After his arrival in Egypt Tamim seems to have occupied 
himself with the leisurely pastimes of his day. So much so that 
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when Amir CAbd Allah died and Tamim was passed over the second 
time, in favour of his younger brother, he offered no resistance 
at all, and until his death in Dhu'l-Qa'da 374/April 985, Tamim 
composed eulogies on his younger brother whenever suitable 
opportunities arose. In fact, he took the bayCa (oath of 
allegiance) for Nizar straight away. 
Canard finds it rather surprising that al-Mucizz's nomination of 
Nizär as his wall Cahd did not seem to have caused even a ripple 
in Isma, cili circles. 21 According to Canard, the death of Amir 
cAbd Allah in his father's lifetime is rather reminiscent of the 
death of the heir apparent, Isma, cil in 145/761-2 while his father, 
Imam Jacfar al-$ädiq was still alive. At that time the issue of 
succession had caused a major split in the community. The 
Ism&clll stance then had been that once the imama had been 
conferred on Ismäcil, it could not then be transferred to anyone 
else except someone from his own progeny, that is, his own son. 
Consequently, according to the Ismacills, the Imam after Ismäcil 
was his son Mu1 ammad b. Ismäcil. 
22 In fact, it was because of 
their adherence to Isma. cil and his progeny that the Ismäcills came 
to be called by that appellation. 
Two possible explanations can be put forward for the lack of 
controversy concerning Nizär's accession. One of the paramount 
precepts of IsmäCilism to this day is that the Imam invokes total 
obedience of the believers. Hence, if the Imam had decided at the 
death of his second son CAbd Alläh that it was his third son Nizär 
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who was to succeed him, then that was his decision and it had to 
be implicitly accepted by all the Ismadilis. Secondly, what had 
happened in the case of IsmaCil, according to the Ismaili 
viewpoint, was that Jacfar al-$adiq had made the nass 
(designation) in favour of his son IsmäCil who in turn had 
appointed his son 114ammad as his successor. The circumstances in 
cAbd Allah's case were somewhat different. The sources do not 
mention whether CAbd Allah had any sons. There is no evidence, 
moreover, of his having appointed someone to succeed him. The 
issue of the imams continuing in CAbd Allah's progeny does not, 
therefore, arise. 
III Nizär - the Next Fätimid Sovereign 
Meanwhile, sometime in Rabic II 365/December 975, Nizär was 
nominated by al-MuCizz as the heir to the imFina. Subsequent to 
the proclamation of Nizär as the wall cahd, members of the royal 
family as well as civil and military dignitaries of the State were 
invited by the Caliph to take the ba a to Nizär. Soon after the 
baylat al-khässa had been undertaken, al-Mucizz died. The wall 
cahd, who was then twenty-two years old, recited the funeral 
prayer over his father and then laid him to rest. Al-Mucizz's 
demise was kept'a secret until cId al-Nahr of the following year. 
On that day, 10 Dhu'l-IJijja 365/9 August 976, al-Mucizz's death 
and Nizär's succession were officially proclaimed. 23 
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On that occasion Nizär adopted the title al cAziz billäh24 by 
which he is subsequently referred to in the sources. In 
describing the events of the day of accession, al-Magrizi and 
clmad al-Din CIdris mention that once al-cAziz's khiläfa had been 
publicly pronounced, he rode under a mizalla25 (parasol) to the 
musallä (place of prayer). There he ascended the pulpit, 
personally led the Muslims in prayer and delivered the khutba. He 
then consoled himself on his father's death. This was followed by 
the people greeting al-cAziz as the new khalifa, the 
Amir al-Mucminin. The ceremonies ended by the cämma (the common 
people) taking the bayca in al-CAziz's name. 26 The occasion was 
also commemorated in verse by Amir Tamim. The royal poet composed 
some verses extempore, a sampling of which is as follows: 
1. We, on this occasion of cLd are celebrating two cks, 27 
because of you. 
2. You appear like the sun on its moss f cstui6'o, day, 
In fact your light is more radiant than the two [the sun 
and the moon]"28 
3. Dignity mounted on 
eý 
% saddle, 
you look like th I; moon in the sky and like the lion with 
the two cubs. 29 
6. They [the people] see the moral qualities and physical 
features of their Prophet 
In you, the attributes of two Mubammads. 30 
8. You evoke fully both the fear of God and the expectation 
of good tidings in those who were in your presence. 
9. To them you combine both praise and admonition, 
as well as promises and threats. 
10. You are the manifest ImFFm and its [imam's] wisdom 
and the one who has mastered the two languages. 
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11. May God bless you, as you are the king 
whose hands generosity regards as two right hands-32 
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Amir Tamim also composed another poem for that auspicious day, 
lauding the imäma of his brother. Some of the verses from this 
poem33 are cited below: 
26. Let the imam be delighted by what you have achieved, 
for God has fulfilled its hopes. 
27. It (the imäma] has certainly been in communication with him 
before, so that he may bear its burden. 
28. It revealed to him the command of God 
and he accepted it 6ef-oAz, he was weaned. 
29. It was married to him by the command of God, 
so God dressed him in its cloak. 
34. If anyone other than he administered it 
the earth would throw up its burden. 34 
35. Long live al-CAziz, safely 40% t IMAM. - 
holding firmly its nooses and bolt. 
36. Honouring its supporters all -L c'lmv 
and striking by the sword its deserters. 
42. Through him God accepts the obligation to fast, 
the duty of the pilgrimage and the prayers of the 
pilgrims. 
Anecdotes concerning al-cAziz's accession appear to have come into 
circulation at this time. The most well-known of these is 
attributed to al-CAziz himself and was first reported by 
al-MuYabbibi and al-Magrizi in their works. It runs in dialogue 
form thus: 
I heard Mawlänä al-CAziz say: "One day Mawlana al-Mucizz was 
walking in his palace. My brothers, Tamim, cAbd Allah, Uqail 
and I were walking behind him. It occurred to me then, I 
wonder if this matter [i. e. the Caliphate] will come to my 
brother CAbd Allah or my brother Tamim or to me? If it comes 
to me, I will be walking like this and they will be around 
me. " 
A1-Mucizz reached his destination. We stood in front of him. 
The group dispersed. I, too, was about to depart when he 
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(i. e. al-Mucizz] said: "0 Nizär, don't leave. " So I stood 
there until no one remained in front of him except me. He 
brought me close and said, "Upon my life, 0 Nizär, if I ask 
you about something, will you tell the truth? " I replied: 
"Yes, Mawlänä. " He said: "I turned towards you and saw that 
you were filled with pride. You were looking at me, then at 
yourself and your brothers. I stole a glance at you while 
you were unaware - and you were saying to yourself, "If this 
matter comes to me, my brothers will be around me ". 
Al-'Aziz said, "I blushed, came near him and kissed his 
hands. I then said, "May Allah make us all a sacrifice for 
you. " He [al-Mucizz] said, "Stop all that. Was not that so? " 
I replied, "Yes, Mawlänä, how did you know? " He [al-MuCizz] 
continued: "I guessed so. Moreover, I could not allow myself 
to see you filled with pride for something other than this. 
It [the command] is going to come to you. Be good to your 
brothers and your family. May God help you. "35 
It is perhaps anecdotes like these that led historians such as 
al-Antakl, Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Khallikän, Ibn CIdharl, Ibn Taghr! 
Bird! and others to believe that Nizär was the first and only wall 
cahd appointed by al-MuCizz. For none of these writers mention, 
even in passing, CAbd Allah's appointment as heir apparent. Yet 
each of these chroniclers deals with al-Mucizz and al-CAziz's 
reigns quite extensively. 
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N Marriage and Offspring 
In 369/979, five years after his accession to the Caliphate, 
al-cAzlz got married. The wedding seems to have been celebrated 
lavishly. According to al-Magrizi's account (and his is the only 
account of the wedding), al-CAziz fixed the dowry on the bride at 
two hundred thousand dinars. He also bestowed a thousand dinars 
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on the person who drew up the marriage contract. The äi and the 
witnesses were each presented with a robe of honour and were 
mounted on mules. After the wedding, the bride and groom toured 
the town, accompanied by the beat of the drums and trumpets. 37 
Although al-Magrizi does not mention either the name or the 
origins of al-CAziz's bride, it is perhaps not too presumptuous to 
infer that she was originally a Byzantine Christian slave of the 
Melkite persuasion. That is how other historians describe 
al-cAziz's wife. Moreover, as he is not known to have taken more 
than one wife, the case for this lady being the same as the bride 
referred to by al-Magrizi is further strengthened. 38 
On Thursday, 23 Rabic I 375/13 August 985, al-cAziz's wife bore 
him his heir. He was named Abü 'Ali Man! iZr and subsequently given 
the title al-Hakim b. Amrilläh. 39 Hitherto, al cAziz only had one 
daughter, known as SaCidat al-hulk. She was born in Dhu'l-Qacda 
359/August 970, while al-cAziz was still in the Maghrib. 40 She 
was a great favourite of her father. It was at her intercession, 
for instance, that the Christian vizier CIsä b. Nestorius, who had 
fallen from royal grace, was restored to his former post. 
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Although no specific information is available on SaCidat al-Mulk's 
mother, a couple of remarks in al-Magrizi's IttiCRz and 
al-An. aki's Ta'rikh seem to suggest that her mother was the same 
woman who gave birth to al-Väkim. In reporting the death of 
al-$äkim's mother, ( in ShaCbän 385/October 995, for example, 
al-Magrizi states that after al-CAziz had performed the funeral 
I 
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rites over his wife, he returned to his tent at Hunä Ja'far. His 
daughter, on the other hand, stayed' by the coffin for a month, 
performing the ceremony of mourning. 42 The argument could be put 
forward that as a senior lady of the royal household, it was 
perhaps SaCidat al-Hulk's duty to perform the ceremony of mourning 
for a month. Yet, a mere three months later when al-CAzlz's own 
mother died, there is no mention of SaCidat al-Hulk conducting the 
funeral ceremonies for her. 43 It can be inferred, then, that the 
mourning ceremonies which Sadidat al-Hulk observed for al dAziz's 
wife were not an integral part of the royal ceremonies of the 
time. She performed those ceremonies for al-CAziz's wife, not as 
the main lady of the royal household but rather as a daughter 
mourning her mother, for al CAziz's wife was, in all probability, 
her own mother. 
A statement made by a well-informed, contemporary historian, 
al-An. aki, lends further support to the hypothesis that al-4äkim 
and Sacidat al-hulk had the same mother. He writes that, 
In Rama45n 375 [January-February 986] Aristos, the maternal 
uncle of al-Saida., the daughter of al-cAzlz, was made the 
Patriarch of Bait al-Mugaddas. 44 
Well-known is the fact that Aristos was the brother of al-CAziz's 
wife and an uncle of al-U5kim. Further evidence in support of 
this argument can be found in the work of Ibn Muyassar. When 
reporting the death of al-CAziz's wife, he states that " her 
daughter"45, that is, SaIldat al-Hulk, performed the religious 
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ceremonies for a month. Had Sar-idat al-Hulk been the daughter of 
al cAzlz by another woman, Ibn Muyassar would not have used the 
suffix "ha", meaning she was daughter. In the light of 
the discussion above, it is possible to conclude that SaCidat 
al-Mulk was born to her mother while the latter was still a slave 
in the Maghrib. After his accession al-CAziz may well have 
married her some time after which she gave birth to al-V kim. 
Pies£tciivo. 
It must be noted that nothwithstanding the fact that h; s I. bRi Q may 
have been a very influential person in al-cAzlz's arim, it is 
most unusual for a medieval monarch to take one of his own 
concubines in marriage, ten years after she had borne him a child. 
Yet, it is not impossible that he did so and the weight of 
evidence in al-cAziz's case certainly seems to point in that 
direction. 
V Al-tJäkim's Appointment as Wall cAhd 
Soon after al-Uäkim had turned eight, he was officially proclaimed 
by al CAziz as his successor in ShaCbin 383/September-October 993. 
It was on that occasion that he was given the title al-Uäkim bi 
amrilläh. The news of his nomination was relayed throughout the 
empire. It was even communicated to the dä. 9is who operated 
outside the Fätimid territories. 46 
Unlike his father, who remained detached from state matters in the 
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formative years of his life, al-V-akim seems to have been groomed 
for leadership from a young age. Once he had been appointed wall 
Cahd, he began initially to participate in and later to perform 
some of the public duties required of a sovereign. Al-Magrizi 
records a number of instances which confirm this. A month after 
his official designation, that is in Ramadan 383/October-November 
993, al-Uäkim accompanied his father to the Fä imid mosque, which 
subsequently came to be called al-Anwar. As this was the very 
first official engagement in which al-IJäkim had participated after 
his appointment, the mizalla (parasol) - one of the insignia of 
kingship - was placed over his head, while al-cAziz went without 
one. Al-ljäkim also accompanied his father to the mosque on ch 
al-Fir. 
The following year, that is, 384/994-5, al-Ijäkim is known to have 
attended four public engagements. In Rabic I/May he sat in on a 
council meeting. A few months later he accompanied his father to 
perform the official opening of the khalif (canal). On each of 
the Fridays of RamagAn of that year, al-! Ialkim went with his father 
to the Fätimid mosques of al-Azhar and al-Anwar. Finally, in 
Dhu'1-Qacda/January 995 al-I35kim joined his father on an 
inspection of the armed forces held on the outskirts of Cairo. 
Probably, as a mark of al-V-zkim's special position as wall cahd, a 
separate marquee was erected for him at that event. 
48 
By 385/995, al-1Iäkim had advanced a step further. Rather than 
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being merely present on public occasions, he actually undertook 
his father's role of leading the ceremonies. Accordingly, at the 
'Id al-Fitr of that year, it was al-1äkim, instead of al-cAziz, 
who led the prayer. He also pronounced the khutba. Al-I äkim is 
described as having worn special clothes on that day with a 
jewelled mizalla over him. 49 
VI Illness and Death 
Al-1äkim's practice of performing the various public engagements 
expected of a Muslim sovereign stood him in good stead. He soon 
had to draw on this experience as a Caliph in his own right for 
al-cAziz did not live to celebrate the IYd al-Fitr of 386/996. 
While at Bilbais, located on the outskirts of Cairo, al-CAziz fell 
ill on 25 Rajab 386/14 August 996. He suffered from colic and 
gall stones. For the next couple of months al-cAziz's health 
fluctuated, sometimes he became extremely indisposed, while at 
other times he seemed to recover. Eventually, on Sunday 25 
Ramadan/11 October, the Fätimid sovereign entered a bath, which 
seems to have been set up for him at the lodgings of his 
treasurer, Abu'l-Futüli Barjawan, for it is there that the sources 
say he took his last breath. 50 
Before his death, however, al-cAzlz made final arrangements for 
44 
the care and the succession of his son al-I1äkim. In this 
connection, he held meetings with his chief q 4i Mu$ammad b. 
al-NuImän as well as with the influential Kutämi Shaikh, the 
commander of the Maghribi troops, Abü MuIammad al-1asan IbnCAmmär, 
who had the title Amin al-Dawla. 51 The Caliph then sent for his 
heir and conversed with him on various matters. Al-Mu§abbilii 
quotes a part of the conversation between father and son as 
personally related by the latter to him. He says: 
0 Mukhtär! My father sent for me before he breathed his 
last, and I found him with nothing on his body but rags and 
bandages. I kissed him, and he pressed me to his bosom, 
exclaiming: "How I grieve for thee, beloved of my heart! " 
and tears flowed from his eyes. He then said, "Go, my 
master, and play, for I am very well. "52 
Well he certainly was not, for al-cAziz's illness continued to 
worsen. As soon as the Caliph quit the bath, between the zuhr and 
the c. a. r prayers on Tuesday 28 Rama4än 386/14 October 996, he 
passed away. 
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A1-cAziz's demise, unlike that of his father al-Mucizz, was not 
kept a secret even for a short period of time. His son, al-$äkim, 
was immediately heralded as the next Fdtimid sovereign. Al-}äkim 
describes in his own words, as narrated by al-Mu$abbi1!, the 
events immediately following the death of al-CAziz. 
I obeyed (my father's command to go and play] and began to 
amuse myself with such sports as are usual with boys, and 
soon afterwards, God took him to Himself. Barjawän then 
hastened to me and, seeing me on the top of a sycamore tree, 
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he exclaimed, "Come down, my boy! May God protect you and us 
all. " When I descended, he placed on my head the turban 
adorned with jewels, kissed the ground before me and said: 
"Hail to the Commander of the Faithful, with the mercy of God 
and His blessings. " He then led me out in that attire and 
showed me to the people, who all kissed the ground before me 
and saluted me with the title of Caliph. 54 
The day after al-CAziz's death, the new Caliph, al-1Iäkim, made a 
grand entrance into the royal palace at Cairo preceded by a litter 
bearing his father's corpse. On that same day, al CAzlz's body 
was laid to rest, next to that of his father, al-Mucizz, in the 
burial chamber of the royal palace. The body had been washed and 
prepared for funeral by Q WI MUbamm-ad b. al-Nucmän. 
Historians vary in their opinion on how old al-"--Aziz was when he 
passed away. Ibn Muyassar, however, gives the most accurate dates. 
He states that al cAziz was forty-two years, eight months and 
fourteen days old when he died. He also provides the nearest 
figure to the length of time al-CAziz reigned over Egypt, which 
was twenty-one years, eight months and eighteen days. 
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VII Personality 
The vivid description of the physical features of the fifth 
Fätimid Caliph, al-cAziz, given in the sources, portrays him as a 
rather attractive-looking person. He is said to have been a tall, 
broad-shouldered man, with reddish hair, dark blue eyes and a 
tawny complexion. 56 
His personality, as recounted by all historians, was, however, 
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even more appealing. Ibn Taghri Bird-1, for instance, remarks that 
al-CAziz had excellent qualities. In his opinion the Fätimid 
sovereign was a brave, enterprising, patient and good-natured 
individual who was apt to forgive and who hated shedding blood. 
He was also just and kind to his subjects. 57 Ibn Taghri Birdi's 
assessment of al-CAziz's character is in total agreement with 
other historians who discussed his character. 58 
VII i Forgiving Nature 
The one quality of al CAziz extolled by all the writers is his 
inclination to forgiveness even when he had the authority to 
punish. The example most often cited in this connection is 
al-CAziz's exemplary behaviour towards a Büyid ghuläm Alptegin, 
who challenged Fätimid rule in Syria. He posed such a serious 
threat that al-CAziz had to march against him in person. Although 
the Fdtimid ruler defeated Alptegin, he managed to do so at a 
tremendous cost to his treasury, estimated by al-Magrizi at one 
hundred thousand dinars. 59 After the battle Alptegin attempted to 
escape. Ibn al-Athir describes the scene when Alptegin was caught 
escaping from the battlefield: 
When Alptegin (Arabic: Aftakin) arrived at al-cAziz['s tent] 
he had no doubt that al-cAzlz would have him killed 
immediately. [Instead], al-cAzlz honoured him and was 
beneficent to him beyond his comprehension. Al-cAziz ordered 
a tent to be pitched for him and returned to him all those 
people who had served him so Alptegin did not lose any of his 
former status. He sent him gifts and money, the like of 
which he had not seen, he took him with him to Egypt and made 
him among his special attendants and häjibs. 60 
Al-Magrizi continues the narrative on Alptegin. After his arrival 
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in Egypt, 
Alptegin was made known in the best possible manner. When he 
returned from his tour [of Cairo] he [al CAzlz] granted him a 
great deal of wealth and presented him a robe of honour. He 
[al CAziz] also asked the nobles to invite him to their 
houses. There was not a single one among them who did not 
play host to him, give him gifts and riding beasts. 61 
So overwhelmed was Alptegin himself by the munificence of al-cAzlz 
that he is reported to have said: 
I am ashamed to ride with Mawlänä al-cAziz billäh or to look 
at him for he has showered me with (such] honour and 
favours. 62 
Undoubtedly, al-CAziz had political motives concerning the Turkish 
commander Alptegin. He wanted the latter to take charge of the 
newly introduced Turkish element in the Fätimid army. 
Nonetheless, the manner in which the Fätimid sovereign treated 
Alptegin was certainly more humane than was customary at the time. 
This is borne out by the fact that even non-partisan historians 
such as Ibn al-Athir and Ibn Khallikän make a special note of 
al-I'Aziz's clemency towards Alptegin'. 63 
Another noteworthy example of al-CAziz's forgiving nature is 
elucidated by Ibn al-Athir. Before mentioning the actual 
incident, the historian states that al-CAziz was fond of forgiving 
and often did so. He then cites the case of the Egyptian poet 
al-Ijasan b. Bashshär al-Dimashgi who wrote many defamatory poems 
in al-CAziz's time. 64 The poet satirised al-cAziz's vizier, 
Yaegüb b. Killis, and his katib al-Inshä' (secretary), Abü Na$r 
cAbd Allah b. al-I! usain al-Qairawani, in the following verses: 
Say to Abü Nair, the scribe of the palace 
who has the ability to ruin the (entire] situation, 
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"Destroy the prop of the W= , [who is] the v, z-%1A 
and 
. ýpu 
will be greatly praised and thanked for it. 
Give and take and fear none, because 
the master of the palace is not in the palace 
He does not know what is happening 
Even if he does know, he does not know [what to do]". 
When Ibn Killis heard these verses, he is reported to have 
complained about the poet to al-CAziz. The latter replied, "He 
has satirised us both so let us share in forgiving him. " Al-Masan 
then composed some more lines alluding to the Fätimid sovereign, 
his vizier and the commander of the Syrian forces at the time, 
al-Fa41 b. $äli1i. He said: 
Become a Christian, for Christianity is the true religion. 
The signs of our times prove that. 
So pronounce the three in reverence and humility 
And abandon all the others for they deserve neglect, 
For Yacqüb the vizier is the father, 
while al-cAziz is the son and Fain is the holy spirit. 
By this time, reports Ibn al-Athir, Ibn Killis resented al-Fasan. 
He complained bitterly to al-CAziz about the poet. Al-cAziz, 
however, restrained his vizier from taking any action against the 
poet and told him, on the contrary, to forgive him. So Ibn Killis 
had no other recourse but to do so. Meanwhile the poet became 
bolder in his satirising of the Fa%imid sovereign and his chief 
advisors: 
ZiyRraj165 the confidant and Kulays166 the vizier 
£&1's. Yes, indeed, each dog has a collar to match 1:. -s 
These verses proved to be the last straw for Ibn Killis. He went 
at once to al-CAzlz and said: 
There is no point in forgiving like this, for by it the 
prestige of the administration and the awe of kingship are 
diminished. He has spoken of you, of me and of Ibn Ribäh, 
your confidant. He has abused you by his [above-mentioned] 
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words. 
The poet was immediately arrested by the vizier. Despite the 
poet's brazenness, the Fätimid Caliph decided to have him 
released. He accordingly summoned al-Fasan to his presence. The 
spies of the vizier at al-CAziz's court informed forthwith their 
master of the Caliph's chosen course of action. Hence, by the 
time the Caliph's messenger arrived at the prison to fetch 
al-Masan, the latter's head had been severed at the express orders 
of the vizier. When al-cAziz heard of the poet's death, he 
grieved for him. 67 
VII ii Sense of Justice 
The other quality which historians attribute to al-cAziz is his 
keen sense of justice. Throughout al-cAziz's twenty-one years' 
reign can be found episodes that clearly reveal his acute concern 
with justice. In the very first year of al cAziz's Caliphate, on 
25 Jumäda II 365/1 March 976, the Fätimid governor of the Maghrib, 
AmIr Abu'l-Futü$ sent, among other gifts, a sum exceeding four 
hundred thousand dinars to the Caliph at the hands of MU]? ammad b. 
$älib, who was in charge of the bait al-m7al. A1-cAziz, however, 
refused to accept the money and ordered that it was to be 
immediately returned to the Maghrib. 
According to the two historians who report this incident at 
length, Ibn al-dIdhäri and al-Magrizi, the Fätimid Caliph's 
vexation over the matter lay with the manner in which the money 
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had been collected in the Maghrib. 68 They recount that after CAbd 
Allah b. Mu1 am-mad al-Kahad read the si, iill he had received 
from al-eAziz proclaiming the latter's succession to the Fätimid 
Caliphate and had distributed the dinars and dirhams that bore the 
new ruler's stamp on them among the people of the land, he spread 
his cloak, put a few dinars in it himself and then announced: "Let 
each one put in this cloak what tie can. " He made most of the 
people of Ifrigiya and all its chieftains contribute to this 
collection. He thus managed to muster a prodigal amount exceeding 
four hundred thousand dinars. CAbd Allah then sent the money to 
the Fätimid Caliph, anticipating that the Caliph would be rather 
pleased with him. 
Al-CAziz, to the contrary, disapproved totally of what CAbd Allah 
had done. He therefore ordered the katib to return the money to 
its original owners. CAbd Allah, however, could not bring himself 
to return the money. He consequently devised a plan to circumvent 
embarrassment for himself. He placed the money in packets and on 
each of these he wrote the name of the person who had donated it. 
He then sent the packets to Cairo. Al-cAziz was not to be 
appeased. He sent all those bags that were labelled to their 
owners in the Maghrib. He further instructed that the money which 
did not bear its owner's name should also be sent to the Maghrib, 
where its owners were to be traced and the money returned to them. 
Al-cAziz's firm refusal to accept money that had been collected 
unlawfully is particularly commendable, for when this money was 
presented to the Fa timid Caliph, he was in the midst of equipping 
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a massive army to fight against Alptegin in Syria. 69 The vast sum 
of money offered to him would have consequently been of immediate 
use to him. 70 This was 'not a lone incident of al-cAziz's lofty 
sense of justice. 
In Dhu'l-I1ijja 377/March 988, the twelfth year of al-CAziz's rule, 
a foreign merchant who used to reside in the Qaisäriya market of 
the Ikhshidid quarter71 at Fus t, was murdered in his own house 
and his possessions were stolen. 72 The next morning the chief of 
al-shurta al-suflä (the lower police), 73 Rashiq, a ghuläm of 
Maimün Dibba, arrested a number of people who lived in the 
vicinity of the Qaisäriya al-Ikhshid. The people accused Räshiq 
of murdering the merchant and stealing his property. He then 
attempted to camouflage his crime by issuing false charges against 
some local residents and arresting them. The matter was brought 
to al-CAziz's attention. 
The Fätimid sovereign was most upset at this breach of peace. He 
immediately wrote a taugiC to his vizier YaCqüb b. Killis urging 
the latter to investigate the matter promptly and thoroughly. The 
Caliph instructed his vizier to imprison those policemen who were 
guilty of committing the crime, and appoint in their stead upright 
and God-fearing individuals. Ibn Killis complied with al cAziz's 
orders and accordingly dismissed Räshiq and other guilty ones from 
the police force. So impressed were the Egyptians of the time by 
the ideals of justice that their ruler put into practice that, 
according to Ibn $airafi, 
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All the Egyptians made copies of this taug-11 [of al-CAziz] 
and the children were taught it at school... 74 
The Fätimid Caliph's desire to be just even pervaded his personal 
affairs. In 383/993 recounts al-Magrizl, al-CAziz inspected 
matters pertaining to his own income and expenditure. 75 The first 
item that he examined concerned his own household, kitchen and 
food expenditure. So shocked was he by the extravagant amounts76 
spent in this category that he exclaimed, "I am full while the 
people are hungry. " After this episode, despite his extreme 
fondness for rare and exquisite dishes, he, "almost abandoned 
eating at the royal table. "77 
Ibn Sarld quotes an account given by the chief of the bait al-mal 
in al cAziz's time, Abti Jar-far Mu}}ammad b. F1usain b. Muhadhdhab 
which provides yet another glimpse of a1-cAziz's sense of 
fairmindedness. 78 Ibn Muhadhdhab once wrote to al-cAziz seeking 
his opinion on whether to loan the F54imid Caliph's money to any 
of the people working under him, including scribes, provincial 
governors and other employees of the state who sought loans from 
him. Al-CAziz replied to him: 
o Mul? ammad, peace be upon you. If any of your people, your 
scribes, your treasurers or those who are working with you, 
or any of our slaves or those who depend upon us, ask for a 
loan, and you see that they are genuinely in need of it, and 
you are certain of their sinct9 then give them what you 
think is appropriate, and take their signatures. Do not 
demand back the money from them. If they return the money 
voluntarily, take it from them. If they do not do so and you 
know that they cannot afford to do so, then foRg-vQ- them 
the delay in returning what they had taken. If they ask for 
more than what you have given them, then give them it on the 
same conditions and do not ask for it. If you know that 
someone who has taken the money is able to return what he has 
received but is not doing so, refrain from demanding it back 
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from him, and refuse [to give money] to those who are like 
him. 79 
Al-cAziz was equally mindful of the economic needs of members of 
the poorer section of society. Accordingly, he instituted the 
practice of paying his own servants and slaves every single day. 80 
VII iii Humane Disposition 
Al-CAziz's humanitarian approach extended to all levels of 
society. Besides taking care of the economic necessities of his 
slaves, he willingly granted freedom to any of his ten thousand 
slaves, who sought to be freed. 
81 
The Fätimid Caliph's benevolent nature was clearly manifest, for 
instance in 373/983, when he continued to pay for all the personal 
charitable works of his vizier YaCqüb b. Killis, while the latter 
had been put in prison. A1-Magrizi states that the charities 
amounted to one thousand dinars per month. 
82 When his erstwhile 
vizier died, it was al-CAziz who personally paid off his vizier's 
debts worth sixteen thousand dinars. 
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VII iv Pastimes 
As an individual the Fä4imid al-CAziz had some recreational 
pastimes of which he was particularly fond and at which he 
excelled. Al-cAziz was known to have been an excellent judge of 
horses and predatory birds. 84 His interest in falconry prompted 
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an author of the time to dedicate a treatise on the subject, 
called Kitäb al-Baizara, to al-CAziz. 85 The Fdtimid Caliph used 
to also indulge in pigeon racing. Ibn 7äfir narrates one such 
incident of pigeon racing in which both the Caliph al CAziz's 
pigeons and those of his vizier, Ibn Killis, took part. It so 
happened that the vizier's pigeons returned to the base prior to 
those of his master's. Some of the vizier's opponents took this 
opportunity to criticise the vizier. They wrote to al CAziz that 
Ibn Killis was seeking to be superior to the Caliph in all 
respects, and that he was acting on that principle even in 
pastimes such as pigeon racing. When Ibn Killis became aware of 
this negative propaganda against him, he at once wrote a couplet 
to al-'Aziz: 
Say to the Amir al-Mu'minin 
who has the majesty, and who is a model of eminence: 
"Your bird is a w'ýnneý,, 
But he does not arrive unless he has a hä, iib " bb (chamberlain) 
Another hobby for which al-CAziz was reputed to have a passionate 
penchant was lion hunting. Al-Magrizi gives a graphic account of 
al-CAziz's hunting trip to Giza in 383/993. On his return from 
the hunt, remarks al-Magrizi, the Caliph entered the city of Cairo 
preceded by a lion which lay on a mule. 
87 Among the Fäimid 
sovereign's other sporting interests was javelin throwing. He was 
the first of the F54imids to throw a javelin which had a curved 
end. He was also regarded as the first of his family members to 
cast arrows. 88 
Al-cAziz was extremely fond of all types of novelties. 
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Consequently a number of different species of birds, animals and 
fish were to be found in his reign which historians claim were 
never seen either before or after al-CAziz's time. 89 Even the 
ships built in his time surpassed all others in size, strength and 
beauty. 90 The Fätimid Caliph was reckoned to be a connoisseur in 
jewellery and furniture. Rare and precious gems were to be found 
in his collection. He was an innovator of fashion. He was the 
first of the Fdtimid Caliphs to clothe himself in a kaftan and a 
belt. He was also the first of them to don a long turban, one end 
of which was at the back and the other one was wrapped round the 
chin. It was one hundred arms' length long. 91 The superb quality 
of cloth that was produced in the various towns of Egypt and the 
exquisite embroidery done on them in the royal workshops bear 
testimony to the Caliph's interest in these items and his 
financial capacity to do so. 92 
VII v Poetr 
The Fäj. imid sovereign al-CAziz's esteem of literature will be 
highlighted in a later chapter entitled: "The religious policy of 
al cAziz: the Ismäcilis". 93 In addition to being a generous 
patron of literature, al-cAziz also possessed literary merit 
himself. Ibn Khallikän quotes al-Mu§abbibl as saying that 
al-cAzlz "was a man of talent, and skilled in literature", 94 while 
Ibn Taghri Bird! pays tribute to al-cAziz's composition by saying 
that the Fätimid Caliph composed fine poetry. 95 Abü Man§ür 
al-ThaCälibi mentions some poetry of al-cAzlz in his literary work 
56 
Yatimat al-Dabr fl Shucar-a' ahl al-CAsr. 96 Both Ibn Khallikän and 
Ibn Taghr! Bird! quote some verses from the Yatima which al-CAziz 
is reckoned to have composed when a son of his died on the day of 
c 
We, the Banü Mu#afä face suffering 
We drink from the suffering of life but make no show of 
it. 
our suffering is distinct from that of all mankind. 
The first among us were afflicted by it and so will the 
_last 
of us 
All of mankind rejoices on this occasion of cIcJ 
but festivals for us are occasions of bereavement. 97 
VII vi Patron of architecture 
The Fätimid ruler al-CAziz's keen interest in architecture is 
clearly evident from the impressive array of buildings that were 
erected in his reign. His generous patronage of structures of a 
religious nature will be discussed in greater detail elsewhere. 
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The Caliph's patronage also extended, however, to buildings of a 
social, economic and recreational nature. A number of militarily 
strategic constructions were also undertaken in his time. 
The best , 
known of the royal edifices which a1-CAziz commissioned 
were the Qa§r al-Bahr and the Qa$r al-Dhahab. 
99 So impressed was 
the historian al-Mu$abbi$i by the former palace that he remarked 
that it was, 
an edifice, the like of which had never been raised either in 
the East or in the West. 100 
In keeping with his refined taste for, aesthetic objects, the 
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Caliph had gardens laid at Sardüs and fountains constructed in the 
i miC al-'A i , 
101 For the comfort of his subjects al-CAziz had 
baths built in Cairo. 102 On the military front, al cAziz had a 
number of castles built, for instance, at 'Ain Shams. He also 
commissioned the construction of a fort at al-Rasiyin and an 
arsenal at Maqs. 103 
In order to facilitate agriculture in his time, the Fä. imid 
sovereign ordered the construction of a number of dams and 
aqueducts. In addition, the existing canal system was improved 
upon by making the canals wider and deeper. A watchtower was also 
constructed on the khal j so as to gauge exactly the ebb and flow 
of the river Nile-104 Regular inspection tours, conducted by the 
Caliph personally, acted as a further impetus to the smooth 
functioning of the irrigation network. 105 
VIII Prosperity 
That there was prosperity in al CAziz's time is attested by all 
the chroniclers who report on his reign. 
106 The historian who has 
given the longest and, by far, the most thorough account of 
al-cAziz's activities, al-Magrizi, describes his reign as being a 
model one. He adds that all the days in al-cAziz's time were like 
days of cjý and of wedding festivals. 107 Ibn Taghri Bird! echoes 
the sentiments expressed by al-Magrizi. In his resume of al-cAziz 
he states, 
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I say that he was the best of the Fätimid Caliphs, in 
comparison to his father al-Mudizz li-din Alläh and his son 
al-Vzkim bi amrilläh. 108 
IX Evaluation of Sources on al-CAzlz's biography 
Such is the descriptive reconstruction of al cAziz's biography 
based on the extant sources. The most important question that 
needs to be addressed, when analysing the biography of al-CAziz, 
concerns the evaluation of source material. The criticism that 
can be levelled at the above account of al-cAziz is that it is 
more of a panegyric than the actual reality. 
The first point that must be made in this connection is that the 
basis of all the information imparted above are the works of 
historians of repute such as Ibn Zäfir (born 565/1171), Ibn 
al-Athir (d. 630/1233), Ibn Khallikän (wrote 672/1234), al-Magrizi 
(d. 845/1441) and Ibn Taghri Birdi (874/1470). 109 None of these 
writers, moreover, can be deemed to have had any ulterior motives 
in presenting the Fätimids in a particularly favourable light, for 
they all wrote their works well after the dynasty had lost all 
political authority. Furthermore they were all Sunni. 
The fact that in dealing with al cAziz these historians were 
reporting on a sovereign whose reign occured much earlier than 
their own times leads to another issue - that of the examination 
of their sources. Well known is the fact that medieval historians 
were notorious for not mentioning their sources of information. 
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In the case of al-cAziz, however, the problem is not quite as 
acute. The chroniclers often name the historian contemporary to 
al-'Aziz, al-Mu! ýabbibi, 110 as their primary source. 
That al-Mu$abbibl was a Fätimid sympathiser is no secret. Yet, 
purely on that basis, any information reported by him cannot 
automatically be labelled as being biased. Moreover, authors such 
as the ones mentioned above gathered their information from a 
variety of sources. Just because they do not many a time name the 
actual author in their narrative does not discount the fact that 
they referred to them. 110 In addition, from time to time the 
chroniclers cited above give their own evaluation of al OAziz. 
Information imparted in these conclusions has also been utilised 
in forming as complete a picture of al CAziz's life and his 
interests. 
The final argument that needs to be discussed in this connection 
concerns the location within the sources of the various attributes 
and qualities of al-cAziz that seem to paint a rather flattering 
image of this particular Fätimid ruler. Some of the favourable 
sentiments expressed concerning al cAzlz are to be found in 
obituaries written on him by various historians. It is 
undoubtedly correct to assume that no writer would say unpleasant 
things about a ruler in the latter's obituary. It would then 
follow that the accounts in an individual's obituary, although not 
totally false, may be highly exaggerated, with the negative 
aspects of the person glossed over. The validity of this argument 
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is beyond question. Yet, the case of al-cAziz is perhaps an 
exception to the rule. This is clearly proven by the fact that 
the majority of the anecdotes that have been cited and discussed 
in the text have been taken from the year by year account of the 
various historians. Even the information found in biographical 
works such as Ibn Khallikän's Wafavät al-cAS. n are corroborated by 
the more detailed narratives of other authorities before being 
included in the text. 
It must also be noted that the various qualities that historians 
have showered on al CAziz do not merely form a part of the hollow 
rhetoric used for all powerful potentates. A comparison of Ibn 
Khallikän's portrayal of another great Fa. imid statesman, 
al-MuCizz, with that of his son and successor al-cAziz, clearly 
reveals a distinction in the personalities of the two men. Nor 
does Ibn Khallil. ä. n even attempt to attribute the same qualities to 
the two sovereigns. It is of course to be expected that all 
renowned rulers will have some qualities in common, but this is 
just where the similarities come to an end. In the final 
analysis, each ruler, like each man, is an individual in his own 
right. It is the portrayal of the individual, al-cAziz, that has 
been attempted in this chapter. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. IttiCäz, I, 236; Khitat, II1 284; Wafayät, III, 529; 
al-Duwal, 38; Ibn Muyassar gives the date of birth as 11 
Muharram 344/8 May 955 in his Ta'rikh, 47; whereas Ibn 
al-Dawadari (Kanz, VI: al-Durra, 174) says it was on 23 
Muharram/20 May that al-CAzlz was born. Ibn Taghrl Bird! 
(al-Nujinrº, 1, mentions that al-CAziz was born on the day of 
cAshürä', that is, 10 Mu1arram 344/7 May 955. 
2. Itti`äz, I, 236; Rhitat II1 318. In his later work (II, 
285) al-Magrizi calls her Durzära ( öJlj J >). Because of her 
melodious voice she was also known as Taghrld (warbling) (Cf. 
Y. Ragib "Sur Deux Monuments Funeraires du Cimetiere 
d'al-Qarafa" as cited by Bloom, "Meaning", p. 125. 
3. A1-Nujüm, 1; Khitat, II, 284; Ittiläz I, 134; Wafayät, 
III, 380. 
4. Ibn Muyassar, Ta'rikh, 46; Itti'--äz, I, 217; al-Duwal, 26, 
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sources. 
5. On Tamim b. al-Mucizz see: Wafayat, I, 279-81; Ibn 
al-'Abbar, Kitab al-13ullat al-Sayra' I. Ed. IUusain Mu'nis 
(Cairo, 1963), 291-8; Diwan Tamim b. Mucizz. Ed. M. K. 
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20. For Tamim's eulogies on various occasions of significance in 
al-cAziz's reign, see Idris, CUyün, VI, 202-48. Al-Magriz1, 
Itti'5.7,, I, mentions various incidents that reveal, that on 
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21. Sirat Jatidhar, pp. 23-4. 
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In the r'än (XII, 30,51), for instance, the title al-cAziz 
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out by Lewis, the title al-cAziz also seems to denote the 
office of chief minister under the Pharaoh. The same title 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE RELIGIOUS POLICY OF AL-cAZIZ: THE ISMAcILIS 
Islam, as is well known, provides a complete code of life for its 
adherents. It does not as such distinguish between "church" and 
"state". The Fätimid sovereigns embraced this all-encompassing 
precept of Islam. Accordingly, they claimed to provide guidance 
on matters temporal and spiritual. In fact, they went a step 
further. They asserted that they were the sole inheritors of 
spiritual and temporal authority in Islam. So concerned were they 
with the propagation of the religious aspect of their sovereignty 
that, for the first time in Islamic annals, they elevated the 
organization responsible for the dissemination of their religious 
mission (the da'wa) to a pillar of state. ' The daCwa thus 
operated alongside the twin pillars of civil bureaucracy and the 
military forces. The Fätimids claimed that the raison d'etre of 
their state was to remove the injustice that prevailed in the 
world and to fill it with justice. In other words, the 
cornerstone of their political authority was based on religious 
ideals. The Fätimids professed to be the Imäms (spiritual guides) 
of the Ismä'ili branch of Shi ism. Accordingly, upon their 
accession to political authority both in the Maghrib and in Egypt, 
they elevated Ismä9ilism to the position of a state religion. 
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This chapter will discuss the religious policies of the fifth 
Fät. imid sovereign, al-cAziz billäh. As the Ismä--Ill Imäm of his 
time, al-CAziz was at the apex of the religious structure. The 
impetus given to IsmäCilism by al-cAziz within Fätimid domains 
will be examined. IsmäCilism also flourished under the auspices 
of its ducat (emissaries) in territories that were not under 
direct Fätimid control but which, nonetheless, formally 
acknowledged Fätimid suzerainty, such as the two holy cities of 
Mecca and Medina, parts of the Yemen, Mosul, Mültän and others. 
The promotion of Ismä'ilism by al-cAziz through its ducat will 
also be analysed. 
What this chapter will not attempt is an elucidation of Fätimid 
doctrines. This is for a number of reasons. Firstly, because 
doctrines, being modes of thought rather than actual sequences of 
events, although they are subject to change, cannot be 
compartmentalised into a fixed chronological period of time, such 
as, for example, the reign of al-CAziz. Secondly, the Fätimid 
doctrinal scene is rather involved and complex. Consequently, a 
study based exclusively on the topic needs to be undertaken. 
Finally, there are no extant treatises on IsmVili doctrines by 
the outstanding figures of the daCwa in al-cAziz's time whose 
views could be summarised to give a flavour of the prevalent 
doctrinal systems. 2 A basic understanding of Fätimid doctrines 
can be culled, however, from the existing studies on the subject. 3 
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I Ismä9Ilism 
Ii Rank and role of the ImSm: 
A number of Fät. imid theologians wrote treatises on the key concept 
of imäma in IsmäCilism. For example, one of the chief exponents 
of Fä4imid Ismädilism, al-Q 4i al-Nu m n, devotes the very first 
chapter of his authoritative work on IsmädIli theology and law, 
Dacä'im al-Isl5m, 4 to al-wiläva (the authority of the Imms). 
Al-Nucmän designates the wiläva as the first pillar of IsmäCilism, 
the acceptance of which is fundamental to the understanding of the 
rest of its precepts. 
5 Subsequent to his composition of the 
DacR'im, al-Nucmän undertook a comprehensive study of the wilä a 
from an esoteric point of view in his Asäs al-Ta'wil and Ta'wil 
al-Daca'im. 6 It is beyond the scope of this chapter to discuss at 
length the doctrinal aspect of the concept of im-uma. A basic 
understanding of the Ismäcill position vis-a-vis its Imzm can be 
ascertained, however, from a cogent resume of the issue by Von 
Grunebaum: 
He [the Fätimid Caliph] is descended from the Prophet through 
F&Vima, the quality of Imam has been transmitted to him by a 
series of [divine] appointments, nass, from father to son, 
theoretically in an unbroken sequence of primogenitures. 
There is thus no power to whom he could possibly be beholden, 
no human contemporary who would be his equal, not merely in 
respect of rank but of substance. Faith, islam, in the 
Ismäcill view is incomplete without belief in the Imn ; 
without him the Muslim religion could be neither correct nor 
perfect; he is budid, iat Allah, the proof of Allah, on earth, 
that is to say, his existence is and provides testimony for 
God's veracity in this Revelation.? 
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I ii Manifestations of the Imam's Authority 
In their capacity as the Imams of the community, the Fätimid 
Caliphs were earnestly concerned with manifesting their status as 
religious leaders in a variety of modes. The performance of 
religious duties by the Caliph, the regular observance of 
religious festivals, the pivotal position of the Caliph in 
processions, the construction of mosques with inscriptions that 
symbolically allude to the spiritual authority of the Fätimid 
Im9m, and even the coins and regnal titles of the Fätimids serve 
to accentuate their religious authority. 
I ii 1 Leading of Prayers 
The first FRtimid to begin his reign in Egypt, al-CAziz billäh, 
was extremely diligent in the performance of his religious duties. 
From 380/980 onwards the sources offer detailed descriptions of 
al-IAziz regularly leading the Friday prayers in "the best of 
months" - Rama4iin. 
8 Al-Magrizi and Ibn 72fir note that al CAziz 
was the first Fätimid ruler to lead the Friday prayer of Ramadan 
in person. 9 Al-Magrizi adds that al-CAziz was the first Fätimid 
to break the fast of Ramadan with the people at the mosque of 
al-cAtiq. 10 The Friday prayers during Ramaclän were not the only 
prayers that al-CAziz led. The earnestness with which al CAziz 
performed his, duties as an Imam can also be ascertained from the 
fact that he personally led the funeral prayers over important 
state officials such as the chief ä1 0A11 b. al-NuCnän and the 
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vizier YaCqüb b. Killis, as well as members of his own family, for 
example, his wife and his mother. 
I ii 2 Processions: 
Processions gave expression to the Ismäcili system in which the 
Imam stood at the centre of all devotions. They were used in 
early Fätimid times in Egypt to link the major ritual centres to 
the Imam's palace. 11 The first description of a procession to the 
Friday prayer during Rama45n also dates back to al-cAziz's time. 
In 380/990 al-CAziz rode to the 'mir- al-Azhar carrying a staff 
(gadib) and wearing a taylasän and sword, under a golden parasol 
(mizalla). He was accompanied by five thousand men on foot. 
After delivering the khutba and leading the prayer, he returned to 
the palace, collecting grievances along the way. 
12 This was 
substantially the manner in which the Ramac, t n processions were 
held henceforth. 
I ii 3 Celebration of did al-Fitr and lid al-Adbä: 
Al cAzlz also actively participated in the celebration of the two 
canonical festivals of the Muslim calendar, lid al-Fitr (the 
festival of the breaking of the fast of Rama4än) and lid al-Adhä 
(the festival of sacrificing). 13 He headed the procession to the 
musallä, 
14 led the 'Id prayer and proclaimed the khutba. The 
religious ceremonies were followed by a sumptuous banquet at the 




As a conscientious Muslim leader, al-CAziz regularly distributed 
alms to the poor and performed other charitable acts. He is 
credited by the historians as being the first Fätimid to build a 
dar al-fitra (warehouse of provisions) where all the charitable 
contributions were collected and stored-15 He made it a custom to 
distribute al-dabayä 
to the awliyä' according to their ranks on the day of 
cId. 16 The poor also received charity from him on that day. The 
Fätimid Imam also distributed alms on occasions of personal grief 
such as the times when his wife and mother died and when his heir 
fell seriously ill. 17 
An important and permanent addition to the celebration of the two 
festivals was introduced by al-'Aziz when in 380/9°10 he ordered 
the construction of benches (mastabas) along the route from the 
palace to the muGallä. He ordered the believers (i. e. Ismäcilis) 
to sit on these benches and to recite the talbir (AIM-u-Akbar), 
"so that it would be continuous from the palace to the musallä. 
18 
Sanders has rightly pointed out that from the year 380/990 the 
processions on the two cis and during Rama45n were not just a 
means of getting from one point to another. Rather, they were 
meant to connect the points as well. The mastabas sought to 
establish a physical link between the palace and the musallA, 
while the continuous to bir was a way of sacralising the 
procession route. 19 
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I ii 4 Relationship between Prayer and Procession: 
The connection between procession and prayer is very close in 
terms of ta'wil . Qa4li al-Nunn in his monumental work Daca: 'im 
al-Islam and his Ta'wil al-DaCä'im discusses this connection. He 
mentions that there are three major festivals: the Friday prayer 
(al-Jumca), the Fitr and the Ate. Each of these three has a 
paradigm in the bä in (the esoteric plane): that of the Friday 
prayer is the daCwa of Muhammad, which is also the daCwa of the 
hidden Imams: that of the fast of Ramadan, the concealment 
(al-kitmän wa'l-satr) of the fitr, the Mahdi and the revealing of 
the hidden dacwa: that of the sacrifical feast (al-ad ä), the 
qä'im. The Dacä'im, moreover, prescribes that one should bring 
out weapons (sil- ) to the prayer. According to the Ta'wil 
al-DaCV im the paradigm of going out in prayer (al-khurüj li'l 
alät) and taking out weapons (ikhräj alb) is like conducting 
a ,Z 
'i häd against the enemy. This is explained further by the 
specification that the prayer on these occasions is to be held in 
an "open field" (al-bariiz), that is, the musall . 
2Ö 
I ii 5 Jihad' 
Jihad (holy war) is one of the fundamental precepts of Islam. It 
6y S"m . 4uý{+atýiiLS 
is reckoned Lto be the sixth pillar of Islam following the five 
obligatory religious rites that a Muslim has to perform, 
al-shahäda, al-salat (prayer), al-saum (fasting), al-zaRRt (alms- 
giving) and al- ai (pilgrimage). Al-Nunn elucidates and 
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interprets the Ism7a9ili viewpoint on 'i, 7 had in a chapter devoted to 
this topic in his Daýä'im al-Islam. He relates, on the authority 
of Imam Mubammad al-Bägir that 'iý had is one of the seven pillars 
of Ismälilism. The other six are: al-waläya/wiläya (devotion to 
the Imam and acceptance of his authority), al-tahara (ritual 
purity), al-salat, al-zakat and al- a ". 21 
As the Ismädili Imam, al-CAziz was extremely conscious of his 
religious obligations. Accordingly, he took very seriously his 
duty to lead a 'i"ý h5d against the enemy when need be. In 385/995, 
for example, al-CAziz heard of the Byzantine Emperor Basil II's 
campaign against Fa, imid territories in Syria. He at once made 
preparations to march in person against the Emperor. When a 
number of prominent citizens of Egypt advised the Fatimid Caliph 
to remain in the capital and to send his troops instead, he 
expressed his gratitude at their concern for his personal safety. 
He insisted, however, that he had to lead his troops in person as 
he was "marching in aid of Islam, to defend it in Allah's lands 
and to protect its people"..... 
22 
I ii 6 Va, 2'i: 
As the spiritual leader of the community, the Fätimid Caliph's 
rule guaranteed the performance of religious rituals. In this 
context the special importance that the FRVimids attached to the 
performance of the pilgrimage (baj, i), one of the pillars of Islam, 
should be examined. 
23 After extensive negotiations, diplomacy and 
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showering of gifts, al-MuCizz had finally managed to receive the 
support of the Sharifs of the two holy cities of Mecca and Medina 
in 364/974-5. The following year the khutba was proclaimed at 
Mecca in the F44imid Caliph's name. 24 It was a matter of great 
prestige for any Muslim ruler to be acknowledged as the legitimate 
authority from the pulpits of the holiest of Islamic cities. 
Al-cAziz, therefore, made every endeavour to continue this 
distinction in his name. In addition, Mecca held enormous 
symbolic significance for the F&Vimids as the home of the Prophet 
and consequently their own ancestral abode. 
25 
Concerning the baj_i itself, al-CAziz took a number of measures to 
facilitate the performance of the pilgrimage by the people of his 
domains. He appointed the person who was to lead the ä4 files 
(pilgrim caravan) and whose duty it was to make all the necessary 
arrangements for the kaa ', i. At times he reviewed the caravans - 
laden with goods and gifts - himself. 
26 He even took military 
action against the Bedouin of the 1Iijäz who used to intercept the 
pilgrim caravans and loot them. Moreover, the Fätimid ruler 
regularly sent one or two extremely beautiful and expensive black 
brocade coverings for the walls of the KaCba known as the kiswa. 
On every pilgrimage the Caliph also sent as gifts various types of 
grain, oil, candles, perfumes, articles made of gold and other 
precious metals and stones, riding beasts and other items to 
Mecca. 27 The total cost of these offerings was estimated by 
al-MagrIzi as being 100,000 dinars in 369/979. By 382/992 Ibn 
Muyassar valued the gifts sent by al-CAziz to the Kacba at 300,000 
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dinars. 28 
It is noteworthy that despite the esteem in which al-CAziz seems 
to have regarded the Kaaba, he did not undertake the pilgrimage 
personally even once in his reign. His was not a unique case 
either. None of the Fätimid Caliphs ever performed the pilgrimage 
whilst they reigned. This fact does not elicit surprise, however. 
When the annals of Islam are examined, it would appear that none 
of the Muslim rulers who were contemporary to the Fritimids - 
including the cAbbäsids and the Umayyads of Spain, embarked on a 
pilgrimage while they reigned. 29 
The major consideration that dissuaded the Muslim rulers in this 
decision was the issue of security. It was often regarded a 
matter of extreme risk for the potentate to leave his seat of 
authority physically. It was with this consideration in mind that 
rulers were also generally advised by their ministers not to lead 
their armed forces in war personally. This advice was regarded as 
crucial if the scene of battle was located at a considerable 
distance from the power base of the ruler. 30 Undertaking the 
pilgrimage to Mecca in person would certainly necessitate the 
ruler's absence from his capital for a number of weeks -a 
proposition that was reckoned to be very risky by the political 
pundits of the time. 
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I ii 7 Building of Religious Structures: 
Architectually, al-CAziz expressed his religious authority by 
embarking on a programme of constructing mosques and other 
religious structures such as a musallä built in Cairo, adjacent to 
the Bäb al-Na: ýr. 31 The foundation of the 'ämic al-Anwzr was 
marked out in Ramadiin 380/November-December 990. It was the first 
and the most well-known of the mosques built under the auspices of 
al-cAziz. The new amiC was two to three times the size of the 
previous amic, al-Azhar. 32 The symbolic allusion to divine light 
(anwar - plural of nür) in the naming of the mosque is 
particularly significant. The parable of the Light of God in a 
lamp in a niche (Qu'r n XXIV: 35 ff) has a very special meaning to 
the Shica, among them the Ismädills too, for it was taken to be 
evidence for the nass (designation); divine light transmitted to 
the successive cAlid Im-ams. 33 
The recognized holiness (baraka) of the month (Ramän) in which 
the j mic was founded is further evidence of the religious 
significance that the Fdtimid ruler attached to the construction 
of the mosque. Al-'Aziz also became the patron of a ruined mosque 
at Qaräfa and he had the entire mosque renovated. 34 So thorough 
and total was the reconstruction that historians, relying on the 
report of a contemporary historian, al-Mu, abbibl, list the mosque 
as being one of the new buildings constructed in al-cAziz's 
time. 35 
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As far as the functions of the Anwar mosque are concerned, 
historians report that no sooner was, the site earmarked as a 
mosque than the fugahä' (jurists) who had previously lectured in 
the mosque of Cairo began to hold courses in the Zamic al-Anwar 
too. 36 A year after the foundation ceremony, that is, in Raman 
381/November 991, al-5Aziz led the Friday prayer and delivered the 
khut there. 37 Thus, long before the construction of the mosque 
was completed, it was being used as a centre for both prayer and 
instruction. The Fätimid Imim ritually integrated the Zamic 
al-Anwär with the existing religious centres by leading the 
Ramadän prayers alternately in the new and the old mosques for the 
first couple of years after the former's foundation. 
I ii 8 Regnal Titles and Other Royal Trappings: 
The Fätimid claim to religious authority can also be ascertained 
from their choice of grand regnal titles for themselves. Fii, imid 
coins and other regalia provide further indications of their 
claims. In their adoption of titles, the Fä imids followed the 
cAbbäsid precedent. The first three Fätimid Caliphs, al-Mahdi, 
al-Qäcim and al-Man$ür, like their cAbbäsid counterparts, took 
titles of messianic and apocalyptic expectations. 38 Once the 
Fätimids felt politically secure they reverted to the standard 
form of regnal titles as the later cAbbäsid Caliphs had done. 
Bernard Lewis describes this standard form as follows: 
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Though [the titles were] commonly abbreviated to the first 
word only, they consist of an adjectival phrase, qualifying 
the holder and formulating a relationship to God, with whose 
name the formula ends ... 39 
It was with the fourth Eitimid ruler, al-MuCizz lidin Allah ("the 
one who strengthens the religion of Allah") that this latter 
formula was adopted. His successor Nizar had as his la ab 
al-CAziz billah ("the one who is powerful through Allah"). He was 
also known as Abü Man$ür. As Lewis has rightly pointed out: 
In medieval Islam as in medieval Christendom, the coming of a 
divinely guided leader, who would overthrow tyranny and "fill 
the world with justice" was no vague dream of a remote 
future, but a firm and specific promise for due and certain 
fulfilment. 40 
The adoption of the messianic epithet Mf r41 by al-"'-Azlz ,,, as in 
conformity with the apocalyptic mood of the times. Evidence of 
the use of the messianic phrase al-Mansur by al-CAziz can be also 
found on the inscriptions of Fatimid coins of his era. A new 
dirham introduced in 382/992 read on the obverse: al-w-abid A11äh 
al-ghafür ("Allah alone is forgiving") and on the reverse: Al-Imam 
Abu' 1-Mansur. 42 
The inscriptions on coinage and items signifying royalty such as 
signet rings display the same Fatimid concern to advocate their 
religious legitimacy. The message on the signet ring of al-cAziz 
read as follows: "Bi nasr al CAziz al-Jabber, YantaRir al-Imäm 
Nizär43 ("By the victory of the most Powerful, the most Mighty 
(that is Allah), Imam Nizar will be victorious. " On a dinar 
minted at al-Mahdiya in 366/976-7 as well as one minted in Mi$r in 
384/994-5 are to be found the following religious legends: CAbd 
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Allah wa walihi Nizär al-Imam al-CAziz billah Amir al-Mucminin 
("The slave and friend of Allah, the Inky Nizär al-CAziz billihh, 
the commander of the believers") and La illaha ilä-Allah, Muhammad 
Rasül Allah CA1ä Khair Safwat Allah ("There is no God but Allah, 
Mu$ammad is His Messenger and [peace be] upon the chosen ones of 
Allä. h... ")44 
One interpretation of al-cAziz's active and diligent performance 
of religious obligations is that it highlighted his exalted rank 
of being not just an extremely powerful temporal ruler but also,. 
according to the Fä . imid view, the only 
legitimate religious 
authority in islam. The liturgical phrases on Fä, imid regalia, 
the carving of religious texts on the mosques of the time and the 
pious inscriptions on their coinage serve further to reiterate the 
Fät. imid claim to exclusive spirituality. 
As the sole heir to spiritual authority and the fountainhead of 
knowledge - ähir (exoteric) and batin (esoteric) - the Eitimid 
Imam's foremost duty was to give impetus to Ismäeilism and to 
disseminate its precepts and doctrines. 
II Daýa; 
One of the most noteworthy ways in which the Fätimid ImRms 
fulfilled this obligation was to continue their patronage of the 
organisation which their predecessors had created in order to 
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establish a sophisticated political and doctrinal structure by 
which Ismäcillsm was able to gain widespread support and political 
success. 45 This organization was called the dacwa -a term based 
on the Qu'ran (LXI, 7), signifying a call or invitation to Islam. 
As Nanji has pointed out, although this institution was not unique 
to the Ismädllls, its skilful organisation by its highly 
accomplished representatives, the dä9is, gave it a very special 
character within Ismäcilism. The importance that the Rtimid 
Imams accorded the dacwa organization can be ascertained from the 
fact that they elevated the latter to a pillar of state. 
According to Lewis: 
The Fätimids organized them [the dä--is] into a third branch 
of government, with its own functions, structure and 
hierarchy, under the direction of the chief missionary and 
the ultimate authority of the Caliph in his capacity as 
Immmm. 47 
The Fätimid dal--wa operated in two concentric circles. Firstly, 
within the territorial domain of the Fätimids, where Ismäcilism 
was the state religion; secondly, outside their dominions where 
the Fätimid Imäms commanded the religious loyalty of groups of 
Ismäcilis who were sent out in advance to prepare the ground for 
the hoped-for ultimate Fätimid conquest. The main functions of 
the dacwa were: (a) administrative at the centre and within the 
Fä, imid empire, and (b) religio-political in other spheres of its 
activity outside the Fätimid boundaries. The aim of both of these 
functions was to consolidate and expand the Fätimid ideology and 
empire, although the first function worked in harmony with the 
established political authority while the second worked in 
opposition to it. 
48 
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II i Patronage of the daCwa by a1-cAziz 
In keeping with the tradition of the Fätimid Imäms before him, 
al-CAziz fostered various daCwa activities during his reign. In 
366/976, he appointed Qä411 al-NuCmNn's son, 'All b. al-NuCman to 
the dual posts of Q 4I al-Qud t (Chief QRd! ) and drAýI al-ducRt 
(Chief da-`i). He also made eAll responsible for the preparation 
and propagation of the mai lis al-culwn wa'l-hikma (lectures on 
religious knowledge and wisdom). 49 The dä9 nl-du'-ilt was 
responsible for the management of the daCwa within the boundaries 
of the Fätimid empire and beyond its frontiers. Broadly speaking, 
this amounted to control over the hierarchy of däcis; the 
training of the dRels; management of the dac 's finances; 
reading of the maj. lis al-bikma and taking the oath of allegiance 
on behalf of the Im5m. 50 
The renowned Fätimid patronage of learning and other intellectual 
pursuits extended to the realm of acquiring religious knowledge as 
well. A classic example of al CAziz's promotion of the daCwa 
occurred in 378/988. On the advice of his vizier Yacqüb b. 
Killis, al-cAziz assigned fixed stipends to thirty-five fu ahä' 
(jurists). These jurists were to hold study sessions and meetings 
in the Azhar mosque on Fridays between the midday and the Cater 
(late afternoon) prayers. In addition to their stipends, the 
fugahä' received a fixed sum from the vizier each year. They were 
also honoured by the Imäm on the two canonical festivals of cI, 
al-Fir and lid al-Adhä. Al-CAziz also permitted the fu ahfi' to 
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build a house for themselves next to the 'ämic. 51 The pattern of 
allowing the jurists to teach at thejämic al-Azhar followed a 
trend established by Ibn Killis. The fuqahä' who had originally 
lectured at the vizier's house were subsequently told to deliver 
their lectures at the mosque of 'Amr. 52 
The official sanction given to the fugahä' to teach in mosques by 
al-cAziz is viewed by some historians as being a forerunner to the 
founding of the där al-bikma by al-1jikim in 395/1004.33 
Thereafter, although the teaching and propaganda functions of the 
mosque did not completely cease, they were nonetheless 
foreshadowed by the activities of the d5r al-bilrmrý which 
flourished in the reign of al-$äkim. 
II ii The Azhar mosque -a centre for the dissemination of the 
da'--wa: 
The notion of the mosque being a centre of Ismäcili instruction as 
well as a place of prayer was reckoned by exponents of Ismacilism 
as a physical expression of the intersection of they ]sir 
(esotericism) and the bä in (esotericism). Qädi al-Nucmän 
explains in his Ta'wil al-Dacä'im that the mosque is a house 
(bait) where people gather to pray, but its esoteric meaning 
(bä in) is that it is the place where Ismaili believers gather 
for initiation to the dacwa. 54 
Soon after the Azhar mosque was founded, it functioned both as a 
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place of prayer as well as a centre of propaganda. In 365/975, 
for example, the chief a i, 'Ali b. al-Nucmän, dictated in the 
presence of an immense multitude at the Azhar, his father, Q1 I 
al-Nucmän's compendium of law "according to the Family of the 
Prophet", called al-Iarisär. 55 In the light of the above 
information, Bloom's statement that, "the establishment of the 
resident fuqaha' [at the Azhar in 378/988] marks the inauguration 
of the mosque's formal role as a teaching institution"56 needs to 
be revised; for long before that event the Azhar was an active 
participant in the propagatory activities of the dacwa. 
An extremely interesting feature of the Azhar is that it also 
functioned as a centre for the religious education of women. 
Al-Magrizi reports on the authority of al-Mu$abbiii! that the chief 
däci used to read out ma. Alis (lectures) to the men sitting on the 
chair of the daCwa in the Great Hall. Lectures for women were 
held in the chief dä9i's audience chamber. These lectures were 
called maiälis al-bikma (lectures on spiritual philosophy). Women 
of the court were lectured separately at the palace. 
57 
Sanders comments that she finds the idea of women gathering 
together for IsmaCili instruction sponsored by the state 
remarkable. 58 This is, however, totally in conformity with what 
one would expect. Bloom's research on the religious situation 
during the half century preceding the conquest of Egypt reveals 
that women had become increasingly involved in religious activates 
and that they were strongly represented among CAlid converts and 
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sympathisers. Egyptian society's penchant for the veneration of 
saints, coupled with a well-established tradition of female cAlid 
saints in Egypt such as Sacida Nafisa (a descendant of liasan b. 
cAll Abi Tälib and a daughter-in-law of ImRm Jacfar al-* diq), 
Umm Kulth m (Kulthtim bint al-Qäsim b. Mul}ammmad b. Jacfar 
al-$Ediq) and Saida Zainab (daughter of Imam Mu1 ammad al-B qir) 
encouraged the participation of women in religious life. 59 
The women of the Fätimid court were perceived by their subject 
counterparts as models of ideal behaviour. Women of al-CAziz's 
court, namely his mother Durzän and his sister Sacidat al-hulk, 
were both actively involved in the religious activities of their 
times. In Rama45n 366/976, for instance, DurzZin had the ramie at 
Qaräfa -a locus of female piety - completely renovated. 
60 When 
Sadidat al-Mulk's mother, that is, Durzän, died in Shawwäl 
386/November 996, the former spent a month at the grave to perform 
all the religious ceremonies and to finish the obsequies. 61. 
Moreover, the Fätimids, with their well-known enlightened attitude 
to knowledge, provided the perfect milieu for the Egyptian women 
to involve themselves in the quest for religious knowledge. 
II iii The Royal Palace -a Repository of Knowledge 
To the Ism-a'-Ills their Imam was, in Sander's words: 
not only God's explicit designee, but an emanation of Divine 
Light itself. He stood at the center of belief (Imrin). His 
palace, standing at the center of this walled city, was one 
visible expression of that idea. 62 
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One interpretation of al-Mudizz bringing the remains of the three 
preceding Fä imid Imams (al-Mähdis al-Q'im and al-Man$ür) from 
North Africa and reburying them in the royal palace at Cairo is 
, 
that the royal palace was a repository for the material remains of 
the line of Imams; and therefore of the spiritual knowledge 
(dilm) that resided in the Imam of the time. 63 
As Sanders has pointed out, however, the palace was not just a 
repository of knowledge: it was the centre of the dissemination 
of that knowledge too. This is evident in a number of ways. The 
palace was used by the chief däci as a place where he delivered 
ma. JRlis to the adepts. Al-Musabbi1i reports an instance from 
al CAziz's reign of the palace being used for this purpose. He 
states that the (i al-ßät Mubammäd b. al-Nudmsn sat in the 
palace to lecture on the sciences of the ahl al-bait (the family 
of the Prophet) according to the custom followed by him and his 
brother ('All b. al-Nucmän) in Egypt and their father in the 
Maghrib. 64 
Stern identifies these maialis as chapters of the Daaä'im 
al-Isläm. 65 The popularity of these lectures can be gauged from 
the fact that eleven people lost their lives due to 
overcrowding. 66 Al-Mu$abbi$i provides details concerning the 
maj1ilis held at the royal palace. According to him the da9i gave 
many lectures to different groups of people. He held separate 
ma, iälis for the awliy , 
67 for the elite and the high-ranking 
officials of the state, for those who were in the service of the 
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palace, for the common people and for those who were visitors. 
The women of the court were lectured separately by the dßC!. 
A1-Mu! ýabbi4l calls these lectures majAlis al-hilýrna (lectures on 
wisdom, that is, Ismacill theology). 
68 
Q541 al-Nucmän, who composed and conducted a number of the majiis 
al-bikma, states that the lectures were graded according to the 
level of knowledge of the audience. To the beginners was read the 
standard work of Ismäcili law, the Dacä'im al-Is15m. Once 
instruction concerning the zR ir, that is, the literal meaning, of 
religion was completed, students were introduced to its b in 
(inner meaning). Al-Nucmän composed the treatise Hudüd al-M. zcrtfa 
("Grades of Knowledge") for the intermediary course. He describes 
the work as follows: 
We based this book on the grades of explaining, for those who 
deny this, the proofs for the need of allegorical 
interpretation and for the existence of an inner meaning for 
religion; and of how one must gradually ascend on its steps. 
We have set out, for the use of intelligent men, allusions 
and indications for the inner meaning and the allegorical 
interpretation. 69 
Advanced disciples were given a course on the roots of the ttin. 
Both the Asäs al-Ta'wTl ("The Foundation of Allegorical 
Interpretation") and the Ta'wil of Daaä'im ("Allegorical 
Interpretation of the Da'ä'im") of al-rumen were utilised for the 
advanced course. 
The practice of reading lectures to the faithful began while the 
Fdtimids were still in North Africa. This is amply evident from 
the style of the compositions of Fäýimid writers such as Qä41 
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al-NuCmän, as well as from the content of his works. Ezzedin 
states that according to a semi-secret, unpublished Druze source 
cUmdat al cÄrifin by a fifth/eleventh century Druze writer 
Ashrafäni, majRlis were composed by the Fätimid Immums al-MuCizz, 
al-CAziz and al-U5kim. 
70 Hätim b. Ibrähim al-liämidi (d. 596/1199) 
has an appendix to his manuscript, Tanbih al-GhHfilin, a ma lis 
which he ascribes to the FR timid Imäm al-CAziz bill5h. 
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As is well known, attribution of religious treatises and 
compositions by members of a religious community to their 
spiritual head is a very common practice indeed. Moreover, due to 
the scanty information available on al-1ämidi and his work, it is 
impossible to verify his attribution of the ma lis to al-cAziz. 
It must also be noted that as an author writing at least a couple 
of centuries after the reign of al-cAziz, his sources of 
information - if indeed he mentions them - also need to be 
critically examined before the maRis can be positively identified 
to al-cAziz. 
Another facet of the palace's functioning as a repository of 
spiritual knowledge is that it housed the books of the famed 
Fätimid library, known as the khizänat al-kutub. Books had a 
special significance in Ismalili thought: they were reckoned to 
be a part of the rightful inheritance of the Im5ms - symbols of 
his spiritual authority. According to Shl'! belief, the rightful 
Imam inherited both the weapons of Prophethood (for example, the 
Prophet's sword) and its knowledge. The Imäm was, therefore, 
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entrusted with books (al-kutub), knowledge (9ilm) and the weapons 
(al-siläh). 72 
I 
Fätimid concern with books is illustrated clearly by an incident 
reported to have taken place in the reign of its first Caliph, 
al-Mahdl billäh (297/910-323/934). Al-Mahdi is reported to have 
been extremely remorseful at losing the books which contained the 
wisdom of the Imams, his ancestors. These books were stolen, 
along with other items, from his caravan as he was travelling from 
Syria to Ifrigiya in 296/909. A few years later, in 301-2/914-5, 
his son and heir presumptive recovered these books during his 
expedition to Egypt. So highly did al-Mahdi value these books 
that he is reported to have remarked that had an expedition been 
sent solely for the purpose of retrieving these books, it would 
still have been totally worthwhile. 
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In accordance with the esteem with which the Fätimids held the 
acquisition and dissemination of knowledge, al-cAziz had the 
khizänat al-kutub built in his palace. This acclaimed treasure 
trove of books was in the final instance destroyed by the Ayyübid 
ýalä$ al-Din. Al-Mu$abbil? i gives a lengthy description of the 
library which al-Magrizi has incorporated in his topographical 
work, Khitat. 
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A1-cAziz's keen interest in his library can be gauged from a 
report by his contemporary, al-Mu$abbiii (366-420/977-1029). The 
latter writes that the Kitäb al-cAin of al-Khälid b. Abroad was 
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once mentioned in the Fdtimid Caliph's presence as a prime source 
of language. Al-IAziz had some thirty odd copies of the work 
brought to him from his library, one of which was in the author's 
own handwriting. Similarly, once a man presented al-cAziz with a 
copy of al-Tabari's Ta'rikh which he had purchased for one hundred 
dinars. The Caliph ordered his librarians to bring him all the 
copies of the Ta'rikh from his library. Twenty copies of the work 
were brought to the Caliph including one in al-Tabarl's own 
writing. On another occasion Ibn al-Duraid's work KitÄb 
al-Jamhara received mention in front of al-CAziz. At his request 
his librarians brought him a hundred copies of the work from the 
Ehizänat al-Kutub. 75 
The promotion of the daewa, in a variety of forms, by the Imi m, 
the chief dä9i and his team of subordinate dis in the Fätimid 
capital Cairo, served as a model which the dads of the provinces 
of the Fa timid empire sought to emulate. 
II iv Provincial däcis 
The dads of the provincial capitals of the Fätimid empire were 
appointed to office by the chief dä9i in Cairo, and, as such, were 
under the latter's authority. Very little concrete information is 
available concerning the activites of the provincial dads during 
the reign of al-CAziz. Even their identities remain generally 
unknown. 
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One notable exception to the above observation is an excerpt found 
in Qä4i CAbd al-Jabbär's work, Tathbit dalä'il al-Nubuwwah76 This 
fiercely anti-IsmäCili chief Q541 of Rayy (d. 415/1024) includes 
in his section on the reputation of the Ismä9ili madhhab a list of 
d5 Is during the reign of al-CAziz. Stern first drew attention to 
this list in his article on the Fai;, imid dacwa. 77 He dates the 
Qati's work to 385/995. The passage reads as follows: 
I have told you about their former leaders. At the present 
time there are among them men like Abü Jabäla Ibrahim b. 
Ghassän, Jäbir al-Manüffi, Abu'l-Fawaris al-Ijasan b. Mubammad 
al-Mimädhi, Abu'l-I1usain Abmad b. Mubanmad b. al-Kumait, Abü 
Mubammad al-Tabari, Abu'l-ljasan al-Ualabl, Abü Tamim 
al-Ralbä3, Abu'l Qäsim al-Najjari, Abu'l-Wafi al-Dailami, Ibn 
Abi'l-Dis, Khuzaima, Abu'l I uzaima and AbQ CAbd Allah 
MUiammmad b. al-NuCmn. They are [based at] Cairo, al-Ramla 
Tyre, Acre, Ascalon, Damascus, Baghdad and Jabal al-Summäq. 7ý 
Of the long list of dä'-is quoted above, only a few can be 
identified by name from the sources. AbQ cAbd Allah Mubammad b. 
al-Nucman was the Chief QZli of Egypt from 374/984 until his death 
in 389/999. He was the son of the renowned Q WI al-Nucmän. His 
base of operations would, of course, be Cairo. 
The second dä3 who can be positively identified is Abu'1-Faw5ris 
al-Mimädhi. He was sent to Rayy as a dä 1 in al CAziz's reign, 
but was compelled to flee for safety from there, some time 
later. 79 While in exile the dä9i composed an epistle addressed to 
the people of Rayy. This risäla has been preserved in what Ivanow 
calls "that precious chrestomathy of early Ismä'ili works", the 
MaimiiC al-Tarbiya compiled by Hubammad b. Tähir b. Ibrahim 
al-rithi (d. 584/1188). From these it was apparently included 
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by Ijasan b. Nü1 b. Yusüf al-Bärüch3 (d. 939/1i533) in his work 
Kit-ab al-Azhär. 80 At the time when CAbd al-Jabbr wrote his work, 
al-Mimädh3 may well have been operating in one of the centres 
mentioned in the above report. No concrete information is, 
however, available on that point. 
The last däi who can be identified is Abu'l-Uasan al-ljalabi. 
Stern considers him to be Muhammad b. Ahmad al-1jalabi al--Qa4i; 
the dä i who transmitted al-Risäla al-Masibiya from al-MuCizz to 
Abu'l-Fawäris al-Mimädhi. 81 The dA'I's base remains unknown. 
CAbd al-Jabbdr's report highlights important information 
concerning Syria. Notwithstanding the much discussed82 
politico-military setbacks that the Fgtimids faced in their 
attempts to control Syria, the Ismäcill dacwa nonetheless 
flourished in its centres. The extent of Fatimid daCwa activities 
in Syria can be gauged from the fact that within a quarter of a 
century of the Fä4imid conquest of Syria, centres such as 
Damascus, Tyre, al-Ramla and cAsgalän had their own däcis. 
Stern has made a valid inference as regards Jabal al-Summäq - the 
mountainous region located south-west of Aleppo and north of 
MaCarrat al-NuCmän. He points out that Jabal al-Summmäq is the 
only district mentioned by CAbd al-Jabba-r. All the rest are 
cities. He concludes that the existence of a "rural" däci in the 
area suggests that Ismäcilism had spread in the villages there. 
He then highlights the fact that Jabal al-Summäq was an important 
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IsmäCili centre in the fifth/eleventh century. 83 
II v Ismä9ili DaCwa in non-Fätimid territories: 
Ismä ilism was the official religion of the Fätimid state. 
Ismäcili communities beyond the Fttt. imid borders kept in touch with 
the headquarters at Cairo from where they received instruction and 
guidance. It was one of the principal obligations of the dacwa to 
provide direction to the Ismälili fraternity abroad. 
A distinction needs to be drawn at the very outset of the 
discussion on the dacwa in non-Fät. imid lands during the reign of 
al-CAziz, between those places that formally acknowledged Filtimid 
rule and those where the dä is had converted segments of the 
population to Ismä9ilism. The pronouncement of the khu ha at 
Mecca and Medina in al-CAziz's name from 366/976 onwards belongs 
to the former category. So does the report that in Mul? arram 
382/March-April 992 the ];, hu ba was pronounced in the Fätimid 
Caliph's name at Mosul by its ruler Abü Duwwäd Mul? ammad b. 
al-Musayyib al-'Ugayli. 
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These formal allegiances to the reigning Fätimid Caliph by rulers 
of petty dynasties belong to the political arena. They have 
therefore been discussed in Chapter One under the section titled 
"Political overview of al-CAziz's reign". Of course, they may 
also reflect the religious sentiments of these rulers or at least 
perhaps of some elements in their states. Fätimid dacwa 
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organisation was indeed too widespread and active by this time not 
to have achieved at least that measure of success. Unfortunately, 
the primary sources of the time do not provide concrete 
information on the daCwa activities in these regions. No more 
will therefore be said about them in this context. Meanwhile, 
enough is known about the activities of the daCwa in Yemen, Sind, 
Kirman and Khwärazm to form a coherent picture. 
II v1 Yemen 
The Fätimid state was the outcome of the Ism5Cill cLacwa. The 
roots of the Ismä93li dacwa had been well entrenched in Yemeni 
soil. 85 Ismä'--ili sources contemporary to the events clearly 
reveal that Yemen had been earmarked by the future Fatimid ruler 
al-Mahdi as the country from which his uhür (emergence) was to 
take place. A turn of events in Yemen, particularly a rupture of 
relations between the two main dais there, made the Imrm choose 
Ifrigiya instead as the first base of Fätimid authority. 86 
once the Fä . imid Caliphate was established in the Maghrib, Yemeni 
dads continued to maintain close links with the daCwa 
headquarters at al-Qairawan. Challenged by protagonists of rival 
ideologies and weakened by internal dissension, the daCwa in Yemen 
suffered serious setbacks in the next few decades. Consequently 
the political power which pioneering dýis like Ibn Ijawshab and 
cAll b. al-Fain had fought so hard to achieve, slipped away from 
Ismäcill hands. The daCwa nonetheless continued to be conducted by 
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the dais there. 87 
By the time the fifth Fatimid Caliph, al-cAziz, acceded to power, 
the dacwa in Yemen had been in operation for almost a century. 
Very few details are, however, available on the dacwa activites at 
this time. The well-Down eighth/fifteenth century Yemeni dRci, 
cImäd al-Din Idris, mentions in his CUyün al-Akhbär, that däci 
Jar-far b. Abmad b. cAbbäs was succeeded by däci cAbd Allah b. 
Muhammad b. Bishr from the Wadi Qutaba, who proclaimed the dacwa 
in the name of al-CAziz billäh. He was followed by däci Muhammad 
b. Ahmad b. al-CAbbäs al-Shäwari. Then came däci 1iarün b. 
Muhammad b. Rahim, who initially preached for al-cAziz and then in 
the name of his successor, al-Häýim bi-amrilläh. Appointments to 
the post of the headship of the dacwa in Yemen were made by the 
Fä. imid Caliphs. 88 
Ismacili dacwa in Yemen benefited from an unusual quarter during 
the reign of al-CAziz. In 379/989-90 CAbd Allah b. Qat? tän b. cAbd 
Allah b. Yucfir invaded the Tihama, routed the rival Ziyadid army 
at Uaraz on the Wadi Sahn and then sacked Zabid - the ZýJa ý 
headquarters. On his return from this victorious campaign CAbd 
Allah declared the khutba in the name of the Fätimid al-cAzlz in 
all his'territories including $anca', Zabid and the TihRma. 89 
The fact that a member of the YuCfirid dynasty, who were both 
ideologically and politically opposed to IsmacIlism, proclaimed 
the khutba in the name of their adversary's Imäzn, appears quite 
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astonishing at first sight. In fact, CAbd A11äh b. YuCfir was 
related from his maternal side to the well-]moan Yemeni dä9i CAli 
b. al-Fa41.90 He appears to have secretly converted to 
IsmäCilism. After his political success cAbd Alläh took the 
opportunity to declare his beliefs openly. His subsequent actions 
bear testimony to the above premise. In 380/990 cAbd Allah led 
his loyal troops into the Mikhlaf Jacfar where his grandfather, 
cAll b. al-Faul had ruled for a long time. He hoped to resurrect 
the Fa4imid state there. He was, however, opposed by the 
inhabitants of the area. He then chose to establish his 
headquarters at Ibb, where he remained till his death in 
387/997-8.91 
It can be concluded from the above information that the dacwa in 
Yemen was certainly functioning, if not perhaps flourishing in the 
reign of al CAziz. The apogee of IsmVill dalu-a in Yemen was, 
however, yet to follow, in the time of the $ulaybid dynasty 
(439-532/1047-1138). 
II v2 Sind 
The earliest authentic account of IsmädIli dawwa activities in 
Sind is to be found in Q4 I al-r'u'nän's work on the beginnings of 
the dawwa and the inception of the [Fä. imid] state, "Iftita 
al-dawla wa ibtidä' al-dawla. According to the Q541, the chief 
dAII of Yemen, Abu'l-Qäsim b. Ijawshab - well-known by his title 
Man, ür al-Yaman - sent his nephew al-Haitham as a däci to Sind in 
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270/883.92 Thus twenty-six years prior to the pronouncement of 
the khutba from the pulpits of Ifrigiya, in the name of the first 
Fätimid sovereign, al-Mahdi billäh, the daCwa in Sind had already 
taken root. Precise information on the subsequent development of 
daCwa activities in the region are not available. The Q3di 
continues his above-mentioned report, however, by stating that 
al-Haitham converted many of the local inhabitants to Ism3Cilism. 
Daewa activities in the area seem to have flourished, for by the 
time of the fourth Fät. imid Caliph, a1-Mu-izz li-din Allilh the 
dacwa had infiltrated to adjacent localities like Gujarat and 
parts of the Punjäb. 93 According to al-Nufmän, the drºCwa had a 
substantial following in these areas. The Qi4i's contemporary, 
the geographer Ibn IIawgal, adds that the authority of the F5%imid 
ruler was recognised in Balüchistän as well. 94 
Politically the daCwa in Sind achieved success during the reign of 
al-MuCizz. The local däC! - whose name is not mentioned in the 
sources - succeeded in converting to Ismär'ilism one of the rulers 
of Sind. Thereafter, the sovereignty of al-Mucizz was publicly 
proclaimed and the khutba read in his name. The d1 further 
consolidated the recently acquired political power of the dacwa. 
The joint forces of the converted ruler and the dä9 were able to 
defeat a coalition of local rulers who had opposed them. The city 
of Mültän was then made the IsmäCili capital and its där al-hiira 
(place of migration). 95 
k 
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The religious views of the politically effective däci of Sind 
were, however, regarded by the exponents of the daCwa as being 
heretical, for he permitted the converts to Isms i lism to continue 
certain un-Islamic practices. As the dä9i died soon after as a 
result of a riding accident, the daCwa authorities did not need to 
take any action concerning the removal of the däli from authority. 
A new dß! 1, $alam b. Shaibän, was then appointed in 354/965 over 
the principality of Sind-96 
1Ialam adopted a much stricter line towards undesirable practices. 
As Stern points out, "not only was he intent on enforcing a strict 
Islamic orthodoxy in the conduct of the da0wa, but also went out 
of his way to destroy the famous idol of Multan. " lie also razed 
to the ground the temple which housed this idol and had a mosque 
built in its stead. 97 
During the reign of al-cAziz, daCwa activities continued unabated 
under the active leadership of däci 1alam b. Shaib5n. The latter 
also maintained regular contact with the dacwa headquarters in 
Egypt. A1-Mugaddasi who visited Mültln in 375/985, pointed out 
that its ruler was just and powerful, its inhabitants were Shiva 
and the khut was read there in the name of the Fätimid Caliph. 
He added that the affairs of the principality were conducted 
according to the instructions from Egypt - where envoys and gifts 
were sent regularly. 98 The above information is corroborated by 
another tenth-century writer, Q; cli cAbd al-Jabbär. He reports 
that: 
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At the court of the fifth (Fätimid Imärn, i. e. al-CAziz) there 
are many visitors from Khwarazm and M ltän and other 
countries carrying money and presents. 
99 
DäCi Valam ruled up to 376/986 when he died. He was succeeded by 
Shaikh Uamid - probably his son, who ruled until 387/997.100 
Ironically, the prosperity of Multän led to its conquest by Ma}}mid 
of Ghazna in 399/1005-6 and the consequent loss of political 
authority by the daCwa in the region. 
As for the factors that attracted the Filtimids to selecting Sind 
as a base for spreading their influence, its location on the 
extremely popular sea route, was of vital consideration. Because 
of its location Sind could, moreover, maintain close contact with 
the dacwa headquarters in Yemen. As hanji has pointed out, 
politically Sind offered an opportunity to establish a 
principality that would serve as a secure foothold in the eastern 
Muslim world. Ideologically, it would act as a stepping-stone to 
spreading Ism7a91l1 influence eastwards. 
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Another major factor was trade. Both Lewis and iiamdani's 
comprehensive research on medieval trade clearly indicates that 
the Fatimids were attempting to wrest the trade with India out of 
the hands of Baghdad. 102 Goitein's study of the Geniza documents 
reveals a predominance of merchants from North Africa involved in 
the trade with India. 103. Nanji succinctly sums up the argument: 
Admittedly, the little that we know of the history of 
economic activity in Islam and its influence on the political 
conditions of the time does not permit any substantial 
conclusions. We can be certain, however, that with the India 
trade becoming the backbone of the international economy of 
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the Islamic world, economic and social factors were important 
in Fätimid expansionism in Sind. 104 
That trade was an important vehicle for the dissemination of the 
IsmädIli dacwa is evident from the fact that communities under 
Fätimid influence were spread on the trade route along the 
southern shores of Persia, Makrän where the khutba was read for 
al-CAziz circa 378/988, and in Baluchistnn. 
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II v3 Kirmän and KhwUrazm 
Trade also appears to have been a major factor in the introduction 
of the Ismä9Ill dawa in commercially thriving areas of Kirmän and 
Khwärazm. 106 Writing , in 367/978, the fourth/tenth century 
geographer Ibn Ijawgal found the people of Kirmin professing the 
Maghribi (that is, the F44imid) dacwa. 107 Unfortunately, he does 
not provide any further information on the issue. Madelung notes 
that towards the end of the fourth/tenth century there was a 
resident Fä. imid drei at the town of Jiruft in Kirmän. 108 One 
conclusion that can be drawn from the above statement is that 
daewa activities must have progressed enough to justify the need 
for a resident dill in the region by that time. 
Similar is the case of Khwärazm. (F41 CAbd al-Jabbär mentions, in 
a report quoted above in connection with MÜltt. n, that gifts and 
money arrived regularly at the fifth Fatimid Caliph's court from 
Khwärazm. 109 This information cannot be corroborated from other 
contemporary sources. Yet there is no need to doubt the 
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information provided by the Qä4i. His work, Tathbit dale'i1 al- 
Nubuwwa, bears ample testimony to the fact that the Q 1i was 
extremely hostile to Ism5. Ilism. He would, therefore, have no 
purpose in providing the above information for the sake of 
propaganda. 
The above survey of da'--wa activities outside the Fätimid domains 
during the reign of al-eAziz, reveals that the däcls in the 
various regions of the Islamic world were actively propagating the 
Ismädili cause. These dä9is were generally trained at the dalwa 
headquarters in Cairo. Once in charge of their own areas, these 
dä9is maintained regular contact with Cairo. Yet they also 
exercised a fair degree of independence in matters pertaining to 
both the dacwa and dawla (politics). If a particular dä$i 
overstepped his authority or introduced innovations in religious 
matters, - however, steps were immediately taken by the central 
dacwa authorities to, replace him. The dacwa also had political 
ambitions. As Stern remarks: 
The far-flung mission, a unique feature of Ismä-11ism, was 
the clearest expression of the ambitions of the Fe timids to 
be much more. than the rulers of the territories which formed 
their empire. 110 
III The Promotion of Fätimid Rites and Law 
The mechanism of introducing Ismmeilism at the official level in 
Egypt was set in motion soon after Jauhar marched into Fust. üt on 
12 Shacbän 358/1 July 970. The process of doing so was 
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deliberately gradual so as not to antagonise the non-Ismi ili 
majority of Egypt. Al-Magrizi notes that while the reigning 
Fätimid Caliph's name was incorporated in the khutba immediately 
after the conquest, the actual Fa. imid formula of the khutba was 
introduced several months later, in Dhü'l-ljijja 
358/October-November 970; 111 and the Fätimid formula of the call 
to prayer (ädhän) later still, in Jumädä I 359/March-April 971.112 
Once al-MuCizz had arrived in Egypt, he initiated some more 
Fätimid rites and forbade the practice of Sunni ones. The Fitimid 
Imäm prohibited the recital of "sabbih bisml-Rabbik" (Sum 
DO VII) during the Friday prayer. He also abolished the t. akbir 
(pronouncement of Alläh-u-Akbar - "Allah is Great") after the 
Friday prayer. 113 Both these acts formed part of the Sunni 
ritual. 
The next Fätimid Imam, al-CAziz, was equally fervent in the 
administration of official Ismä9ilism in Egypt. In 370/980-1 an 
official decree was pronounced forbidding the performance of Sunni 
practices and prayers in Rama4an. 
114 According to al-Magr1z1, the 
recital of the tar9w1h (prayer(s) during Rama45n) was prohibited 
in all mosques throughout Egypt in 372/982-3.115 In Syria the 
tar5wi12 had apparently been stopped much earlier, for under the 
year 363/973-4 al-Dhahabi reports that at the beginning of Rama4an 
al-Mueizz issued orders abolishing the taräwi prayer there. 116 
Another significant step that a1-cAziz took in the "Ismailisation" 
of Egypt was to prevent cAbd al-Samic- and his sons from reciting 
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the khutba in 379/989. This powerful and well-established family 
of mu'adhdhins (preachers) were unwilling to pronounce the khu ha 
according to the Frltimid practice. Consequently they were 
replaced by Jacfar b. al-ljasan and his brother (whom al-Magrizi 
does not name). These brothers were to read the kh utba at the 
iämic al CAtiq and the . 
iämic al-Azhar respectively. 117 
The gradual but steady enforcement of Fatimid law was yet another 
means of introducing official Ismä9ilism in Egypt. At the time of 
the Fdtimid conquest the (ä4l at Fustät was a Malik!, Muhammad b. 
cAbd Allah Abü Tahir al-Duhli. }}9 was well established in his 
post, having served in that capacity since 348/959-60.118 Abü 
Tähir was allowed to continue in his post by Jawhar on condition 
that he pass judgements according to Ismädill law. The Q541 
agreed in principle but did not always abide by it in practice. 
Fatimid policy concerning legal matters appears to have hinged on 
gradually phasing out Sunni authority without, however, disrupting 
the state machinery. In keeping with this policy, Abi Tixhir was 
not dismissed, although his authority was curtailed considerably. 
A Maghribi Qäc1i called CAbd Allah b. Abi Thawbän, who had 
accompanied al-Mucizz to Egypt, was initially appointed to hear 
the grievances of the Maghribis. Later he extended his authority 
to judge the population of Fus. at as well. 119 Upon his death, 
al-Mucizz officially appointed 'All b. al-Nucmän as a gäýi. cAll 
heard cases in the ' niC al-CAtiq in Fustät where Abü Täihir also 
judged-120 There are other accounts as to where 'All judged 
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cases. According to Ibn al-Dawädarl, Ibn a1-Nucm3n acted as a 
judge in Cairo for the Maghribls. Al-Magriz3, on the other hand, 
mentions that both the qis heard cases in their own homes, a 
practice which, as Lev has remarked, seems rather unusual. 121 
Al-Nulizz's successor, al-cAziz, applied himself zealously to the 
enforcement of Fätimid law in his domains. Accordingly, he took 
certain measures to curb the ?i liki q61i's powers. He sought to 
do so by increasing 'Ali b. Nu'män's authority. In the official 
letter of appointment confirming 'Ali b. al-NuCmriºn in his post, 
was, therefore, included a clause which stipulated that it was 
sufficient for one of the parties involved in a suit to request 
the case to be brought before 'Ali for it to be heard by 'All and 
not by anyone else. 
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In $afar 366/September 976, less than a year after al-cAziz's 
accession to power, Abü Tähir tendered his resignation as the qii I 
of Micr. He had reached an advanced age and by this time suffered 
poor health and was semi-paralysed. Abü T&hir made a final bid to 
keep the giship in his family, however. When handing in his 
resignation to al-cAziz, the Qä(ýI requested that his son be 
appointed in his place-123 As Lev has remarked, it was an attempt 
that had little chance of success since al-CAzlz intended to 
introduce official Ismä'ilism more widely. 124 Yet adhering to the 
Fa. imid policy of gradually phasing out Sunni authority, al-CAziz 
had waited patiently for Abü Tähir to retire. The Fätimid Caliph 
then brought about some significant changes in the judicial 
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system. 
Al-cAziz centralized the judiciary. He vested all judicial 
authority in the hands of 'Ali b. al-NuCman. He even made cAll in 
charge of other aspects of Filtimid religious and secular 
administration. In a letter of appointment issued by the Fdtimid 
ruler, three days after the resignation of AbQ T5hir, cAll b. 
al-Nunn was appointed the ggdl al-gudvt (chief :i 1) of all 
Fätimid lands. He was also made the dRCl al-ducRt (chief d1t9i ) 
whose responsibility it was to perform religious rituals such as 
prayers and preaching. In the secular sphere of government, 
CAli 
was appointed as a supervisor of the mint and of weights and 
measures. 125 
Important modifications were also introduced in the administration 
of justice. From 366/976-7 onwards a separate judge was not 
appointed over Fustät. 
126 
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Moreover, Fätimid jurisdiction was 
extended to the provinces of the Caliphate as well. This took 
place when cAll b. al-Nucman appointed his brother Mubammad as the 
qWI of Tinnis, DamyRt and Far6ma. Mu$ammad, in turn, appointed 
his deputies in these areas. 
The "Ismailisation" of the judicial system did not impose a ban on 
the recruitment of non-Ismä'ilI jurists to legal posts. Ibn l3ajar 
al-'Asgalänl reports, for instance, that a Shäfi'i fagih was 
appointed as q54-1 by 'Ali b. al-Nucman. 128 It certainly meant, 
however, that non-Ismäcili judges too had to pronounce their 
judgements according to Ismäcili law. 
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The centralisation of the judiciary continued even after the death 
of "-Ali b. al-Nuten in 374/984-5. After Ali, his brother 
MUIIammad b. al-NuCmän was promoted to the post of aädi n1-qt. At. 
This latter was entrusted with the same responsibilities and power 
as his predecessor. In addition, Mu»amnad continued to appoint 
deputies at Timis, Damyät and Far5ma. 
129 Mu}Uammad appears to 
have subsequently appointed his brother Yabyä over these 
territories, for under the year 384/994 al-Magrizl mentions that 
Ya}? yä sent money, presents and gifts for the Ka%x from Timis, 
DamyULt and FarSma. 130 
That the enforcement of Ismäcili law was paramount to the Fetimid 
authorities of the time is evident from the following incident. 
The chief g541, Mul? ammad b. al-Nucmän, had appointed jurists to 
give fatwäs (legal opinions) according to the Ismi i li code of 
law. The jurists of one of the . 
iamic of Fustät refused to comply 
with this condition of the c17541. Mubammad immediately took firm 
action against the dissenters. 131 
IV Conversion to Ismi'IlIsm 
Fätimid concern with the introduction of Ismiiºdilism at the 
official level was not, however, part of the alleged Fätimid 
scheme of converting the population of Egypt en masse to 
IsmaIllism. Modern historians of the Fitimids often draw 
conclusions such as: 
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They [the Fä, imids] failed in converting the poulation of 
Egypt to Ismädilism. Egypt in the tenth-twelfth centuries 
was an Ismäcill state, but it was not an IsmäCili society. 
This assertion can certainly not be substantiated for the reigns 
of either al-Mucizz or of al-cAzlz. The gradual but thorough 
permeation of Fäjimid rites and law in the time of the first two 
Fätimid Imams of Egypt clearly reveals that once these two rulers 
decided on a certain course of action, they made every endeavour 
to translate that notion into reality. Had they decided on a 
policy of mass conversion then surely there would be some 
manifestations of this policy? 
The most powerful tool that the FL. imids possessed for religious 
propaganda was the daCwa. As is evident from the discussion on 
the da=wa earlier on in the chapter, this F 4imid organisation 
flourished during the times of al-Piucizz and al-CAziz. The 
activities of its dA$is are fairly well documented as well. Yet 
in the sources contemporary to the Fätimids one finds not even a 
hint to the effect that the dads were engaged in conversation at 
the grass root level. Instances of the chief d&91 reading out 
ma. iälis or even lectures on the ahl al-bait in the 'ämic al-Azhar, 
located in the Fätimid court capital, cannot clearly be classified 
as an example of conversion at the popular level. Nor, too, can 
the precedent of establishing resident fu ahä' at the Azhar by 
al-CAziz. 
This is not to say that the conversion of the masses was not one 
of the means employed by the daCwa to achieve its religious and 
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political ambitions. This method was certainly employed by the 
däcis of the Yemen and of the Maghrib in pre-Fi. imid days to 
procure support for the IsmR1111 cause. Conversion of various 
segments of the population was also the aim of the dncTs operating 
in territories outside the Fätimid fold. 
133 It does not appear to 
have been the object of the daCwa within the Ritimid domain, 
however. 
Consequently, the statement that the Fä , imids failed to convert 
the population of Egypt to Isms ilism is certainly invalid and 
unjust as far as the first two Fät. imid Im, Rms of Egypt are 
u 
concerned. These two rulers did not aim to make Egypt an Ismicill 
society". They did, on the other hand, strive to transform Egypt 
to an "Ismacili state" Accordingly, they took every step to 
ensure that the IsmVili code of conduct was adopted at the 
official level. Overt opposition to their official policies was 
consequently not merely frowned upon by the Fätimid authorities 
but liable to provoke immediate reprisals from them. 
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CHAPTER 4 
THE RELIGIOUS POLICIES OF AL-cAZIZ VIS-A-VIS THE 
NON-ISMA'ILI MUSLIMS AND THE AHL AL-Mb 
In the previous chapter the manifestations of al-cAziz's authority 
as an Ismäcill Imam and the measures he took to introduce 
Isma. cilism at the official level were examined. In addition to 
his role as an Ismäcili Imam, however, the Fatimid Caliph was the 
sovereign of a vast multi-religious and multi-cultural empire. In 
this capacity he had to formulate policies concerning the various 
segments of the population. This chapter will seek to survey the 
Fätimid ruler's strategy as regards his Muslim (non-Ismricill Shill 
and Sunni) subjects and the ahl al-KitRb (or the ahl al-Dhimna, 
"the people of the covenant of protection", that is to say in the 
case of Egypt, predominantly the Christians and the Jews). 
When the Fitimids conquered Egypt in 358/969, its society was 
truly pluralistic. The ahl al-Sunna formed the bulwark of the 
population. The judiciary was chiefly manned by them-1 There was 
also a significant non-Ism5. ili Shici population residing in Egypt 
by this time. 2 The financial and clerical bureaux were 
administered in the main by officials who hailed from the sizeable 
indigenous Christian population. The well-established Jewish 
community, equally fluent in Arabic as in Hebrew, formed the 
backbone of Egypt's active involvement in international trade and 
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commerce. 3 The Fdtimids, as the new rulers of Egypt, had 
accordingly to formulate policies to govern each of these distinct 
segments of the indigenous Egyptian populace, and to do so in such 
a manner as to form a cohesive whole. In this endeavour of 
theirs, the Fätimids proved successful. This can be ascertained 
from the pertinent remarks of Grunebaum to the effect that the 
lasting success of the Fätimids and perhaps even their victory 
over the Egypt of the Ikhshldids was largely due to their ability 
to build and maintain a pluralistic community, or, as Grunebaum 
qualifies his remark, it may be more accurate to speak of a 
pluralism of communities under one administration. 
4 
The Fä, imid approach to administering this "pluralism of 
communities" was based to a certain degree on laissez faire. As 
the preceding chapter has shown, the early Fä . imid rulers strove 
earnestly to establish Ismdcilism at the official level. The 
personal beliefs of their subjects notwithstanding, the first two 
Fätimid Caliphs, al-Mucizz and al-cAziz, do not seem to have made 
any attempts - persuasive or compulsive - to convert the masses to 
Ismäcilism. Consequently, the various religious groups within 
these territories were relatively free to practise their own 
faiths. Nonetheless, if any of these religious groups transgressed 
the limits set by the state in the public manifestations of their 
creed, they were at once censured. 
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I The ShI'a 
It is well known that by the time the Fätimids came to Egypt, the 
country had a large, resident Shill element. Not all of these 
Shiva were Ismäcill. In fact, the majority of them belonged to 
the Ithnä CAshari branch. The advent of the Fä, imids had positive 
implications for the Shia. Hitherto, they had been persecuted at 
times, not particularly at the hands of the Ikhshidids but more as 
a result of clashes with the Sunni majority. 
5 As far as the 
Fätimids were concerned, it was not in their interest to play off 
one group against the other. On the contrary, the Fitimids were 
proud of their own Shici heritage. Consequently, they were keen 
to display it. This was naturally to the benefit of all the Shill 
groups in Egypt as it drew upon their common heritage. 
The most distinct method that the first two Fä , imid monarchs of 
Egypt adopted to proclaim their Shicism was the public observance 
of religious festivals that were peculiar to the Shica . To this 
classification belong the observance of religious practices at 
times which the Shica regard as holy, in addition to Rama4än: the 
months of Rajab and Sha'bän. In the same category fall also the 
celebration of cId al-Ghadir and the commemoration of Imäm Ijusain 
b. 'Ali b. Abi Tälib in the form of cäshürä'. 
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Ii Celebrations of Rajab and ShaCban 
Fasting in the months of Rajab and Shan was considered as being 
as meritorious as fasting in Rama4iln by the ShTca . The beginning 
and the middle of each of these two months were, as a result, 
celebrated in the same manner as they were in Ramad n. The Friday 
nights of both of these months were also celebrated. 6 While 
reporting on the reign of al-CAziz, for instance, al-Magriz! 
states that the people used to go to the mosques on certain nights 
of these months.? 
The personal interest that al-cAziz took in the performance of 
good deeds in the months of Rajab, ShaCbän and Rama4än is evident 
from. the fact that he arranged for food to be served at the jämiC 
al-Qähira in these months. 8 The festivals of mid Rajab and mid 
Shacb n were not, however, marked by the personal appearance of 
the Caliph. These celebrations were usually led by the chief 
Q,! 4!, cAli b. al-NuCmän and later by his successor Mubarrm d b. 
al-NuCmän. 
9 
I ii c-Id al-Ghadir 
The events at Ghadir Hhumm are too well known to be repeated yet 
again. '0 Suffice it to say that the words uttered by the Prophet 
Mu$ammad, concerning the subsequent first ShICI ImFim cAli b. Abi 
Tälib on that occasion, formed the core of the Sh19i view of 
Imäma. Consequently, 18 Dhu'l-Hijja, the date on which this 
memorable event took place, was annually celebrated by the 
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numerous ShICI communities. 11 This occasion did not, however, 
attain the status of an official celebration until the 
fourth/tenth century. In 352/964 the reigning Büyid ruler at 
Baghdad, Mucizz al-Dawla, had the city of Baghdad decorated and 
fires lit at the mailis al-Shurta (police headquarters) to mark 
the occasion. l2. 
In Egypt the festival of Ghadir was earmarked for celebration by 
the Fätimids from the very year in which al-Mucizz took up 
residence there. Ibn Züläq recounts the first officially 
sanctioned celebration of this festival. On the 18th of 
Dhu' l-Ili j ja 362/September 973 a number of people from Fustat and 
the Maghariba (North African troops) gathered for ducä 
(invocations) as it was on that date that the Messenger of Alläh 
had conferred the 'ahd (covenant) on 'All b. TAlib, designating 
him the Amir al-Mu'minin (commander of the Believers) and 
appointing him as his own successor. 
Henceforth 1--Id al-Ghadir assumed the rank of an annual, 
state-sponsored festival in Fä%imid Egypt. 14 In his narrative of 
the reign of al-cAziz, for instance, al-Magrizi notes under most 
years that the cId al-Ghadir was celebrated in the usual manner. 15 
The grand celebration of the event of Ghadir I{humm was naturally 
encouraged by the Fä imids, who traced their lineal descent to 
'All b. Ab! Tdbib. As the avowed spiritual and physical heirs of 
the first Shici Imam, it was in FAtimid interests to revive 
annually the public proclamation of the latter's ImSm<aand Khiläfa 
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by the Prophet. The '-I provided the FA , imids with an ideal 
opportunity to express their own right to spiritual and temporal 
authority. 
I iii '--. shürä' 
The second specifically Shill occasion that was officially 
sanctioned for public observance in Fatimid Egypt was that of 
Cashürä'. The ruthless killing of Imam al-Husain b. Abi Talib at 
Karbala' in 61/680 on Cäshüra' (the tenth of Mu$arram), 16 by the 
Umayy-ad forces, so deeply shocked the Sh! ca of the time and of 
subsequent generations that to this day the majority of the Shic! 
groups commemorate the event. 
The martyrdom of Imäm al-ktusain had been observed in the form of 
processions by the ShiCa of Egypt since the Ikhshidid period. 
This event, however, often became a tool for the persecution of 
the Shia by the Sunni authorities. It also provoked the 
expression of anti-ShiCa feelings by the public. 17 Consequently, 
more often than not, the processions ended in violent clashes 
between the Shica and the ahl al-Sunna. 
With the Fatimid takeover of Egypt, the roles were reversed. 
There was a Shici dynasty in authority, which had every intention 
of publicizing their allegiance to Shicism. As a result, the 
observance of Cäshüra' was, from the very onset of Fätimid rule, 
"granted the nod of approval by a sympathetic government. "18 This 
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is amply evident from the first instance of the observance of 
Cäshürä' after al-Mu9izz's arrival in Egypt. Historians relate 
that in 363/973-4 the cäshürz; ' procession started from the 
traditional Shica centres of the mausolea of Salcda Nafisa and Umm 
Kulthtm. It then proceeded to Fus. iit, mourning al-Uusain. The 
crowd is then reported to have become violent. It disturbed the 
commerce in the markets, where clashes broke out. Perhaps the 
aggression of the Shidi groups was voiced as an act of vengeance 
against the former power of their persecutors. In any case, 
further clashes were prevented by the timely intervention of a 
high-ranking Maghribi officer, al-ijasan b. cAmm5r. 19. 
The observance of 19shürM was further solemnised in the reign of 
al-CAziz. In 366/976-7, the official mourning ceremony for InOun 
al-1usain, called ma'tam, was, for the first time in Egypt, 
officially incorporated into the observance of the Cishürl' 
festival. 20 The introduction of ma'tam in the time of al-cAziz 
was in keeping with the latter's overall objective of bringing to 
fruition the directives initiated by al-MuCizz in his short reign 
over Egypt. 
At the ideological level, the official observance of eäshüril' by 
the Fä4imids invoked in the believers' minds the themes of 
self-sacrifice, atonement and redemption which became such 
powerful forces in ShICI belief after Im-am al-I1usain's massaere. 21 
The occasion of cäshürR', like that of Ghadir, also served to 
stress that to attain salvation the intercession and guidance of 
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the Imärn were vital. Hence total obedience to the Imäm was of 
paramount importance. 
22 Ideologically, too, there were many 
favourable arguments for the Fätimids wishing to observe 
specifically Shl'! festivals. 
one interpretation of the official adoption of these festivals is 
that they formed the common ground among all denominations of the 
Shiva. They, therefore, presented an opportunity to the sizeable 
Shici population of Egypt to identify their cause with that of the 
ruling house. How the Fätimids sought to appeal, on the other 
hand, to the mainstay of the Muslim population, the ahl al-Sunna, 
will be discussed below. 
II The Ahl al-Sunna 
It is well known that Egypt, since its Islamisation, had been a 
bastion of Sunnism. The majority of the Sunni population of Egypt 
adhered to the Shäfi'--i and Miliki schools of law. The question 
then arises as to how the Fätimids, as the publicly proclaimed 
Imäms of the Shill Ismäcilis sought to appeal to the loyalties of 
their Sunni subjects? What policies did these rulers formulate 
concerning this single and largest class of people in their 
empire? As the focus of this thesis is on al-cAziz, more 
specifically then, how did al-CAziz'set about governing the ahl 
al-Sunna? 
To a certain extent the answers to the questions posed above have 
128 
been aired in the previous chapter in the discussion on the 
manifestations of al-CAziz's authority as the ImFm. As some of 
the points outlined there reflect theFät. imid Caliph's attitude 
towards the Muslims in general, they merit mention here as well. 
II i A1-cAziz's Leadership of the Muslim L. mr (community) 
The Fätimids perceived themselves as leaders of the Muslim xzrma. 
Accordingly, they diligently sought to perform the various duties 
that this post required. Al-cAziz proved to be particularly 
conscientious in this respect. Historians credit him with 
regularly leading the prayers on the Fridays of Rruna4Fin, on the 
two '-Iý and at the funerals of high-ranking state officials and 
close family members. He also personally delivered the khu bas on 
the CIJci al-Adhä and the c. Icl al-Fitr. Al-CAziz was, moreover, the 
first Fdtimid to break the fasts of Rama4an"with the people at the 
Z mic al cAtiq and to arrange for food to be served at the jamiC 
al-Qähira during the months of Rajab, Shacbän and R, am<actän. He 
also performed a number of charitable acts, as befits a good 
Muslim ruler. In addition, he commissioned the building of a 
number of religious structures. 23 These, in brief, then, are the 
deeds of al CAzäz which depict both his personal leadership of the 
umma and his authority as the Im5rn. 
There are certain other measures of al-cAzlz which shed light on 
his actions as Muslim leader. Al-Mu. 7abbi1i reports, for instance, 
that in 381/991 al-IAziz issued a decree ordering the abolition of 
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all things that Islam forbids. The historian then mentions a 
particular instance of an individual who attempted to contravene 
the official pronouncement. Consequently, fifty thousand jars of 
his, presumably containing alcohol, were destroyed. 24 Another 
example that sheds light on the F5timid Caliph's views on the 
leadership of the umma concerns the issue of heresy. Like his 
predecessor al-Mucizz, 25 al-cAziz too denied the belief of the 
divine nature of the Imäm. Nonetheless, this belief was very 
popular, particularly among the Kutäma Berbers. 
Under the year 369/979-80, al-Magrizi records that many people 
began swearing in the name of the Amir al-Mu'minin. It was 
publicly announced, therefore, that those who swore in al-cAzlz's 
name would be punished. The si. iill continued, "do not swear 
except by Allah alone. " This decree must have been firmly 
enforced, for al-Magrizi concludes the report by saying "the 
people stopped swearing" (in the name of al-cAziz). 
26 
II ii A1-cAziz's Policies Concerning the Ahl al-Sunna 
Not all of the Fätimid Caliph's policies pertaining to the ahl 
al-Sunna met with the latter's approval. 
27 That is not 
surprising, however. For al-cAziz was first and foremost an 
Ismä'-111 Imam who, as has been shown in the previous chapter, 
earnestly strove to introduce IsmäCilism at the official level. 
To that end he took certain measures that affected the Sunni 
community adversely. He had the Sunni practice of saying the 
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taräw3 prayers in Ran5n stopped, for instance. 28 In $afar 
385/March 995, almost towards the end of his reign, al-CAziz 
ordered that maledictions against the companions of the Prophet 
Mu1ammad, who were considered by the Shica to have been against 
cAll b. Abi Tälib and his progeny - be inscribed on the walls of 
the , Lamlc al-CAtiq and 
in several other places in Cairo and in the 
provinces. 29 
II ii 1 The M- likis 
Of all the Sunni madhähib (legal schools) al-cAzlz appears to have 
been most strict towards the Mälikis. In 381/991, for example, a 
man was beaten and paraded round the city as he was found to have 
possessed a copy of Malik b. Anas' work al-Muwatta. 30 Al-cAz1z 
was not the only Fä imid to have adopted a stern attitude towards 
the Malikis. As Canard has pointed out, the two immediate 
successors of al-cAziz, al-I3äkim and al-? ähir, adopted the same 
overall policy towards them too. 31 The reasons for this Fätimid 
attitude towards the Malikis can be clearly ascertained. 
As the M 1ikis had occupied influential posts in the Egyptian 
state mechanism well before the Fä, imid takeover, they felt 
powerful enough to challenge the Fätimids. Consequently, the 
latter attempted to curb their authority. The first Chief q 4i of 
FA timid Egypt, who served in the reigns of al-Mucizz and al-CAziz, 
is a case in point. So powerful was this Mäliki q9.4 that the 
Fätimids felt it unwise to remove him from this extremely 
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prestigious post. Eventually the gg4li tendered his resignation 
due to ill-health and old age, whereupon he was at once replaced 
by an Ismälill q W1, CAli b. al-NuCm-an. 32 
II iii The Grievances of the Ahl al-Sunny 
If, on the one hand, the powers of the ahl al-Sunna were kept in 
check, their grievances, on the other hand, received serious 
attention from the Fgtimid authorities. The impression that the 
secondary sources generally present of the early F timids is that 
they unreservedly favoured the ahl al-KitFib to the exclusion, and 
sometimes even to the detriment, of the ahl al-Sunna. While 
speaking of the first Fitimid vizier, Ibn Hillis, who had been 
appointed by al-cAziz, Goitein, for example, remarks that Ibn 
Hillis made copious use of his former coreligionists (i. e. Jews) 
as well as the Christians in the administration of the provinces 
and that this policy was continued by his Christian successor, who 
appointed a Jew as his deputy in Syria. Goitein's statement gives 
the false impression that the top brass of the Fätimid 
administrative apparatus consisted of Jews and Christians only. 
Moreover, Goitein states that dIsä succeeded Ibn Hillis as vizier. 
In reality there were five other viziers who were Muslims and who 
followed Ibn Hillis prior to cIsä's appointment to the post. 
This observation is particularly applied to the reign of 
al-IAziz. 33 A well documented episode from his reign will clearly 
reveal, however, that this was not the case. 34 The fullest 
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account of the incident has been provided by Ibn Zäfir. He states 
that the Muslims became extremely concerned when the Christian 
vizier, CIsii b. Nestorius and his Jewish deputy in Syria, 
Manashshä b. Ibrahim, began to favour their own co-religionists. 
These two ministers expelled Muslim scribes and other officials, 
replacing them instead with members of their own communities. The 
Muslims decided to draw the Caliph's attention to the injustice 
done to them. They wrote a note to him saying: 
O Amir al-Mu'minin. 0 you who strengthen the Christians 
through CIsä b. Nestorius and the Jews through Manashshd b. 
Ibrähim and humiliate the Muslims. Will you not see to my 
affairs? 35 
The note was then thrown at al-CAziz's feet as he rode past. He 
was very perturbed by its contents. He consulted his chief g541 
at the time, Mul}ammad b. al-Nucmän, on the matter. He admitted to 
the fact that the Muslims had been wronged. Immediately, 
therefore, al-cAziz had both cIsit and Manashsha arrested and 
imposed very high fines on them. He also had all the former 
Muslim scribes and officials restored to their posts. Eventually 
al-cAziz agreed to reinstate cIsä to his former position, under 
the stipulation, however, that the vizier engage the services of 
the Muslims in his administrative bureaux. Ibn fir concludes 
his report by saying that henceforth al-cAziz maintained a close 
surveillance on cIsä. 36 
In terms of the Fätimid Caliph's concern for his Muslim subjects, 
the incident speaks for itself. Al-CAziz was a humane person who 
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was generally averse to any kind of injustice. This fact is borne 
out time and again through various other incidents that took place 
in his reign. 37 Like the other segments of the population, the 
ahl al-Sunna too knew they could address their complaints to 
al-CAziz, who would seek to redress them. 
III The Ahl al-Kitäb 
The Fä . imid attitude towards the Christians and the Jews 
has 
received a great deal of attention from modern historians. 
38 The 
overall impression given by the majority of these writers is that 
the Fätimid Caliphs adopted a very liberal attitude towards the 
ahl al-Dhimma As a result, the latter rose to prominence and 
often occupied key posts in the state bureaucracy. The truth of 
the matter is, however, that the ahl al-Dhimma had become well 
established in the Egyptian administrative structure prior to the 
Fätimids' arrival. It is well-known is the fact that the 
Christians and the Jews of the various Islamic lands excelled in 
the administrative and commercial spheres to which they had access 
and which they regarded as being financially rewarding. Not 
surprisingly, then, by the time the Fät, imids arrived in Egypt and 
took over Syria, the ahl al-Dhimma formed a large and prosperous 
segment of the population. 
It is true that there were more restrictions imposed upon the 
Dhimmis in Ikhshidid39 times than during the reigns of al-Mul-izz 
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and al-cAziz - the heyday of the ahl al-Dhimma. An important 
faactor must be borne in mind in this connection. The Ikhshidids, 
0 
though politically independent, were nonetheless reliant on the 
Sunni cAbbäsid Caliphate for religious legitimacy. They were 
therefore compelled to react to the views, justified or otherwise, 
of the ahl al-Sunna at large, concerning the ahl al-Dhimma. As 
spiritual and temporal rulers in their own right, the Ftimids did 
not have that constraint. 
Goitein questions the liberalism of the Fä . imids. 
40 Ile asserts 
that the comparatively liberal spirit of the period was not of 
Fätimid choosing but due to the fact that they represented only a 
small minority among the Muslim population. This contributed to a 
trend of tolerance in their conduct of government and to a general 
leniency towards other minority groups. 
The validity of Goitein's statement needs to be questioned. First 
of all, the premise that because the rulers of a particular 
dynasty belong to a minority group they, as a matter of course, 
dealt tolerantly with other such groups, is totally invalid. 
Examples of such rulers acting, on the contrary, most 
autocratically with other minorities, are to be found not only in 
the annals of Islam, but in world history too. 
Secondly, Goitein's remarks imply that as the representatives of 
one of the numerically smaller branches of Islam, the Fätimids 
perhaps did not dare to antagonize the other communities of their 
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realm. Hence, they had to exhibit more tolerance towards these 
communities. This assumption is not correct either. For the 
Fätimid Caliphs, especially al-Mu9izz and al-cAziz, were in total 
command of their territories and their subjects. Examples cited 
earlier concerning the measures that al-CAziz took to check the 
increasing authority of the ahl al-Sunna41 bear ample testimony to 
the fact that the Fätimid ruler did not "tolerate" things that he 
did not wish to. The instances cited below of the measures that 
the first two Fätimids of Egypt took to limit the power of the ahl 
al-Dhimma reiterate the point further. 
III i A1-Mul--izz's Attitude towards the Ahl al-Kit5b 
The ahl al-Kitäb fared extremely well, on the whole, during the 
brief reign of al-Mucizz over Egypt. His policies concerning the 
Christians and the Jews are evidence of this fact. Al-Mucizz has 
been credited with granting permission for the restoration of the 
church of al-MuCallaka at Fustät. Despite severe opposition from 
one particular Shaikh, who vowed to die rather than allow the 
church to be repaired, al-MuCizz saw to it that the church was 
fully repaired. 42 This episode should not be misconstrued to 
deduce that the Christians were given a free rein in Fätimid 
times. In twentieth century terms the above incident can perhaps 
be termed as an example of the maxim "freedom to practise one's 
own religion" as exhibited by the early Fätimids. 
Although al-Mucizz safeguarded the rights of the ahl al-Kitäb, he 
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simultaneously set strict limits on what was permissible to them 
and what was not. Severus Ibn al-Mukaffä' -a Christian writer 
contemporary with the early Fätimids - reports at length on an 
instance of a Muslim who turned Christian. The matter was brought 
to al-Mucizz's attention. The Caliph ordered the youth to recant. 
The latter refused repeatedly, whereupon he was publicly 
beheaded; 43 his example acting as a severe deterrent to others 
who may have contemplated a similar move. 
As a person who was deeply versed in his own religious tradition, 
yet interested in other faiths, particularly the revealed ones, 
al-Mucizz encouraged the learned men of Islam, Christianity and 
Judaism, to hold dialogues and discussions in his presence. 44 
These were held in a generally amiable atmosphere; rude and 
unjustified remarks about other faiths not being permitted. 
Sessions of Jewish-Christian dialogue were also encouraged by 
al-Mu'izz and were often held in his court. A well known example 
of rivalry between the Christian and the Jewish groups, the former 
being represented by Patriarch Ephraim and the latter by Moses, 
came to light at one of these sessions. 45 
As is well known, the ahl al-Dhimma of the time excelled in 
administrative skills. Al-Mu9izz sought to take advantage of 
that. He accordingly appointed a Christian, Quzmän b. Minä 
(Cosmas ibn Menas) as one of his chief advisors on financial 
matters. He then nominated Quzm5n as the official responsible for 
the collection of khargi in Egypt. 46 The latter served in that 
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capacity until the accession of al-cAziz. 
III ii Al-cAziz and the Ahl al-Kitäb 
In principle, al-CAziz pursued the same humane but firm policies 
towards the ahl al-Kitäb as his father had done before him. An 
issue that needs to be aired at the very outset of the discussion 
on al-cAziz's attitude towards the Christians and Jews, concerns 
the first Fätimid vizier Yahüb b. Killis. The vizier's biography 
is extremely well documented in the sources. It has also received 
sufficient attention from modern historians so as not to require 
any further discussion here. 
47 
The one facet of Ibn Killis' life that needs to be commented on, 
however, concerns the religious persuasion of the vizier. Apart 
from the notable exception of Lev, the majority of the 
orientalists who touch upon the career of Ibn Killis, advertently 
or otherwise, harp excessively on the vizier's links with Judaism. 
These writers uncritically assimilate information from some of the 
biased Christian and Jewish sources. 48 They then present Ibn 
Killis as a great champion of the Jews merely garbed in the cloak 
of Islam. Mann and Fische149 are particularly guilty of pursuing 
this line of thought. In discussing the personal frictions 
between the Coptic Patriarch Abraham and Ibn Killis for example, 
the overall impression given by Mann is that it was essentially a 
tussle between Christianity and Judaism; Abraham representing the 
former and Ibn Killis the latter. 50 
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Mann in fact goes to the extent of remarking that Ibn Killis died 
a Jew and was only outwardly a Muslim. He then adds that Muslim 
sources deny this assertion. 51 Not surprisingly, for the sources 
are crystal clear that Ibn Killis converted to Islam in the days 
of Käfur the Ikhshid. 52 How sincere his motives were for 
conversion is hardly a matter for us to judge. Yet even on that 
point historians such as Ibn Khallikän and Ibn Taghribirdi stress 
that from the time of his conversion Ibn Killis was a good Muslim 
and that he often passed his nights in the recitation of prayers 
and the reading of the r'Sn. 
53 Moreover, Lev is justified in 
remarking that it is impossible to question Ibn Killis' total 
absorption not only in the Fä, imid cause as a political movement 
but also with Ismacilism as a creed. 54 
This is amply borne out by his deep involvement in the religious 
sphere of the IsmäCili community, particularly during the reign of 
al-cAziz. The vizier was sufficiently learned in Ismalill fight 
for instance, to write a book on the subject. 55 He based this 
work on the dicta of al-cAzlz and his predecessors. In Rama4; n 
369/June-July 980 he read this work to a large audience of learned 
men assembled at his house. According to Ibn Khallikän and 
al-Magrizi, the book was thereafter used by the ftýä' of the 
jämic al CA, iq as a source of legal opinion. It was also taught 
there as a standard work on Ismädili jurisprudence. 56 
In addition, it was on Ibn Killis' advice that al-CAz established 
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resident fugahä' at the Jämil al-Azhar in 378/988-9. Every Friday 
these fugahä' gave lectures on Isma"11i law at the mosque. The 
vizier even contributed financially towards the maintenance of 
these fugahä'. 57 Ibn Killis' patronage extended to other mosques 
as well. It was on his order that the maintenance and 
redecorating work was carried out at various mosques. 58 
Finally, as Lev has pointed out, even the intimate, highly 
sensitive religious59 secrets of the dynasty, such as the 
genealogy of the Fä imid Caliphs, were not hidden from Ibn Killis. 
In 371/981-2, in response to the Büyid ruler cAciud al-Dawla's 
enquiry concerning the genealogy of the Fätimids, it was Ibn 
Killis who, in conjunction with al-cAziz, put the FAtimid 
geneology on paper. 60 The vizier was also responsible for the 
publicity for the newly prepared document. 
The vizier's commitment to this issue did not end there. When, 
for example, the Fätimid genealogy was read out from the pulpits 
of Damascus, it was scorned by one of the ashräf called IIamza b. 
cAll al-1usain al-Sharif Abu'l-llasan al cAlawl. The sharif was 
immediately arrested on the orders of Ibn Killis and exiled to 
Alexandria, where he died some time later in either 379/989-90 or 
380/990-1.61 
The above discussion of Ibn Killis clearly reveals his total 
absorption in the religious atmosphere of the Fätimid age. In 
view of this evidence it is rather unjustified of writers like 
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Mann to assert that Ibn Killis was only outwardly a Muslim. As 
for the contention that the vizier promoted his former 
co-religionists, that is the Jews, to powerful posts, only two 
names spring to mind in this connection - al-Fain Ibn $älib and 
Manashshä (Mennasse) b. Ibrahim b. al-Qazzäz. The former was 
appointed a äa 'id (high ranking military official) by the 
vizier. 62 The latter, on the other hand, held an important post 
in the Syrian administration in 370/981.63 Both these men were 
appointed to other government posts by al-cAzlz after the death of 
Ibn Killis. 64 The reappointment of the two men makes it obvious 
that they had been chosen on the basis of merit and not religion. 
Moreover, the point is often made that the Christians and the Jews 
possessed administrative skills. It was the job of the vizier, as 
the highest administrative official in the state, to appoint the 
most able people to administrative posts. It does not 
automatically follow, then, that because the appointee was a Jew, 
Ibn Killis was favouring the Jews. The one topic, therefore, that 
will not be discussed under the heading of ahl al-Dhimma is Ibn 
Killis' supposed favouritism of, to use May's term, his "ehemalige 
Glaubens - genossen"65 (erstwhile fellow confessionists), that is, 
the Jews. 
III iii The Personal Touch of a1-cAziz 
Al-cAziz undertook a number of measures to maintain his direct 
hold over the ahl al-Dhimma. In this connection, for instance, 
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the Fätimid Caliph personally appointed to office the Patriarchs 
of the Melkite Church. 66 Like his father, al-CAziz also sought to 
safeguard the interests of the ahl al-Dhimma, so long as these did 
not infringe upon the rights of other segments of the population. 
He accordingly permitted Patriarch Ephraim to restore the church 
of St. Mercurius in Fuse,. The Caliph even offered the Patriarch 
the funds necessary for the repair of the church; funds which, 
according to the Christian sources, the Patriarch politely 
declined. 
Over the years the church had fallen into ruin and had 
subsequently been used as a warehouse for storing sugar cane. 
When the Patriarch began the restoration, some of the local people 
offered resistance to him. Al-'Aziz acted in a manner reminiscent 
of what his predecessor, al-Mucizz, had done in a similar 
situation. He commanded a group of his mamltiks to stand guard at 
the site and to repulse anyone who attempted to hinder the repair 
work. 67 The extremely humane attitude of both al-MuCizz and 
al-CAziz towards the repair of churches in fact led the rather 
biased Christian writer Severus Ibn al-Mugaffä' to remark that in 
the reigns of these two monarchs, "there was great peace for the 
churches. "68 
Some of the most prominent people engaged in the personal service 
of the Caliph al-CAziz hailed from the ahl al-Dimma. The 
Christian doctor, Abu'1-Fat}} Man§ür b. Muqashshir, for example, 
was appointed by al-cAzlz as his personal physician and as such 
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was well respected by him. Al cAziz's successor, al-iäkim, also 
engaged the services of the same Abu'(-Fair} as one of his 
physicians. 69 
III iv A Christian Vizier - the Case of CIsä b. Nestorius 
Al-cAziz's liberal attitude towards the ahl al-Dhimma can be 
discerned from the fact that a Christian katib70 (scribe), cIsü b. 
h'estorius, was appointed to the highest administrative post - that 
of the vizier, in Dhu'1-Qacda 385/December 995.71 As Canard and 
Grunebaum have pointed out, however, the most powerful of the 
Büyid amirs and a contemporary of al-cAziz, CA4ud al-Dawla, also 
entrusted a Christian with the office of vizier. This trend was 
even occasionally adopted by the "champions of Sunni orthodoxy", 
the Saljuqs. 72 
On the other hand, the Ritimid Caliph's sense of fair play at once 
came to the fore when 11sä abused his authority. The latter was 
accused of appointing, to the exclusion of all others, men of his 
own faith to key administrative posts. No sooner had this fact 
been brought to al CAziz's attention than he had both the 
Christian vizier and his Jewish deputy in Syria, Ibn Menasseh, 
arrested. He imposed heavy fines on them both. Only at the 
intercession of al-cAziz's daughter, Sacidat al-hulk, was cIsä 
eventually reinstated in his former post. 'Isä could not step 
into office again, however, until he had agreed to abide by the 
stipulation that he would appoint Muslims to the various 
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administrative posts. In addition, henceforth, al-cAziz is noted 
to have maintained a close surveillance over the Christian 
vizier. 
III v Limitations of the Ahl al-Kitab 
The imprisonment of CIsä and Menasseh by al 'Azlz is illustrative 
of the fact that like the rest of the populace, the ahl al-Dhimma 
too had to conform to certain rules. If they transgressed these 
regulations, punishment was imminent. A1-Magrizi mentions an 
incident concerning the ahl al-Dhimma which reiterates the above 
point. He states that some Christians went to al-cAziz and made 
certain requests73 to the Caliph, apparently on the basis that 
they were from the ahl al-Dhimma. Al-cAzlz is reported to have 
been extremely annoyed at them and threatened to punish them. As 
one of the persons involved claimed to be very poor, al-CAzlz gave 
him a sum of twenty dinars. He, however, forbade them from ever 
returning in that manner. 
Apart from instances of restrictions imposed on individuals of the 
ahl al-Dhimma certain constraints were also imposed on them as a 
community. In 367/977, the second year of al-CAzlz's reign, for 
example, a decree was issued which prohibited the Christians from 
participating in the rituals of Epiphany (cId al-ghit"5s). 74 In 
381/991 another official pronouncement forbade the Christians from 
celebrating the festival of the Cross (CId al-Salib). 75 As Lev 
has pointed out, however, these decrees can be interpreted as a 
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reflection of the general tendency to fight moral laxity. For, as 
al-Magrizi explains, many vile practices (munkariit), which were 
"beyond description", took place at these festivals. 76 
Moreover, the Christians were not permanently banned from 
observing their holy days. Thus, for instance, in 382/992, the 
very next year after they had been prohibited from the celebration 
of the Festival of the Cross, the Christians were permitted to 
celebrate that particular occasion. 77 
Goitein makes some pertinent remarks as to how the ahl al-Dhimma 
viewed the restrictions imposed on them by a Muslim government. 
According to him, the Christians and Jews regarded it as natural, 
if somewhat burdensome, that certain limitations were imposed on 
them by the Muslim community in the midst of which they lived, but 
to which they did not belong. He then adds that the ahl al-Dhimma 
also discriminated against the Muslims. Thus, as a rule, they 
would certainly not feel obliged to provide for the poor among the 
Muslims or to ransom their captives. 78 
As the leader of the empire, al-cAziz also had the duty of 
safeguarding the rights of the ahl al-Dhimma. 79 This he did with 
vigilance as the following incident reveals. As part of the war 
preparations against Byzantium, al-cAziz had authorised cIsä to 
construct a massive fleet. The fleet was to set sail on Friday 23 
Rabic II 386/15 May 996. On that very day fire broke out in the 
Cairo arsenal, destroying most of the ships. The populace of 
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Cairo suspected the Byzantine residents of starting the fire. So 
they attacked them and looted their belongings. In the chaos that 
ensued, a couple of churches were plundered and a bishop was 
severely injured. Al-CAziz at once took steps to restore order. 
He accordingly ordered '-Isä to attend to the matter immediately 
and to deal with the malefactors with an iron hand. As a result, 
most of the loot was recovered and tranquillity restored. 80 
Grunebaum's remarks on the Fätimid approach to the various 
communities of their empire aptly sums up this chapter. He states 
that the political and cultural success of the Fä, imids was due to 
their unusual capability to utilise to best advantage all the 
groups, classes, and communities of their lands regardless of race 
or creed. 81 He then asserts that the Fätimids may not have 
treated all alike and as equals - one with the other - but that 
they deallt with them equitably as equity was then understood. In 
Grunebaum's words, then: 
All praise is due the Fä4imids for having known how to induce 
the communities under their sway to develop their courage and 
enterprise and to preserve their intellectual Elan without 
damaging that unity of the larger community which hinged on 
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CHAPTER 5 
FATIMID DIPLOMACY WITH THE CABBASIDS AND BUYIDS 
IN THE REIGN OF AL-cAZIZ 
The Fä4imid conquest of Egypt in 359/969 and the subsequent 
extension of their power into Syria and the IJijäz signified a 
major step forward in their avowed quest to conquer the heartlands 
of Islam. Their ultimate political ambition was to depose the 
cAbbäsid Caliphate and take the reins of government of the entire 
Muslim umma into their own hands instead. 
The arrival of the Büyid prince Mu'izz al-Dawla at Baghdad in 
334/945, and his assumption of total secular authority, 
dramatically altered the status of the already weakened CAbbdsid 
Caliph to that of a mere titular head of state. Throughout Büyid 
rule in Baghdad - that is until 447/1055 - and later, the function 
of the cAbbäsid Caliphs was restricted to representing the 
religious headship of Sunni Islam and acting as the legitimising 
force for the numerous secular rulers who exercised effective 
sovereignty both in the provinces as well as in the capital 
itself. 1 The FS timid rulers went a step further than the Büyids. 
They were the first dynasty who felt powerful enough to deny even 
titular authority to the CAbbäsids. On the contrary, they founded 
a Caliphate of their own, thus challenging the r-Abbäsids for the 
religious leadership of the whole Islamic world. In the realm of 
secular affairs, however, an examination of Fdtimid relations with 
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the centre of the Islamic world involves, in reality, an 
evaluation of their interaction with the Büyids - the custodians 
of actual authority at Baghdad at the time. 
I Büyid Origins and History up to the Takeover of 
Baghdad by CAdud al-Dawla 
The Biayids were a dynasty that originated from the southern shores 
of the Caspian sea, from the region of Dailam. 
2 The people of 
this area were relative late-comers to Islam, having resisted a 
number of attempts at Islamisation in Umayyad and '--Abbasid times. 
it was not until the late third/early fourth/eighth-ninth 
centuries that large numbers of Dailamis converted to the Shi--i 
branch of Islam. The impetus for this mass conversion was 
provided by the arrival of a Zaidi Imam, al-ijasan b. Mu$ammad b. 
Ismacil b. al-Fasan b. Zaid, and the subsequent establishment of 
an cAlid state by him and his successors in the neighbouring 
province of Tabaristan. 
3 
The Büyids were one such Dailami family who embraced Shi'ism at 
this time. They were of humble origins. Charged with the 
characteristic zeal of new converts, the Büyids formed part of the 
large number of Dailamis who enlisted in the armies of the Muslim 
East, including those of the CAbbäsid Caliphate. The founders of 
the dynasty, Abu'l-Fasan 'All b. Büya and al-Ijasan, initially 
distinguished themselves in the forces of one of their compatriots 
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Makin b. ICäki who was supported by the Sämänids. The Büyids then 
joined the Gilani Mardäwij, in the latter's struggle against the 
Zaidi state of Tabaristän. Gradually Mardäwij carved out for 
himself a vast autonomous principality in central Iran. Confident 
of his own ability, 'Ali b. Büya declared his independence from 
his previous master by occupying I: ýfahän in 321/933. 
Subsequently, he extended his authority over the entire province 
of Fars. 
Having thus become the ruler of Fars, cAli, in order to protect 
himself from Mardawij, and in spite of being a Shici, secured 
ratification of his authority from the Sunni CAbbäsid Caliph at 
Baghdad. "All was well aware of the Caliph's inability to oppose 
him. He therefore did not send the tribute which he had promised 
the Caliph in lieu of the latter's recognition of his rule over 
Fars. Subsequently, 'All b. Büya had the Caliph confer on him the 
title of CImad al-Dawla. In the meantime, one of cAll's brothers, 
al-lIasan Rukn al-Dawla, extended his sway over almost the whole of 
the Jibal. The youngest of the three brothers, A1mad, Mucizz 
al-Dawla, entrenched himself in Rirmän and Khuzistän. 
It was the last of the above Büyids, Mucizz al-Dawla, who finally 
exerted Büyid domination over Iraq. He triumphally entered the 
capital city of the CAbbäsids in 334/945 and assumed total 
authority. He even felt powerful enough to depose the reigning 
cAbbäsid Caliph, al-Mustakfi, and replaced him with another member 
of the CAbbäsid family, granting him the title al-Music lilläh. 
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(Obedient to God). The title that the first Büyid emir of Baghdad 
bestowed on the cAbbäsid Caliph clearly reflects the general Büyid 
attitude towards the CAbbäsids. The Büyid amirs viewed the 
cAbbäsid Caliphs as being subservient to them. Consequently, they 
accorded very limited authority to them. 
4 
As the eldest of the Büyids, 'Imäd al-Dawla, had no heir of his 
own, he appointed instead the eldest son of Rukn al-Dawla, called 
Fannä-khusraw, cA ud al-Dawla, as his successor. Upon CImäd 
al-Dawla's death in 338/949, CA4ud al-Dawla, though then aged only 
thirteen, became the ruler of Färs. 5 Over the years he steadily 
consolidated his power and extended his dominions considerably. 
In 356/967 Mucizz al-Dawla - the reigning Büyid at Baghdad - died. 
Prior to that, however, he appointed his son Balditiyär, cIzz 
al-Dawla, as his heir. 
By this time cAclud al-Dawla reigned supreme over all of southern 
Iran . He thus felt powerful enough to displace his cousin 
Bakhtiyär, and annex Iraq to his territories. In 364/925, cAclud 
al-Dawla found the opportunity he had been seeking. Upon the 
request of his father, Rukn al-Dawla, cA4ud al-Dawla marched to 
Baghdad ostensibly to assist his cousin Bakhtiyar in quelling a 
serious revolt of the latter's Turkish troops. cA4ud al-Dawla 
defeated the rebels but then stirred up a mutiny against Bakhtiyr r 
so as to prove his brother's incompetence as a ruler and to compel 
him to resign. Rukn al-Dawla, the most senior of all the Büyids, 
strongly disapproved of cA4ud al-Dawla's actions, however, and 
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threatened to disinherit him. Consequently, cAciud al-Dawla was 
compelled to retract. He agreed to restore Bakhtiyär to his 
former position under certain conditions, and a temporary 
settlement prevailed between the two cousins. It was in this 
interlude of peace between the two Büyids that the Eitimid ruler 
al-cAzlz billäh came to power in Egypt. 
Immediately after the death of Rukn al-Dawla in Mu1arram 
366/September 976, hostilities re-erupted between CA4ud al-Dawla 
and Bakhtiyär. cA4ud al-Dawla marched a second time to Iraq and 
secured a resounding victory over his cousin in Dhu'l-QaOda 
366/July 977. He thus became the next Büyid sovereign over Iraq. 6 
It was after CAciud al-Dawla had secured Iraq that he established 
diplomtic contacts with the Fätimids. 
II Fätimid-Büyid Diplomacy in the Reigns of al-CAzlz billäh and 
cAdud al-Dawla 
It is a coincidence of history that arguably the greatest 
sovereign of the Fätimid dynasty, al-CAziz billäh, and the most 
powerful potentate of Büyid rule, cAAud al-Dawla, were 
contemporaries. It was in the time of these two great rulers that 
Fä. imid-Büyid diplomacy reached its high watermark. Prior to 
CAýud al-Dawla's appearance on the political scene at Baghdad and 
after his departure from it, the other Büyid amirs were too 
involved in interfamilial strife to have any contact - friendly or 
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otherwise - with the FAtimid ruler al cAziz. 
II i Exchange of Embassies 
The first recorded instance of diplomacy between al cAziz and 
cAýud al-Dawla is to be found in a letter the Büyid ruler 
supposedly wrote to his Fatimid counterpart circa 367-8/977-8. 
Unfortunately, this letter does not seem to have been preserved in 
its entirety by any of the extant sources. Ibn Taghr! Birdi, 
however, gives a summary of its contents. He says: 
cAcud al-Dawla had written a letter to him Cie al-cAziz] 
acknowledging in it the excellence of the ahl al-bait and 
confirming to al CAziz that he (i. e. al cAziz) was from that 
pure source. He addressed him Cie al-cAziz] as al-hadrat 
al-sharifa and words to that effect. 
7 
The gist of the letter that CA4ud al-Dawla wrote to al-cAziz can 
also be ascertained from al-CAzlz's reply to it which arrived at 
the Büyid court in 369/979-80.8 Fortunately Ibn Taghri Bird! has 
reproduced this letter of al-cAziz in far greater detail than that 
of the Büyid amir. He says: 
9 
his (i. e. al-CAziz's) letter to cA4ud al-Dawla who was 
in the company of the 'Abbasid Caliph al-Tä'ic points to his 
(i. e. al-cAzlz's) merit and strength. The contents of the 
letter, after the basmala were [as follows]: "From the slave 
and wall (friend) of Allah, Nizar Abi'l-Man$ür al-Imam 
al-cAziz billäh Amir al-Mu'minin to CAcud al-Dawla, al-Imam, 
the protector of the milla (community) of Islam, Abi Shujac 
b. Abi cAll, greetings to you. The Amir al-Mu'minin praises 
Allah - there is no god but He - to you and asks Him to bless 
his (i. e. al-cAzlz's) forefather Muhammad, the messenger of 
the Lord of both worlds and the Proof of Allah for all 
creation, continuous, increasing and everlasting prayers 
through his right guiding, his pious and pure progeny. 
And now to our subject: Your envoy has come in the presence 
of the Amir al-Mu'minin with the messenger sent to you. He 
has reported what he was to convey of your sincerity 
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concerning loyalty to the Amir al-Mu'minin, your friendship 
and your acknowledgement of his right to the imama and your 
love towards his pious and rightly guided forefathers. The 
Amir al-Mu'minin has been pleased with what he has heard from 
you and it was in accordance with what he has come to expect 
of you. You do not deviate from the truth. " Then he said 
many words in the same vein until he said: "I have found out 
what has happened at the Muslims' borders at the hands of the 
Polytheists and the destruction of al-Shim, the weakening of 
its people and the rise in prices. If that was not the case, 
the Amir al-Mu'minin would personally march to the thughür 
(borders). He will go to al-i1ira. 10 His letter will come to 
you shortly. So prepare for 'iý häd in the path of Alläh. " 
Both the precis of CAciud al-Dawla's letter as well as al-CAziz's 
reply to it offer valuable information on the nature of diplomacy 
between the two powerful dynasts of the medieval Muslim world. 
They also offer interesting insights into the terms of negotiation 
between the two rulers. 
According to Ibn Taghri Bird!, CA4ud al-Dawla acknowledged in his 
letter the excellence of the ahl al-bait and affirmed that 
al-CAzlz was "from that pure source. " Moreover, he addressed the 
Fätimid ruler as al-bacirat al-sharifa. This appellation that the 
Büyid amir uses to address his Fäirimid counterpart clearly denotes 
his acceptance of the Fäirimid sovereign as a descendant of 'Ali b. 
Abi Tälib. 11 
These sentiments of CAclud al-Dawla are further confirmed in 
al-CAziz's reply to the Büyid ruler. After the basmala (the usual 
opening of a letter) al CAzlz thanks the Büyid amir for "the 
sincerity and loyalty to the Amir al-Mu'minin (that is, al-CAzlz), 
your friendship, your knowledgement of his right to the imäma and 
your love towards his pious ... ancestors. "12 He adds that he is 
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pleased with what 'A4ud al-Dawla has to say about him and his 
progeny and that it is in conformity with what he expects from the 
Büyid amir. 
The military manoeuvres of the Byzantine forces on the borderlands 
of the Muslims appears to be a matter of particular import to the 
Fätimid ruler. Accordingly, he expresses his disapproval about 
the suffering meted out to the Muslims of the thu hür 
(Muslim-Byzantine frontier) by Byzantium. He then urges the Büyid 
I 
ruler to join him in a 'i. ý häd which he intends to undertake 
personally against the Byzantine forces in retaliation for the 
havoc which they have caused in al-Sham. 
CAciud al-Dawla's response to the above despatch of al cAziz has 
*an4YM 
been preserved in a tadhkira (memo)) addressed to the Biyid envoy, 
al-Qäii Abi Mu1ammad al-SJmmani, who was to accompany the Fätimid 
emissary Abu'l-Walid cUtba b. al-Walid to the Fätimid court. 13 
Cahen edited this memo from a collection of BUyid documents which 
Hiläl al-$dbi' incorporated in one of his works. As the memo has 
already been translated into French by Cahen, it was deemed 
unnecessary to re-translate it into English. Bearing its 
importance in mind, a detailed analysis of its contents has been 
undertaken below. 
The earlier part of the memo is characterised by the same kind of 
respectful tones denoting the noble ancestry of al-CAziz as found 
in the Büyid amir's previous correspondence. It praises 
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al-'--Aziz's outstanding merit, generosity, friendship and goodwill. 
CAclud al-Dawla then states that the dispatches of the Fätimid 
0 
sovereign do not offer clear evidence of peaceful relations, 
friendship and fulfilment of promises that the Büyid amir expected 
from him. He therefore urges his envoy, al-QZI1l al CUmmäni, to 
take up these issues with al-CAziz and seek clarification for 
them. We are left in the dark as regards the exact terms of 
conciliation that the Büyid ruler was seeking from his Fätimid 
counterpart. These were probably transmitted orally, for it is 
quite clear in the text of the letters themselves that they were 
to be accompanied by oral messages. In their letters, both 
al-CAziz and 'ASlud al-Dawla instruct their envoys to take up 
certain issues in person with the respective sovereigns. 
The Büyid amir continues by confirming vehemently the need to wage 
a jib ad against the enemies of Allah, the Byzantines. However, he 
makes his co-operation on the matter with the Fatimids conditional 
on the latter's fulfilment of his "demanded conditions of 
friendship, obligation of trust and peaceful affairs. "14 C/4ud 
al-Dawla then refers to the activities of Ismäcil däcis in his 
realm. He confirms that the dacis can continue propagating their 
message. The däCis of al-Basra are an exception to the above 
ruling, however, for they have transgressed their limits. He then 
gives instructions to the Q94i to deal with this matter upon his 
return from the Fatimid court. 
cAclud al-Dawla then alludes to an cUgaill with whom he disclaims 
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any ties of friendship and, in fact, repudiates him. It is quite 
probable that al-CAziz may have questioned CAcud al-Dawla's 
involvement in the desertion of the Banü cUgail at a critical 
juncture of the battle which resulted in the defeat and death of 
one of CAqlud al-Dawla's avowed enemies and a röte a of the 
Fätimids - the Ilamdänid Abü Taghlib. 
15 
Finally, the Büyid amir makes a vague reference to the "hijriyün", 
assuring that he will fulfil his promises to them provided his 
conditions of "agreement and friendship" are complied with. Cahen 
remarks that he knows of "no text that explains what this is 
about". 16 It may well be a reference to one of Bakhtiyär's 
brothers and 'Alud's cousins, AbU Is$äq Ibrihim and his entourage, 
who had eventually taken refuge in Egypt after suffering a defeat 
at the hands of CA4ud al-Dawla in 367/977.17 Either their safe 
return to the Büyid court without being persecuted by CA4ud 
al-Dawla or their being kept away from it, as suggested by 
Busse, 18 could well have been a matter of negotiations between the 
two powers. 
II ii Proposed Confrontation and Subsequent Breakdown of 
Relations 
The next reference to Fdtimid-Büyid relations is to be found in 
the year 369/979. Historians report the aggressive designs of 
c4ud al-Dawla against al-Shäm - where the Fätimids were involved 
in gaining ascendancy over other powers, and against Egypt - the 
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very base of Fätimid power. 
19 Curiously enough, that was the very 
year in which the above mentioned Fa imid embassy had arrived at 
the Bizyid court and had returned to Cairo with the Büyid amir's 
emissary. 20 According to the sources, the main obstacle that held 
c/4ud al-Dawla back from marching to Syria and then Egypt was the 
eruption of hostilities between him and his brother Fakhr 
al-Dawla. CA4ud al-Dawla was consequently compelled to divert his 
energies and resources to deal militarily with his brother 
first. 21 
The diplomatic negotiations between the two powers appear to have 
come to a complete full stop. In $afar 371/August 981 al-CAziz is 
reported to have hired a henchman to spirit away a silver lion 
which was placed on top of the zabzab (a pectoral in the shape of 
a boat) belonging to eA4ud al-Dawla. 
22 This zabzab formed a part 
of the royal emblems of CAýud al-Dawla and by having it stolen the 
Fätimid sovereign was ridiculing the Büyid ruler's authority, 
pride and alertness. 23 
CAýud al-Dawla appears to have retaliated by sending spies to the 
Fä . 
imid capital and inspiring awe among the people there. Under 
the year 372/982-3 al-Rudhräwäri reports at length the tale of a 
confectioner in Cairo who refused to accept a Büyid coin in 
payment for some confectionery that one of the men working for 
cAciud al-Dawla had purchased. Further, he is reported to have 
abused the Büyid amir. When the matter was reported to cA4ud 
al-Dawla, he secured the presence of this confectioner at his 
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court and severely reprimanded him. The Büyid amir then let him 
return to Cairo on condition that he would never repeat the 
offence. Al-Rudhräwäri ends the report by saying that the 
confectioner's story became well known in Cairo. As a result, the 
people there refrained from mentioning cA4ud al-Dawla. 
24 
II iii The Issue of Genealogy 
To my knowledge, Ibn 7äfir's work is the only source which offers 
an explanation for the deterioration of Fä , imid-Büyid relations, 
placing the blame squarely on the issue of Fätimid genealogy. }e 
says that cASlud al-Dawla had questioned the Fitimid ruler on his 
true genealogy and as he was not quite satisfied with the Fätimid 
response, he had then threatened to attack Fitimid lands. The 
Büyid amir is also supposed to have questioned the cAlids of Iraq 
on the matter of the genealogy of the Fätimids. 
In response to persistent enquiries on the part of CA4ud al-Dawla, 
al CAziz, in consultation with his vizier YaCqüb b. Killis, 
supposedly had a genealogy prepared, linking himself to Mui ammad 
b. Ismä. Cil, a lineal descendant of 'All b. Abi Tälib. 25 The 
genealogy thus prepared was apparently to be sent to Baghdad with 
the Büyid envoy. This envoy did not reach the Büyid court, 
however, for he was murdered at Tripoli by a Fa, imid envoy who had 
accompanied him. Ibn 7äfir contends that the Fatimids hoped by 
their supposed above action to spread their genealogy in the 
various countries and claimed that the genealogy did not reach 
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Baghdad because of the death of the Büyid envoy and not because it 
was false. 26 
If cAciud al-Dawla did question the genuineness of the Fätimid 
descent from CAll b. Abi Tälib, that is not evident from the 
extant correspondence exchanged between him and al-CAziz. On the 
contrary, in the written correspondence cA4ud al-Dawla clearly 
acknowledges the cAlid descent of the Fatimids. It could be 
argued that the Büyid amir may have questioned FEtimid genealogy 
in the oral messages that accompanied the letters. If that were 
the case, though, it is surprising that the Büyid amlr should have 
felt the need to assent to these claims, and indeed to reiterate 
them, in the letters themselves. He could just as well have 
omitted then. It is possible that the issue of genealogy may have 
been raised in later dispatches between the two rulers. However, 
that appears highly improbable as the sources are totally silent 
on the matter. 
What can be clearly concluded from the events as they have 
unfolded so far is that Fdtimid-Büyid relations began in very 
amiable terms circa 367-8/977-8, but within a span of three years, 
that is by the year 371//981, they had deteriorated completely. 
The question then arises as to what were the reasons that may have 
prompted the most powerful of all Büyid amirs, cA4ud al-Dawla, to 
enter into negotiations with his F5 timid counterpart, al-CAziz, in 
the first instance? 
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II iv Büyid Acceptance of cAlid Descent of the Fätimids 
Perhaps an answer to the above question lies in the supposed 
"temporary" acceptance of the Fätimid claims of cAlid descent by 
the Büyid CA4ud al-Dawla. It must be borne in mind that both the 
Fätimids and the Büyids belonged to different denominations of the 
Shidi branch of Islam. The FStimids asserted themselves as Im<Rms 
of the Ism5Cilis while the Büyids were either of Zaidi or Ithnä 
cAshari persuasion. 27 Moreover, as the claimed descendants of 
cAll b. Abi Tälib and the Prophet's daughter Fä4ima, the Fritimids 
presented themselves as the legitimate political as well as 
spiritual leaders of the Shida in general, embodying all its 
hitherto largely unfulfilled hopes and aspirations. 
The BUyids, on the other hand, made no claims to religious 
authority for themselves. In fact, most of them do not appear to 
have been very zealous about their religious beliefs. It follows 
that had the Btayid amir chosen to accept the Fätimids as the 
descendants of 'All b. Abi Tälib and consequently the legitimate 
Imams, they would then necessarily have had to bow to their 
authority in religious as well as political matters. 
It is noteworthy that the Büyids, being ShICa, did not replace the 
Sunni CAbbäsid Caliph with a ShiCite one. However, as Kennedy has 
pointed out, the Büyid amirs faced the same problems as any ruler 
who wished to establish an cAlid caliphate. If the Büyids were 
Twelver ShiCa, then they acknowledged that their last Imäm had 
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gone into occultation some seventy years earlier, while if they 
were Zaidis, then the only Imrº whose leadership could be accepted 
as valid had to be a descendant of al-UUusain or al-Fjasan, who had 
secured power for himself by his own efforts. 28 
In any case, the first Büyid ruler over Iraq, Mucizz al-Dawla, 
contemplated appointing an cAlid to the Caliphate after he had 
deposed the reigning cAbbäsid Caliph al-Mustakfi in 334/945. He 
was persuaded to abandon the idea by his vizier al-$aimarl who 
pointed out to him that an cAlld Caliph whose claims were accepted 
as valid would have greater authority than the Büyid amir 
himself. 29 Moreover, as relative outsiders in the Islamic world, 
and with no real claims to nobility, the Büyids could not afford 
to throw off the yoke of legitimacy which the 'Abbasid caliphate 
embodied without facing repercussions with which they were not yet 
powerful enough to cope. 
All things considered then, it is difficult to imagine that an 
astute and ambitious politician of the stature of cAcud al-Dawla 
would place himself under an Ismäcili Imam out of choice. 
Furthermore, by maintaining the nominal authority of the Sunni 
cAbbasid Caliph, CAýud al-Dawla placated the majority of his 
subjects who were Sunni. As a Twelver Shicl, too, his stance of 
maintaining the 'Abbasid Caliphate would be quite valid, for 
according to the political theory of Twelver Shicism, as it had 
evolved by this time, a ruler who was maf ül (inferior) could 
legally be tolerated in the absence of an of al (superior) one. 30 
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Hence the acceptance that the Fätimids belonged to the progeny of 
the ahl al-bait does not appear to be at all in the interests of 
the B yid amir. Conversely, recognition of Fätimid claims by the 
mighty c/4ud al-Dawla would certainly have been most prestigious 
for the FR. imid al-CAziz. 
In keeping with his views on kingship and the vesting of total 
authority in the shähanshäh (king of kings) - that is, himself - 
cAýud al-Dawla may have contemplated using his supposed allegiance 
to the Fitimid Caliph as a threat to the total annulment of the 
cAbbäsid Caliphate. In this way he may have compelled the 
cAbbäsid Caliph to accept the supreme position of the Büyid amir 
with the Caliph being a mere figurehead. 
31 There is ample 
evidence that upon his accession to power at Baghdad, CA4ud 
al-Dawla made the cAbbbsid Caliph grant him unprecedented honours 
and powers. 32 
However, the very fact that CAcud al-Dawla was desirous and 
capable of exercising total authority in his domains makes his 
overtures to the Fätimids all the more strange, for that would 
undoubtedly place him in a subsidiary position vis-t-vis the 
Fätimid ruler. 
If, on the other hand, the motives of cA4ud al-Dawla for courting 
the Fätimid Caliph were based purely on the grounds of gaining 
legitimacy for his own rule, then the position of the 'Abbasid 
Caliph as the religious head of the Sunni world, yet possessing 
168 
very little secular powers, appears to be a much more suitable 
choice than that of the politically and religiously virile Fätimid 
Caliph. The answer to the question posed above as to the I3 yid 
emir's need to initiate diplomacy with his Ritimid counterpart, 
has then to be sought elsewhere. 
Most sources are reticent on the issue of the overtures made by 
cAcud al-Dawla to al-cAziz. Ibn Taghr! Bird! finds it most 
astonishing that CA4ud al-Dawla began communications with 
al-cAziz. What he offers by way of explanation provides a clue, 
however, to the Büyid amlr's possible reasons for doing so. Ne 
states that CAqud al-Dawla only corresponded with al-cAziz because 
of his inability to oppose him. 33 This chance remark of Ibn 
Taghr! Bird! also sheds interesting light on the historiographical 
aspects of the issue of Fiä . imid-Büyid diplomacy at this time. 
II v Historiographical Aspects 
It appears rather curious that although iiiläl al-$äbi, the court 
historian of the Büyids, is the original source of information on 
the overtures of r-Ajud al-Dawla to his Fätimid counterpart, 
al-CAziz, as well as the latter's response to the Büyid amir, 
subsequent historians of the Büyid court such as Ibn Miskawaih and 
al-Rudhräwärl, while relying considerably on Hiläl al-$äbi' for 
other information, significantly underplay the issue of the wooing 
of al-CAzlz by cAdud al-Dawla, 34 
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So marked is the omission on the part of these historians that not 
a trace of it is to be found in either of their works except a 
mention in passing by Ibn Miskawaih that an embassy arrived from 
the ruler of the west (i. e. Egypt) at the Büyid court in ShaCbän 
369/February-March 980, and that it left in DhuIl-QaC a/May of the 
same year. 35 Not a word is said about the contents of the message 
brought by the Fatimid envoy nor the fact that his embassy was 
sent in response to the one dispatched by the Büyid amir to the 
Fätimid court earlier. Under that very year Ibn Miskawaih also 
mentions that after cAdud al-Dawla had overpowered all his real 
and potential enemies, "his thoughts were redirected to the 
conquest of Egypt especially, and after that to the territory of 
the Unbelievers, the Byzantines and such as lie beyond them. 
"36 
Although Ibn Miskawaih then states that CA4ud al-Dawla had by 
this time dropped his intention of marching against Egypt, he does 
not state at this point in the text - or for that matter, earlier 
on in the work - as to when CA4ud al-Dawla had initially resolved 
to wage war against Egypt. It is the later historians such as Ibn 
Taghri Birdi and Ibn fir who, deriving their information either 
directly or indirectly from Hiläl al-$äbi', discuss the issue of 
the initial attempts by CAcud al-Dawla to court the Filtimid 
al-CAziz. 
This deliberate attempt at suppressing information on the part of 
Büyid court historians such as Ibn Miskawaih and al-Rudhräwäri may 
well be due to the fact that writing as they were, in the heyday 
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of the mighty CA4ud al-Dawla, they, as well as their patron, may 
have wished to blot out any memories of actions that the Büyid 
amir may have taken in his moments of weakness, during the earlier 
part of his reign. The unusually friendly advances to al-CAziz on 
the part of cA4ud al-Dawla lend themselves to such an 
interpretation. 
III The Interest and Activities of CAdud nl-Dawla in al-Sh: un 
vis-ä-vis the Fätimids 
As Cahen has pointed out, it was inevitable that two military 
expansionist dynasties like the Fitimids and the Büyids would 
clash, as they were both aiming at the domination of common 
territories - those that lay between Iraq and Egypt. 
37 This was 
particularly true of the militarily active times of al-CAziz and 
cAcud al-Dawla. 
The Büyid amir turned his attention to al-Sham soon after his 
accession to power at Baghdad. The interest shown by CAcud 
al-Dawla in al-Sham sprang from the interlinked considerations of 
politics and commerce. Politically al-Shim at this time was in a 
fragmented state. The Fatimids were successful only from time to 
time in asserting their authority over the central and southern 
parts of the country, whilst its northern territories were either 
under direct Byzantine rule or at least under its nominal 
tutelage: the Vnids of Aleppo were one such dynasty. In 
relative terms, then, al-Sham was free to be taken by anyone who 
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felt powerful enough to exert their authority in the region. 
For CA4ud al-Dawla, the commercial advantages of controlling parts 
of al-Shim were clearly evident. The years of misrule over Iraq 
by his cousin and predecessor Bakhtiyir, cIzz al-Dawla, had left 
the country's commerce as well as agriculture in total disarray. 38 
Needless to say, the economic situation in Iraq was on the verge 
of total collapse when CA4ud al-Dawla took over as the next Büyid 
amir. Undoubtedly, therefore, one of the very first concerns of 
cAcud al-Dawla was to look for alternative sources of revenue to 
supplement the depleted ones of Iraq. The various towns of 
al-Sham - with its centres of commemrce and trading, and its 
considerable agricultural output - must certainly have appeared to 
the Büyid amir as a suitable source of desperately needed 
revenues. 
Moreover, since the FStimids had conquered Egypt, they had 
endeavoured and succeeded in diverting trade from the Persian Gulf 
to the Red Sea. 39 This had dealt a further blow for the Iraqi 
economy. If, on the other hand, CA4ud al-Dawla managed to secure 
a foothold in some of the coastal towns of al-Shäm, such as 
Tripoli and Antioch, which formed a part of this newly 
established, thriving trade route, he would stand to benefit 
considerably from it. 
Another significant negative vestige from the reign of IIzz 
al-Dawla, which CA(lud al-Dawla had to face, was the total mistrust 
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and enmity between the two major blocks of the armed forces - the 
Turks and the Dailamis. 40 Channelling this divided force's 
energies into fighting a war in a foreign territory would 
certainly be a constructive and profitable manner of dealing - at 
least temporarily - with them. 
It could be argued that CA4ud al-Dawla could just as well have 
diverted his energies eastwards towards the lucrative lands of 
Khuräsan - then under the Sämänids. 
41 There were a number of 
factors that deterred him from doing so, however, not the least of 
them being the fact that the Samanids were still a considerable 
force to be reckoned with in his own time. Moreover, in the 
earlier stages of his career at Baghdad, the Büyid amir lacked 
both the resources and the manpower that challenging the Samänids 
would entail. Furthermore, the Büyids had signed a peace treaty 
with the Samanids, according to which neither would encroach upon 
the other's territories. This was seen to be in the mutual 
interest of both the dynasties. Al-Sham, then, would have 
appeared a far more tempting proposition than the East. 
IV Balance of. Power 
The politico-military activities of the two Powers in the 
strategic lands of al-Sham circa 367-81/977-8 - the time when 
cAlud al-Dawla made the preliminary overtures to al-tAziz - 
clearly reveal that the balance of power was certainly in favour 
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of the Fä imids. A few examples may be given to illustrate the 
point. By 368/978-9, Alptegin, a former mawlä of the Büyids, who 
had earlier seized control of. Damascus and had declared the khutba 
there in the name of the 'Abbasid Caliph, withstanding all 
previous attempts by the Frltimids to oust him, had finally been 
defeated and won over by al-cAziz. 42 According to Ibn Khallikän, 
once Alptegin had established himself in Damascus, he sought the 
assistance of IA4ud al-Dawla in attacking Egypt. He sent the 
following communication to the Büyid amir: 
Syria is free (from the presence of foreign troops). It is 
now within our grasp and the rule of the monarch of Egypt has 
ceased therein; aid me therefore with money and soldiers so 
that I may attack those people even in the seat of their 
power. 43 
Nabia Abbott validly comments on the above request of Alptegin: 
cAlud, in these critical years (365-7/975-7) of Büyid 
history, coupled perhaps with mistrust of Aftakin discouraged 
the idea... 4` 
Consequently, CAýud al-Dawla replied as follows: 
Thy power has misled thee, and the result of that undertaking 
would be thy disgrace; fear therefore the dishonour which 
may attend it. By this, perhaps, thou mayest be guided. 45 
Qassäm succeeded Alptegin in ruling Damascus. Though not a loyal 
supporter of the Fdtimids, he nevertheless accepted the suzerainty 
of the Fätimid al-CAziz and had the khu. ba pronounced in his 
name. 46 Meanwhile, al-Mufarrij b. Daghfal b. al-Jarr4 had 
established his hold over al-Ramla and its environs. He too paid 
nominal allegiance to al CAziz, during the period under 
discussion. 47 
Similar was the case with Abü Taghlib, the former ruler of Diyär 
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Bakr, Diyär Rabica and parts of the Jazira. He had previously 
forged an alliance with CA4ud al-Dawla but by this time had fallen 
0 
out with the latter and had joined al-cAzlz's camp instead. 48 Ibn 
Miskawaih mentions an interesting tale of the manner' in which 
cA4ud al-Dawla attempted to dissuade the Fätimid al cAziz from 
assisting Abi Taghlib, which in turn reveals the political worth 
of Abi Taghlib"49 Up to the year 368/978-9 the I! amdinid ruler of 
Aleppo, Abull-MaIdli Säcd al-Dawla, had also acknowledged the 
nominal suzerainty of the Fätimid sovereign over his domains. 50 
The one group that had seriously challenged Fdtimid authority and 
had been a constant source of anxiety to them were the QarämiVa. 
They had joined Alptegin in fighting the Fätimid forces. They had 
also co-operated with cA4ud al-Dawla in the latter's wars against 
the other BGyid princes. After the joint defeat of Alptegin and 
the Qarmatian forces in 368/979, al-CAziz managed to buy off the 
Qarmatians by giving them an annual pension-51 Consequently, at 
least during the reign of al-CAziz, we do not hear of any serious 
hostilities from their side. 
It emerges thdrefore that by 368/979 al-cAziz had either managed 
to win over a number of forces that had previously opposed him or 
had at least neutralised them. This would explain why cA4ud 
al-Dawla may have felt the need to initiate good relations with 
the Fätimids. 
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V The Byzantine Angle 
The other possible reason for the negotiations may be sought in 
the relations of the two powers with Byzantium. The one common 
professed goal of the Fäj. imids and the Büyids was to wage a Jihad 
against the Byzantines. The need to do so became particularly 
imperative for al-cAziz and CA4ud al-Dawla because of the 
aggressive policy that the Byzantine rulers pursued against the 
d-ar al-Islam in the tenth century - especially in the territories 
of al-Sham. As can be ascertained from the correspondence 
exchanged between the two rulers, the subject of 'iý had comprised 
an important part of the negotiations. There is a possibility 
that fighting against a common enemy, the Byzantines, may have 
contributed to the joining of forces between the two Shir-i powers 
- at least temporarily - had it not been for the sudden change of 
the balance of power circa 369-70/979-80. 
Vi The Defeat of Bardas Skieros 
The one major factor that tipped the scales of power in favour of 
the Büyids was the crushing of the rebellion of Bardas Skieros in 
369/979 by the forces of the Byzantine emperor. Skieros had been 
the chief lieutenant and a brother-in-law of John Tzimiskes - the 
previous Byzantine emperor. On the latter's death Skieros himself 
aspired for the imperial crown. When he was thwarted in his 
attempts, he rebelled. 52 After his defeat Skleros appealed for 
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assistance from cAjud al-Dawla. In return he pledged allegiance 
to the Büyid amir. He also promised to hand over to the Büyids 
all the fortresses at the thughür that had earlier been under 
Muslim control but which had subsequently been seized by the 
Byzantine forces. 53 
The presence of Bardas Skieros at the Büyid court transformed the 
hitherto hostile attitude of the Byzantines into seeking a pact 
with the Biayids. A1-Rudhräwäri gives a graphic account of the 
Byzantine envoy and the representative of Skleros vying with each 
other in trying to win cA4ud al-Dawla to their respective camps. 
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Understandably, the main aim of the Byzantines in undertaking 
these negotiations was the handing over of Skieros to Byzantium. 
CA4ud al-Dawla was thus presented with an opportunity to achieve 
by way of diplomacy what would otherwise have necessitated 
confrontation. As time elapsed he increased his demands, using 
Skleros as a bait. Agreements were on the verge of being 
concluded between the Büyids and the Byzantines when CA4ud 
al-Dawla died in 372/983. 
Meanwhile Büyid influence was in ascendance in al-Shäm. The Büyid 
amir succeeded in 369/979 in getting rid of Abü Taghlib through 
the services of al-Mufarrij b. al-Jarra - who too had by now been 
won over to the Büyid side. Consequently, the latter rebelled 
openly against the Fätimids in 370/980-1.55 Moreover, by 
371/982-3 cAclud al-Dawla was able to diffuse and defeat the 
syndicate formed against him by his brother Fakhr al-Dawla. 56 
177 
To conclude, it appears as if for a short period time, the two 
most powerful of the Muslim rulers of the late tenth century had 
chosen the path of negotiation rather than confrontation. 
However, within a couple of years after these diplomatic contacts 
began, they were brought to a standstill. The major reason for 
that would seem to have been the rising politico-military 
authority of CA4ud al-Dawla. Thereafter he may not have felt the 
need to pursue further diplomatic contacts with the Fätimids. As 
the Büyid amir had initiated these negotiations in the first 
place, he was probably the one who terminated them. Had these 
negotiations been consolidated into an alliance, however, it would 
have had a substantial impact on the subsequent course of events. 
It would also have been a unique occasion in the history of 
Fätimid-Büyid diplomacy. 
After the death of cAýud al-Dawla, the Büyid amirs who succeeded 
him were too involved in interfamilial and local politics to have 
any relations - friendly or otherwise - with the FEVimids. 
Consequently, the era of Fätimid-Büyid diplomacy in the reign of 
al-cAziz came to a conclusion with the demise of the greatest of 
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CHAPTER 6 
FATIMID POLICIES IN THE MAGHRIB UNDER AL-cAZIZ BILLAH: 
ANIMOSITY WITH THE U14LYYADS 
Fourth/tenth century Maghrib (North West Africa) was essentially 
split between two rival military empires, the Fätimids and the 
Umayyads of Cordoba. Ifrlgiya (present-day Tunisia and eastern 
Algeria) was the power base of the Fä . imids and formed an 
integral 
part of that dynasty even after their capital was transferred to 
Cairo. Umayyad hegemony generally prevailed over al-Gharb al-Aqua. 
(lands that lay west of Sijilmäsa as far as the Atlantic Ocean). 
The strength and the assertiveness of the two super powers in the 
region determined the sphere of influence to which the central 
Maghrib (al-Gharb al-Adnä) was subjugated. 
At the grassroot level the animosity of the two dynasties was 
translated into warfare between the two long-standing rival Berber 
confederations - the Sinhäja and the Zanäta. The F44imid move to 
Egypt made it necessary for them to delegate power in the Maghrib 
to their Zirid lieutenants. Subsequently, as Zirid power grew, so 
too their desire for autonomy increased. It was against this 
backdrop of events that the Fätimid caliph al-cAziz billdh, was 
obliged to formulate a strategy concerning the Maghrib. 
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I A1-'--Aziz's Interest in the Maghrib 
r 
One of the very first acts of al-cAziz billäh upon his accession 
to power was to issue vast quantities of dinars and dirhams 
bearing his name and regnal titles, for official distribution in 
the Maghrib. l This fact outlines the prominence which the Fa timid 
sovereign attached to promoting his authority over the Maghrib. 
The Fätimid Caliph's concern to maintain his hegemony over 
Maghribi territories is understandable, for notwithstanding the 
fact that al-5Aziz embarked on his caliphal career in Egypt, he 
was the first member of his dynasty to do so. Although the 
Fa timid conquest of Egypt had been accomplished in 358/969 it was 
not until 362/973 that al-MuCizz finally left the Maghrib for 
Egypt. When al-cAziz succeeded his father in 365/975, then, 
barely three years had elapsed since the Fä imid sovereigns had 
moved their headquarters from the Maghrib to Egypt. 
The opinion expressed by some scholars of Fätimid history to the 
effect that once the Fätimids moved east they maintained only a 
nominal interest in the Gharb (their western territories), almost 
abandoning it to its fate, 2 is certainly questionable as regards 
the reign of al-CAziz. For a close scrutiny of the source 
material3 reveals that at this point in their history the Fätimids 
had close links with the Maghrib and were keen on maintaining 
these connections. The sending of the dä9i Abu'l-Fal}m from Egypt 
to the Maghrib in 376/986 to challenge the Fä . 
imid appointee, the 
Zirid Yusüf b. Buluqqln, who was showing a tendency towards 
186 
independent rule, 4 offers one of the prime examples of the sharp 
yet somewhat discreet surveillance that al-CAziz maintained over 
the Maghribi lands and over his deputies there. [The details and 
ramifications of the above event will be discussed a little later 
in the chapter]. 
Al-cAziz also appears to have kept a close watch on his Zirid 
governor by keeping one of the latter's brothers, Bad-is b. Zirl, 
at his court in Cairo. It was to Bädis that the Fätimid ruler 
gave the distinction of leading the pilgrims from Egypt in 
369/979.5 Yet another example of al cAziz's vigilance over his 
Zirid lieutenant can be seen in the generosity he accorded to 
Kattäb and Mughnin, the two brothers of Yusüf b. Buluggin, whom 
the latter had deposed from the Maghrib. 6 Thus, in case al-cAziz 
ever wished to replace Yusüf, he could have done so by appointing 
one of his brothers instead. In that manner he would not lose out 
on the support of those people who generally favoured the Zirids. 
Although al-CAziz certainly appears to have delegated a large 
amount of power to his Zirid governor, nonetheless the actions of 
the latter had to be formally sanctioned by the former. For 
instance, in 368/978 Yusüf b. Buluggin sought al-cAziz's decision 
on the appointment of a qä(ri in the Maghrib. Al-CAziz replied 
that he was transferring that responsibility to Yusüf who should 
henceforth appoint whom he considered suitable for the post. 
YusUf chose a man named Mu}ammad b. Is1 q al-Küfi. He then 
informed the Fätimid Caliph of his choice. Al CAzlz officially 
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sanctioned Yusüf's nomination and sent a sijill of galiship to the 
Maghrib. 7 
The Fätimid takeover of Egypt was preceded by sixty years of the 
dynasty wielding its authority in the Maghrib. The combination of 
providing a fairly stable and sound internal policy, keeping a 
firm check on external threats to their territories and giving 
impetus to commerce and agriculture enabled the Filtimids to reap 
rich harvests from the general prosperity that ensued. 8 In 
al-cAziz's time the Maghrib continued to be a profitable source of 
the following: 
i Recruitment of Kutäma soldiers 
ii Revenues from taxation and trade 
iii Gold 
Ii Recruitment of the Kutäma Soldiers: 
The land of Ifrigiya provided the Fätimids with an essential 
commodity of a state - manpower for the armed forces - in the form 
of the Kutäma Berbers. The Kutäma were one of the most numerous 
and powerful tribes of the Sinhäja confederation of Berbers. 9 
They were the earliest and on the whole the most staunch 
supporters of the Fätimids in the Maghrib. They also formed the 
backbone of the Fätimid armed forces throughout the Fätimids' stay 
in the Maghrib. Indeed, it was on them that the Fä imid Caliph 
al-Mucizz had relied for the conquest of Egypt. Even after the 
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Fätimid move to Egypt, the Kutäma continued to play a significant 
role in the internal as well as external policy of the dynasty. 
The Kutäma monopoly over the Fdtimid armed forces was unchallenged 
until al-CAziz, on the advice of his skilful vizier YaCqüb b. 
Hillis, introduced a Turkish contingent into the forces. 10 The 
Kutäma, nonetheless, continued to be a force to be reckoned with 
throughout the reign of al CAziz. 
I ii Revenues from Taxation and Trade 
From the very inception of their rule in Ifrlgiya the Fä imids 
paid great attention to the fiscal administration of their 
territories. Accordingly, a conscious and consistent effort was 
made throughout the Fätimid period to maximise the revenues that 
accrued from the various taxes which the state levied on the 
population. The Fdtimids also formulated their entire fiscal 
policy to derive the maximum advantage from the lucrative trade 
that flowed through many of their North African territories. 
The monetary benefits that the F44imids reaped as a result appear 
to have been considerable, as can be ascertained by the reports of 
a contemporary geographer, Ibn Vaugal (d. after 378/988). Citing 
his source as the säbib al-mal (the official in charge of the 
public treasury) of the Maghrib, Ibn Uawgal states that the total 
revenues of the Maghrib for the year 336/947-8 were evaluated at 
seven to eight hundred thousand dinars. 11 After furnishing 
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details of the means of FdVimid income, Ibn I}awgal indicates that 
the sum total of the revenues collected from the Maghrib at least 
equalled, if not surpassed, the above amount, at the time of the 
Fä%imid move to-Egypt in 359/970. 
Fätimid interest in the revenues of the Maghrib therefore appears 
to have been a very likely factor in their determination to keep 
hold of the Maghrib after. they had moved to Egypt. After 
examnining the available economic data on the Maghrib, Messier 
concludes that "the Fäjimids extorted more revenue in North Africa 
than any other Muslim regime up to that time. "12 
Notwithstanding the appointment of a Zirid lieutenant to rule over 
Ifrigiya in his absence, the Fä4imid Caliph al-Mucizz exercised 
personal judgement in the appointment of the chief ministers of 
finance over his Ifrigiyan provinces. 13 His successor, al-cAziz 
billäh, whilst granting more territories and a higher degree of 
autonomy to his Ifrigiyan governor, nonetheless retained overall 
control in financial matters. An anecdote from the early period 
of al-CAziz's reign clearly illustrates this point. 
As mentioned previously, one of the first acts of al CAziz upon 
his accession to power, was to have dinars bearing his name and 
regnal titles sent to the Maghrib for distribution. When the 
governor of al-Qairawan, cAbd Allah al-Katib, received these 
dinars, he duly distributed them among the people. Then, however, 
he held out a piece of cloth into which he flung some dinars and 
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insisted that everyone in the town contribute to this collection, 
according to their financial status. In this manner he raised a 
grand sum of four hundred thousand dinars, which he then sent to 
the Fatimid Caliph. Al-'Aziz totally disapproved of this method 
of raising money. He therefore ordered that the money be sent 
back to al-Qairawan and returned to the people. 14 He also 
commanded Buluggin b. Ziri, his Zirid lieutenant, to put a stop to 
the oppressive taxation imposed on the people of al-Qairawän by 
CAbd Allah al-Katib. 15 
The Fätimid move to Egypt also resulted in commercial and 
financial advantages for the dynasty. As the trade flow between 
the old and the new capital of the Fä%imid empire received a great 
boom, so too the state revenues accruing from it soared. 
Moreover, as Messier has pointed out, the "gifts" sent to the 
Fätimid caliphs by their Zirid vassals were of such quantity and 
sufficient regularity as to be termed tribute. 16 In the first 
eight years of al-CAziz's reign alone, for example, the sources 
mention four instances of the arrival of Zirid gifts at the 
Fdtimid court. 17 The substantial sums of money sent are an 
indication of the above point. In 367/978 Buluggin is reputed to 
have sent al-cAziz four hundred thousand dinars, whilst in 374/984 
Buluqqin's successor, al-Man§ür, sent the Fä imid Caliph one 
million dinars. 
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I iii Gold 
Gold was an extremely useful commodity for imperialistic medieval 
powers. The precious metal was essential for propaganda purposes 
and preferred by dynasties such as the Fä. imids for minting coins 
and financing military campaigns. It is not surprising then that: 
The Fä imids were the first North African regime to exercise 
a concerted effort to control the routes to the Sudan [via 
North Africa] and to exploit the gold trade for their own 
international designs. 19 
Once the move to Egypt had been accomplished, the need for a 
regular gold supply from West Africa via North Africa was felt 
acutely enough by the Fätimid sovereigns to maintain as firm a 
hold over their North African possessions as circumstances 
permitted them. Only after the Zirids had declared their autonomy 
from their Fätimid overlords in 439/1048 were the latter compelled 
to procure their gold supplies from the alternate source of Nubia 
via southern Egypt. 20 Indeed, it was the Spanish Umayyad 
challenge to Fätimid monopoly over the gold trade of West Africa 
that was a major bone of contention between the two regional 
superpowers. 
II Fätimid-Umayyad Animosity 
The genesis of the conflict between the cAlids of the Banü Häshim 
(from whom the Fätimids traced their descent) and the Banü Umayya 
is too well known to be reiterated here. 21 Suffice it to say that 
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the descendants of the two families, the Bang Fatima and the Bang 
Umayya of al-Andalus, inherited and, in fact, perpetuated this 
longstanding hostility. Politics and propaganda were the two most 
prominent media through which the two regimes expressed their 
animosity against each other. 
The Fätimid dads were particularly active in Spain and were 
instrumental in securing support for the Fätimids at the grassroot 
level. The extent of success that Fdtimid propaganda achieved in 
Spain can be gauged by the public expression of Fätimid sympathy 
and Umayyad hostility by "the first great poet of the Muslim 
West", 22 and the future panegyrist of the Fätimid al-Mucizz, Ibn 
Hani' al-Andalusi, whilst he was still residing in Spain. The 
Umayyad rulers, on the other hand, challenged Fä imid authority in 
the Maghrib by fomenting rebellion amonst tribes that were subject 
to Fätimid suzerainty. They also induced Fatimid commanders to 
revolt against their sovereign. 
23 
Fatimid-Umayyad conflict reached its apogee in the time of 
al-Mucizz li din Allah (341-365/953-975) and cAbd al-Ra4man 
(300-50/912-961), the two "eminences grises" of the respective 
regimes. 24 Animosities between the two dynasties, nonetheless, 
ran high in the time of their respective successors, al-cAziz 
billah and al-}Jakam II (350-366/961-976), as can be ascertained 
from the following report. Ibn Khallikan relates that al-'Aziz 
reacted to an insulting letter from al-Fiakam with the contemptuous 
reply: "You satirise us because you have heard of us. Had we 
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heard of you, we would respond. "25 The author also cites another 
version of this exchange of correspondence where the roles of the 
two Caliphs were reversed. 
Though the very satirical dialogue is probably apocryphal, it 
nonetheless succinctly reflects the mutually hostile attitude of 
the two regimes. As for the assertion that the two rulers had not 
yet heard of each other, al-Q4.4i al-NuCmän in his al-Majälis 
wa'l-Musayarät mentions exchanges of detailed correspondence that 
had transpired between al-Mueizz and CAbd al-Ra4man III. 26 
The Fätimid conquest of Egypt and their subsequent departure from 
Ifrigiya had a profound impact on the politics of the Maghrib as a 
whole. Consequently, it had a bearing on Fdtimid-Umayyad 
relations as well. One of the prime objects of CAbd al-Ragman 
III's policies in the Maghrib was to defend his lands from Fa timid 
invasions by keeping the latter occupied in dealing with Maghribi 
affairs. FgVimid achievements in the Maghrib as well as their 
success at empire building in Egypt prompted al-liakam II to revert 
from the traditional Umayyad policy of merely supporting the 
Zanäta tribes in their rebellion against the Fätimids to a policy 
of an all-out offensive against the latter. 
Dozy is of the opinion that it would have been in Umayyad 
interests for al-I1akam to abandon the Maghrib. He also states 
that al-I1akam's further involvement in the Maghrib was based on 
honour, pure and simple, rather than any economic calculations. 28 
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Whilst pride may have been an important factor in al-1akam's 
decision, the desire to exploit the extremely rich gold deposits 
of West Africa - accessible via the Maghrib - must certainly. have 
tipped the scales in favour of direct Umayyad control. The 
Umayyad ruler would also have been tempted to take advantage of 
the lucrative trade that passed through many of the Maghribi 
towns. 
Al-1akam consequently embarked on a wave of conquests to increase 
his influence in the Maghrib. This was done at the expense of the 
Fätimids. As lieutenants of the F5timids in Ifrigiya, the Banü 
Ziri were compelled to meet this new challenge. 
29 
II i The Zirid Succession 
Before his departure for Egypt in 362/973, the Fä%imid Caliph 
al-MuCizz appointed Buluqqin b. Mr! as his viceroy over all the 
western territories of the F4. imids except Sicily and Tripoli-30 
Buluggin's appointment to this senior position was the culmination 
of Fdtimid favour bestowed on the Banü Ziri for their services in 
fighting the LJmayyad-backed Zanäta tribes. The next Fätimid 
Caliph, al-CAziz, not only confirmed Buluggin in the post but 
placed Tripoli, Surat and Ajdabiya under his jurisdiction as 
well. 31 
Despite the various honours and distinctions showered on Buluggin 
by the Fätimid caliphs, he remained primarily the "lord of the 
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West". As such, the Zirid chieftain's prime concern was to fight 
the anti-Fdtimid elements in central Maýhrib from his headquarters 
at tAshir. 32 Meanwhile, the administration of Ifrigiya was 
entrusted by him to CAbd Allah b. Mu$ammad al-Katib, who operated 
from al-Qairawan. As Brett has pointed out, the whole machinery 
of central government was thus left in the hands of a deputy. 
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Circumstances in the Maghrib were of such a nature, however, as to 
leave Buluqqin little choice to act otherwise. 
II ii Umayyad Policies in theMaghrib 
As mentioned previously, the Umayyad al-IJakam II had inaugurated a 
policy of actively opposing Fätimid hegemony in central Maghrib. 
After his death in 366/976 his Maghribi policies were continued by 
Ibn Abi IAmir - the chief minister of state who subsequently 
became the regent of al-Andalus under the young boy Hishäm 11.34 
The Umayyads pursued their above-stated objective by fanning the 
enmity that existed between the Zanäta and the Sinhäja Berber 
confederations. Accordingly, they took up the Zanäta cause 
against the Fätimid-backed Sinhäja. 
The first instance of the Zanäta challenging Fätimid authority in 
the Maghrib during the Caliphate of al-cAziz occurred in 367/978. 
The Maghribi chief, Lazar b. Fulful b. Khazar al-Zanät3, was 
successful in evicting the last of the pro-Fätimid Banü Midräs 
rulers, al-MuCtazz, from the economically strategic town of 
Sijilmäsa. 35 The victory was more than just a successful military 
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encounter for the Zanata. It heightened their prestige in the 
area and resulted in great financial advantages for them. As much 
in acknowledgement of Umayyad assistance as to demonstrate his own 
achievement, Khazar dispatched the skull of his defeated opponent 
to Andalusia. 
The Zirid response was swift. Bulugqin set out at once on an 
expedition to re-establish his authority in the region. The first 
town that felt his wrath was al-Basra, which was razed to the 
ground on his orders. Next he occupied Fez in Shacn 368/March 
979. Sijilmäsa capitulated to him as well. Subsequently the 
whole of the Bild al-Hibt was conquered by him. By 370/980 
Bulugqin was powerful enough to compel the deposed Zanäta amirs 
and their Umayyad allies to seek refuge at Ceuta - the only town 
that still remained under Umayyad control. Bulugqin laid siege to 
this extremely well-fortified Umayyad stronghold to no avail. He 
therefore withdrew from it with the intention of subsequently 
leading a naval expedition against it. 
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Next, the Zirid commander campaigned against the Barghwata kingdom 
to the south. 37 This too belonged to the Umayyad sphere of 
influence. 38 Its ruler $äli$ b. 'Abi'1-An$är professed a brand of 
religion of his own. As Ibn CIdhärl puts it, "He ($äli$) gave 
them (his people) a sharl'a and led them astray. "39 After many 
battles Buluggin emerged victorious and the Barghwata leader was 
killed. Many of their women and children were taken prisoner and 
sent to al-Qairawan. 
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In 371/981-2 Buluggin received orders from the Fätimid al-CAziz to 
enlist the services of a thousand select cavalry men from the 
Sinhäja and lead them in a campaign to expel the Umay ads from the 
Gharb. 40 Although Ibn 'Idhäri does not report clearly the outcome 
of this military expedition, it appears that this time the 
Fätimids met with only fleeting success. 
Nonetheless, the Zirid commander's presence in the Maghrib was 
certainly felt. Bulugqin subsequently stayed on in the region for 
the next couple of years, as much to organize the administration 
of the recently acquired territories as to keep his opponents at 
bay. Bulugqin finally set out for Ifrigiya in 373/983. As was to 
be expected, no sooner had he departed from the Maghrib than the 
Zanäta Banü Khazrizn're -entered Sijilmäsa and expelled Buluggin's 
deputy from the town. Buluggin therefore retraced his steps to 
Sijilmäsa. Before arriving there, however, death overtook him on 
23 Dhu'1-Ijijja 373/27 May 984.41 According to Buluggin's wishes, 
his son Abu'1-Futüý al-Man§ür succeeded him. The Fätimid al-CAziz 
officially confirmed al-Man§ür's appointment and conferred on him 
the title CUddat al-cAzlz billäh ("the instrument of al-cAziz 
billäh"). 42 
As far as the Maghrib was concerned, al-Man$ür pursued, in 
principle, the policies laid down by his father. Accordingly, he 
sent an army under the command of his brother Yattufat in 374/985 
to reconquer strategic towns like Mrs and Sijilmäsa which had 
slipped from Sinhäji hands at the death of Buluggin. The 
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Umayyad-backed Zanäta, however, had by this time a firm grip on 
Maghrib al-Aq$ä. Ya44ufat's forces were badly defeated by those 
of the Zan-at! chief ZIri b. CAtiya. Although al-Man! ýür sent 
reinforcements to his brother, this proved to be of no avail. 
Fearing a Zanäta backlash, al-Man$%ir took the precaution'of moving 
his army from Ifrigiya to cAshir. There it remained. 43 
Henceforth, the Zirid chieftain made no attempts to embark on any 
military manoeuvres west of CAshir. So adamant was he in this 
decision of his that he even refrained from giving assistance to 
1iasan b. Qannün, the last Idrisid of Fez, in recovering his lands 
from the Zanäta. 44 Consequently, as Brett succinctly sums up,. 
Fifty years after the foundation of cAshir to guard against 
such a threat, the west had reverted to the power of the 
Umayyads and their Zanä, ta allies. 45 
While peace prevailed on the warfront, however, other events were 
brewing up on the domestic front. Unlike his father Buluggin, 
a1-Man-pür preferred to adopt a more independent approach to his 
Fätimid sovereign. 
III A1-Man$5r's Bid for Independence 
In his accession speech al41an$ür is reported to have declared 
that whilst his father and grandfather had obtained the submission 
of their subjects under compulsion, he would win over the populace 
by goodwill. He then added "I am not among those who are 
appointed by a letter and can be dismissed by a letter... " He 
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went on to say that he had inherited his right to authority from 
his 1 imyarite ancestors of Yemen. In other words, al CAziz would 
not be able to dismiss him. merely by the stroke of a pen. 46 
Al-Man! ýür also appears to have questioned Buluggin's choice of the 
administrator of their territories. For, soon after assuming 
leadership, al-Mansur had the chief administrator, CAbd Allah 
al-Ka-tib, arrested and denuded of his unlimited powers. 
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Although al-Man$ür reinstated al-Iiätib in his former post some 
time later, he may well have been compelled to do so as the latter 
was extremely powerful and on very good terms with Egypt. The 
fact that al-Man$ür had al-Ka-tib arrested in the first place is an 
indication of the Zirid lieutenant's determination to have his own 
authority felt in the region. In any case, the final showdown 
between the two men was not long in coming. Al-Kätib's assistance 
to a da91 from Egypt became a bone of contention between the 
governor and his administrator. 
La Li Masan b. Na$r Abu'l-Fa1}m al-Khuräsäni was sent from Egypt to 
Ifrigiya by al CAziz. His mission appears to have been one of 
going to Kutäma lands and of preaching to them. On his arrival at 
al-Man$Uriya Abu'l-Fabm was cordially received by al-Kätib's son 
Yüsuf. It was the latter who had been appointed deputy 
administrator of Ifrlqiya whilst al-Kätib was at 'Ashir with 
al-Man$ür. In accordance with his father's wishes, Yüsuf provided 
the dä. 91 with all the assistance that the latter needed and 
dispatched him to Sa, if, the headquarters of Kutäma power. 48 
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When al-Man§ür arrived at a1-Maxi§üriya the following year, he 
I 
found himself taking the oath of allegiance to Cairo at the hands 
of al-Katib who had been granted the rank of a dadi by the Fatimid 
ruler. 49 Moreover, according to Ibn dIdhari's report, the 
closeness between al-MangUr and al-Katib and the unlimited power 
enjoyed by the latter, became a matter of great envy for other 
members of the Zirid household as well as for the court officials. 
Accordingly, they incited al-Man: ýür against his chief 
administrator. They even accused al-Katib of sending d-ýI 
Abu'l-Farm to the Kutama. Convinced of his administrator's 
treachery, al-Man$ür ordered the killing of both al-Katib'and his 
son Y suf on 11 Rajab 377/6 November 987.50 
This is how the sources relate the tale of al-Ma. n$O. r and al-Katib. 
As Brett has clearly pointed out, however, the story has been 
deformed by subsequent chroniclers of the Zirid dynasty. Their 
concern was to expose al-Iatib as a rebel against a legitimate 
monarch (al-Man$ür), with the connivance of Cairo. 
51 Two possible 
inferences can be drawn from the above episode. Firstly, that it 
was, a local struggle for supremacy between two powerful men, each 
of whom was trying to curry favour with Cairo in whatever manner 
they could; al-Kätib by supporting däci Abu'l-Fa}? m and al-Man§ür 
by sending vast sums of money to the Fätimid court. For example, 
soon after his accession, al-Manqür sent gifts valued at one 
million dinars to Egypt. 52 
Alternatively, by distinguishing al-Y, &tib with the rank of a dä-i 
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and attempting to make al-Man$ür submit to him, the Fätimid 
al-'Aziz may perhaps have wished to replace al-Man Ur with 
al-Kätib, his principal representative in the Maghrib. Judging by 
the subsequent good relations between the ZIrid chieftain and his 
FA imid sovereign, however, the rift between al-Man. $ür and 
al-Kätib appears to have been a domestic affair. Meanwhile, 
getting rid of al-Kätib did not solve al-Manr? ür's problems with 
the Kutina. 
IV The hutgma Rebellion 
As noted previously, dä9 Abu'l-Fabm had gone to the Kutäma lands 
in 376/986. So successful was he at gaining Kutäxna confidence 
that within a couple of years of being in their midst, he had 
raised a large army from amongst them and had minted coins there 
too. 53 As can be expected, news of Abu'l-Fa1m's increasing power 
and popularity reached al-Man! ýür. 
Ibn al-Athir reports that alarmed by the above developments, 
al-Man! ýür dispatched a messenger to al-CAziz to apprise the latter 
of the situation and to inform him of al-ManýUr's intention of 
leading an army against Abu'l-Fabm. Soon afterwards, two envoys 
of al-CAziz arrived at al-Man$üriya with the message that 
al-Man! pür was not to oppose either Abu'l-Fal}m or the Iiutäma. 
A1-Man! ýür did not, however, pay heed to these instructions of the 
Fätimid ruler. 54 It is rather surprising to note that Ibn 'Idhärl 
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who gives a more thorough and detailed account of al-Man$ür's 
reign `generally, does not even allude to the exchange of 
messengers mentioned by Ibn al-Athir. 
Be that as it may, in 378/988 al-Man§iar set out to fight 
Abu'l-Fal? m. The first Kutäma town to feel his wrath was Mila. 
Razed to the ground, its people were compelled to seek refuge in 
the nearby town of Baghäya. Destroying every building he passed, 
the Zirid amir finally reached Sa#, if, the headquarters of Kutäma 
strength. In a bloody battle between Zirid and liutäma forces, the 
latter were totally routed. Abu'l-Falim sought refuge with some of 
the Kutäma tribes on Mount Wacar. Compelled to surrender, 
Abu'l-Fa m was subsequently butchered in the most cruel manner in 
$afar 378/May 988, al-Mansür's Cabld (slaves) actually devouring 
Abu'l-Falim's flesh. 55 
Thus suppressed, the Kutäma were not to remain so for long. A 
couple of years after the defeat of Abu'1-Fa$m, they rallied 
around one of their fellow men, Abu'l-Faraj. After raising an 
army, Abu'l-Faraj challenged Zirid authority in the area by 
clashing several times with al-Man! ýür's deputy over riila and 
Satif. Finally, the Zirid amir decided once again to lead his 
forces personally against the Kutäma. Accordingly, he set out in 
379/989 and in a repeat performance of the ruthless campaign he 
had, conducted previously against the Kutä. ma, the latter were 
completely routed. Their leader, Abu'l-Faraj, was brutally put to 
death and the Kutäma were totally humbled into submission. 56 
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This defeat signalled the end of Kutäma hegemony in the Maghrib. 
Thus after almost a century of having the distinction of being a 
"favoured" tribe of the Fätimids, theKuti. ma were relegated to 
f 
being one of the many subjects of their Zirid overlord. 
A question that needs to be addressed at this stage is: why did 
al-cAziz send a special envoy to the Kutilma in the first place? 
He may have done so to acknowledge the Kutäma as a distinctive 
source of recruits for a major division of the Fätimid army 
stationed in the east. The acknowledgement of the special status 
of the Kutäma by the Fätimid Caliph may have been all the more 
essential to counterbalance the policies of his vizier, Ibn 
Killis. 
As early as 370/980, for example, Ibn Killis is reported to have 
made a determined effort to break the KutFima monopoly over the 
Fä. imid armed forces. He did so by recruiting Turks and other 
elements in the army. 57 He also replaced a number of Kutäma 
officials by their Turkish counterparts. The reasoning behind 
this course of action was that it was dangerous for the Fatimids 
to rely totally on the loyalty of one single group of people. 
Moreover, whilst the Kutäma (or the Berbers in general, for that 
matter) were good infantrymen, they lacked the skill of the 
cavalry. The Turks, on the other hand, were renowned for their 
equestrian skills. Even in military terms, therefore, it was 
essential for the Fa . imids to balance their armed forces with both 
the infantry and the cavalry. 58 Nonetheless, the Kutäma continued 
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to constitute an essential element of the Fät, imid armed forces. 
Viewed in this light, the sending of Abu' l-Fal}m to the Kutä. ma by 
al-cAzlz makes good sense. 
Another possible interpretation may be that al-CAziz wished to get 
rid of the Zirid amir al-Man$ür. He therefore sent a dä'i to the 
Kutäma to prepare them to rise in arms against al-Man! ýür. This 
interpretation appears to have some validity if one bears in mind 
the previously mentioned report of Ibn al-Athir which states that 
al-1; Aziz forbade al-Man! ýür to oppose either the Kutäma or 
Abu'l-Falim. 59 This, despite the fact that the latter had raised 
an army. . There 
is no evidence in the sources, however, that 
Abu'l-Fabm was planning to oppose al-Mangür and that the latter 
pre-empted the dä, 'i by attacking him first. 
Is it possible that the d5F1 may have been sent by al CAziz to 
lead the Kutäma against the Zanäta and other Berber allies of the 
Umayyads in the Maghrib al-Aq! ýä? After all, al-Man$ür had to all 
intents and'purposes abandoned the Gharb to the Zanata by this 
time. The Fa timid sovereign may well have wished to renew the bid 
for supremacy in the Gharb against the dynasty's arch rival, the 
Umayyads. In the final analysis, however, whatever the reasons 
for the sending of Abu'l-Fa$m, one thing is certain: al-Man§ür 
felt sufficiently threatened by the däci to exterminate him 
swiftly. 
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V Fätimid-Zlrid Relations after the Defeat of the Kutäma 
f 
Diplomatic relations between Cairo and al-Man$üriya appear to have 
been unaffected by the Zirid amir's purge of the Iutäma. Soon 
after the killing of Abu'l-Fa$m, for instance, gifts arrived at 
the Zirid court from Cairo, with no mention made of the dä, 1.60 
In 382/992 the Fä. imid Caliph officially proclaimed Abu'1-Manäd 
Bädls b. al-Man! ýür as his father's wall cahd to the governorship 
of the Maghrib. 61 Extremely pleased by the appointment of his 
son, al-Man$ür sent magnificent gifts to his Fätimid sovereign as 
well as to the latter's heir - the future F5timid Caliph, 
al-Iakim. Al-Magriz! gives a description of these presents: 
One hundred and fifty mares, f'f}A°'L saddled female 
mules, one hundred and eighty horses, fifty mares, fifty 
female mules dressed in protective armour, three hundred 
s4Aaw saddled mules of which a hundred were carrying chests of 
money, five hundred and thirty-five camels carrying wheat and 
other provisions ... a hundred of which were carrying money, 
hunting dogs, five saddled mares and twenty horses for 
al-CAziz's son and fifteen slave servants. 62 
The following year al-cAzlz reciprocated by sending al-Man! ýür 
gifts which included an elephant, a large number of riding beasts, 
various types of cloth, a kiswa for the Kacba, crystal, porcelain, 
robes of honour as well as specially selected mares decorated with 
gold saddles. 63 Judging by the fairly regular exchange of gifts 
between the Fdtimid Caliph and his Zirid amir, relations between 




Al-Man! ýür died on 3 Rabic I 386/26 March 996, just six months 
before the death of al-cAziz. The last few years of al-Man$Lir's 
reign were taken up mainly with attempting to resolve an internal 
crisis within the Zirid family over the issue of succession. 
Abu'l-Bahär, an uncle of al-Man§ür, made a personal bid for power 
by defecting to the Umayyads. Al-Man§ür, however, managed to win 
over his uncle who then transferred his loyalties to al-Man! ýür and 
the latter's son Bädis until 389/999, when the Zirid feud for 
succession was re-enacted. 
64 In the meantime, the amirate passed 
on fairly smoothly from al-Mýür to his son Bädis at the former's 
death. 
In evaluating F5 timid control over the Maghrib, it has to be said 
that by the end of al-CAziz's reign the Fätimids had very little 
say in the administration of the Maghribi territories. This was 
left by the Fä imid Caliph mainly to his Zirid amir. The formal 
acknowledgement of Fä, imid supremacy, however, was rigorously 
maintained by the Zirids. Thus all the imperial regalia, coins 
and banners bore the name of the Fätimid Caliph. As has been 
discussed earlier, the Zirid amir regularly sent tribute and 
valuable gifts to the Fätimid court as well. 
Fa , imid acceptance of formal suzerainty over the Piaghrib makes 
perfect sense. For in practical terms it would have been 
extremely difficult, if not impossible, for the Fätimid Caliph to 
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scrutinise the affairs of the Maghrib from his base in Cairo. 
Moreover, besides maintaining control over the existing 
territories of the Fätimids, al-cAziz had to supervise the rather 
rapid expansion of his empire. More particularly, the F5, imid 
commitment in Syria took up a great deal of al CAziz's material 
and monetary resources. Thus, undoubtedly the Fätimid-Zirid 
arrangement in the Maghrib suited the interests of both parties. 
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CHAPTER 7 
FATIMID-BYZANTINE RELATIONS DURING THE REIGN OF AL-CAZIZ BILIAIU 
The Fatimid conquest of Egypt in 358/969 meant a continuation of 
diplomacy with their familiar neighbour in the rlaghrib - 
Byzantium. ' Once in Egypt, the Fatimids, according to their 
avowed ambition of expanding eastwards, began military operations 
in al-Sham (Greater Syria). Coincidentally, Byzantium too had 
become particularly interested in and capable of pursuing an 
expansionist policy in al-Sham at this time. Conflicts of 
interests of these two major powers of the fourth/tenth century 
inevitably led to military confrontation between them. These were 
punctuated by brief periods of reconciliation. In this chapter 
the description of Fatimid-Byzantine diplomacy will be undertaken. 
This is done with a view to providing a sound background for 
analysing the relations between these two superpowers in 
al-CAzlz's time. 
I Causes of Fätimid Byzantine Conflict in nl-Sham 
The one common factor for Fä imid and Byzantine involvement in 
al-Sham was the issue of security. With their arrival in Egypt 
the Fätimids realized that the geographical structure of the 
country was such that their authority over it would be seriously 
214 
challenged unless they held at least Palestine and Damascus, but 
preferably the whole of Syria. Syria would then provide the 
buffer between Egypt and the invading forces. 2 For Byzantium, 
control of northern Syria was vital for the maintaining of their 
firm hold over Antioch and other territories that they had wrested 
from Muslim lands in the 350s/960s. 3 The Fiitimids were also 
motivated by economic considerations. For them control over Syria 
meant that in times of bad harvests in Egypt, due to the low 
flooding of the Nile, Syria would be an important source of food 
supplies. Commercially, too, control of Syria would prove very 
lucrative for both powers as its various cities were great centres 
of trade. 
On the ideological front, the Fitimids sought justification for 
their rule by reiterating their intention of waging a jihad 
against their aggressive Christian neighbour. One of the reasons 
the Fitimids offered for toppling the Ikhshidid regime in Egypt 
was that the latter were not interested or capable of waging a 
'i, ý häd against Byzantium. ` Later, they used the same argument for 
attacking the Uamdänid territories in northern Syria. The latter 
had by now become too weak to ward off Byzantine attacks. 
Consequently, one of their mawläs named Qarghuwaih, had, much 
against their will, forged an alliance with Byzantium in afar 
359/December 969-January 970.5 Fi. imid control of al-Shim would 
thus give them the opportunity and prestige of defending Islam 
against Byzantine aggression. In fact, it would place the 
Byzantines on the defensive rather than being the aggressors, as 
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had been the case at the time. 
Fätimid preoccupation with waging a 'ihäd against Byzantium was 
not just a propaganda tactic employed by the Fdtimids to win the 
populace over to their cause. It actually reflected the gravity 
with which the Muslims of the time viewed the Byzantine offensive 
into territories that had been a contended part of the dir 
al-Isläm for at least two centuries. 
6 
II Struggle over al-Shäm 
i. Prelude 
The fall of the great city of Antioch to Byzantium in 358/969 
stirred up strong Muslim reactions against them. The Fäýimids 
responded to this challenge by sending an army to retrieve Antioch 
in 359/970. This force was supported by many local fighting 
contingents from Syria and Palestine. After laying siege to the 
city for five months, the Fätimid army was forced to withdraw as 
their interests at Damascus were seriously challenged by local 
elements within the city as well as by the Qarmatians. For the 
next few years the Fitimids had their hands too full in dealing 
with the Qarmatians and other elements in Syria to conduct any 
further campaigns against Byzantine possessions in northern Syria. 
The Fätimid threat to Antioch did not go unnoticed in Byzantium. 
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As soon as the new Byzantine Emperor John Tzimisces 
(358-366/969-976) had pacified the Armenian-Georgian and 
Mesopotamian borders of his empire, he turned his attention to 
Syria. In the summer of 363/974 Tzimisces amassed a large, 
impressive army at Antioch.? The Byzantine army conducted forays 
into territories that lay between Antioch and Tripoli - which was 
in Fätimid hands. At about the same time Tzimisces also sent an 
embassy to the Fätimid court to seek an armistice. Unfortunately, 
the terms of negotiation are unknown and all we are told is that 
the Byzantine envoy died in Egypt in Dhu-l-Qacda 363/August 974.8 
It may well have been that the Byzantines had sought some sort of 
an agreement with the Fätimids concerning control over Syria. 
However, nothing constructive appears to have come out of these 
negotiations and the Fätimids, in response to the Byzantine 
military build-up at Antioch, dispatched a large army towards 
Syria. 9 
In the spring of the following year, that is 364/975, Tzimisces 
undertook an extensive expedition into Syria. He subjugated 
either by military might or persuasion, most of the major towns of 
Syria including I1im! ý, BaClabakk. and Damascus. His entry into 
Palestine, however, was stubbornly resisted by Frztimid troops. 10 
He thus began his return journey to Antioch via the coastal route, 
taking Beirut and Byblos. He then set out for Frltimid-held 
Tripoli. Despite engaging in some savage battles, the torn did 
not surrender as it had been thoroughly fortified by the Fätimids. 
The successful defence of Tripoli by Fa timid troops was 
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significant from the Hi timid, point of view. It, demonstrated that 
even at this relatively early stage of their activities in Syria 
the Fätimids were determined to maintain their hold over Tripoli. 
Later events were to show that the Fätimids used Tripoli as a base 
from which they attempted to maintain their authority in Syria as 
well as use it as a springboard from which to challenge the 
Byzantines in northern Syria. The Byzantine Emperor thus retraced 
his steps to Antioch, annexing some fortresses on the way. Soon 
after, in Rabic II 365/January 976, he died at Constantinople. 
By his campaign into Syria, Tzimisces succeeded in making a very 
clear statement that Byzantium was capable and willing to protect 
its interests in northern Syria, by use of force if necessary. 11 
In all the places where he had gained the upper hand, Tzimisces 
was satisfied that their rulers should pay nominal allegiance to 
Byzantium. He thus seems to have aimed at creating a buffer zone 
between Byzantine-held areas of northern Syria and the Fatimids, 
by creating a string of independent Muslim principalities. 
Byzantine aggression in what the Fätimids perceived as their 
domain in Syria was viewed with serious concern by them. The fact 
that only the arrival of a Byzantine envoy to the Fdtimid court 
after Tzimisces' return to Constantinople is recorded, without any 
indication of the message from the Byzantine emperor, nor the 
Fa. imid response to it, suggests a breakdown of negotiations 
between the two powers. 12 Ibn Zuläq, a notable contemporary 
historian, states in the obituary notice of the Fät. imid Caliph at 
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the time, al-Mu7-izz lidin Alläh (341-365/953-75), that he intended 
to wage a 'iý häd against Byzantium. 
13 However, shortly after the 
Byzantine incursion into Syria, al-MuCizz passed away. 
II ii The first decade 365-375/975-985 
The next Fätimid ruler, al-'Aziz billäh (365-396/975-99G), and his 
Byzantine counterpart, Basil II (365-415-6/976-1025), came to 
power within a year of each other. As can be envisaged, in the 
initial years of their rule, both these potentates were too 
involved with their internal affairs to pursue an active foreign 
policy against each other. For the first three years of Basil 
II's reign (365-368/976-979), his authority was resolutely 
undermined by the revolt of Bardas Skieros -a contender to the 
Byzantine throne. His defeat in 368/979 and his subsequent escape 
to the Büyids gave Basil II a brief respite. 14 
Ironically, the very general who crushed the rebellion of Bardas 
Skieros, called Bardas Phocas, then proclaimed himself emperor in 
376/987. So serious was his sedition that it could only be curbed 
with assistance from Basil II's Russian allies in 379/989.15 
Moreover, for almost a decade after he became the emperor, real 
power lay in the hands of his great uncle Basil, the 
Parakoimomenos. It was only after the deposition of the latter in 
375/985 that Basil II took over the reins of government himself. 16 
On the Fätimid side al-CAziz was in total and undisputed conuwind 
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in Egypt. However, in the early years of his caliphate he had to 
deploy considerable military and monetary resources to pacify and 
subjugate southern Syria and Palestine. 17 This should not be 
interpreted to mean that there was a total lack of hostilities 
between these two powers from the very onset of the reigns of 
al-CAziz and Basil II. 
II iii Frontier skirmishes between Fätimid and Byzantine Forces 
Ya1yä b. Sadid al-An. aki, an invaluable source on 
Fätimid-Byzantine diplomacy, 18 records a highly profitable raid on 
Fätimid-held Tripoli authorized by the Byzantine Emperor and 
executed by his governor at Antioch, Michael Burtzes, in the very 
year of Basil II's accession. He adds that upon Burtzes' return, 
preparations got under way for the next foray against Tripoli. 
19 
Al-An4alc3 reports another Byzantine raid on Tripoli in 370/980-1. 
It was viewed as a great success by Byzantium for a large number 
of the town's inhabitants and the Maghilriba20 were either taken 
captive or massacred. Byzantium also gained a great deal of 
booty. Consequently, the person who had led the razzia, liurmülc, 
was appointed governor of al-1 dhagIya. In response to the 
Byzantine raid on Tripoli, the Fätimids sent one of their 
commanders called al-Sanhäji to raid the environs of Antioch. The 
same Burmük launched a bold night ajtack against the raiding party 
and routed it completely. 
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The Fätimids retaliated in that very year by dispatching Nazzäl 
and Ibn Shäkir from Tripoli to al-Lädhagiya where they besieged 
f 
its fortress. Once again Kurmic set out to ward them off but this 
time the tables were turned on him. He was arrested by Fätimid 
troops, sent to Cairo and eventually executed. 21 
The next recorded instance of Fdtimid-Byzantine confrontation 
occurs five years later when in 375/985-6, FRtimid forces besieged 
Bulunyäs, a coastal fortress south of al-L6dhagiya. This was a 
particularly troublesome period for Basil II as he was in the 
process of ridding himself of the power of his great uncle Basil 
the parakoimomenos. As a result, although the Byzantine governor 
at Antioch, Leo Melissenos, set out to meet the invaders at 
Bulunyas and besieged it, a revolt in his army in favour of Basil 
the parakoimomenos, made him retreat. Basil II was infuriated at 
that and immediately took steps to recover Bulunyis. A Byzantine 
force under Leo laid another siege to Bulunyäs. Its Fütimid 
occupants sought and were granted amen. They then returned to 
Tripoli. 22 
Thus the first decade of al-cAzlz and Basil II's reigns witnessed 
limited confrontation between the two powers. Their range of 
military activities was confined mainly to sending raiding parties 
by land and sea into each other's frontier territories. 
However, just when Basil II must have breathed a sign of relief at 
having checked Fä. imid expansion into his domains as well as 
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having successfully wrested power from Basil the parakoimomenos, 
further trouble was brewing for him. In 376/986-7 the BUyids 
released Bardas Skleros from captivity for a couple of reasons. 23 
The first was that Skieros had not proved to be as good a bait for 
wresting concessions from Byzantium as the Büyids had envisaged. 
Secondly, by releasing Skieros the Büyids were hoping to get their 
own back on Basil II, for Skleros had every intention of 
continuing his revolt against the Byzantine Emperor. 
To add'fuel to the fire, as mentioned earlier, Bardas Phocas shook 
the very foundation of Basil II's authority by declaring himself 
the new Byzantine emperor. His revolt assumed threatening 
proportions as he managed to secure the support of Bardas Skieros 
as well. As a result, they rebelled jointly. At the same time, 
on the military front, Basil II's forces met with severe reverses 
in Bulgaria. 24 All these factors contributed to Basil II's 
sending an embassy to the Fätimid court to seek a peace treaty. 
III Fätimid-Byzantine Accord 
Ünder the year 377/987 the Egyptian historian Abu'l-Malisin Ibn 
Taghri Bird125 records the arrival of a Byzantine embassy to 
al-c-Aziz. The Byzantine delegation came by sea to the coast of 
Palestine and then travelled to Cairo by land. it can be inferred 
quite clearly from the stipulations of the settlement between the 
two parties that the Byzantines had come to seek a truce. The 
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main conditions of the treaty were that: 
1. Byzantium was to release all Muslim prisoners held by them. 
2. Every Friday the khu ba in the 
.i mic mosque of 
Constantinople 
was to be pronounced in al-cAziz's name. 
3. Byzantium guaranteed to supply any provisions that al-CAziz 
sought. 
4. The agreement was valid for a period of seven years. 
The above terms of settlement and the year in which the pact was 
made are corroborated by no less a Byzantine source than the deeds 
of the imperial archives of the Byzantine empire. 26 The first 
clause of the agreement that it mentions, however, is additional 
to those cited above. According to this version, al cAziz would, 
perhaps, restore the Church of the Resurrection in Jerusalem. The 
wording of the clause and its omission in Fatimid sources suggests 
that this is what Byzantium may have wished but not necessarily 
something that al-cAziz had agreed to. Moreover, by malting the 
repair of the church the very first item of the accord, the 
Byzantine scribe may have tried to sweeten the pill of having had 
to make concessions to the Fätimids in return for peace. 
For the Fätimids, an agreement with Byzantium, made on their own 
terms, meant an extra feather in their cap. Commercially, they 
benefited considerably, for through this truce al-'Aziz managed to 
lift the economic sanctions that the Byzantine Emperor John 
Tzimisces had imposed in 360-1/971. According to this decree 
Venetian merchants were forbidden to carry essential maritime 
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supplies such as iron, arms and timber to Fätimid lands; items 
which Egypt did not locally produce in abundance and which, 
consequently, the F44imids needed to import from abroad. Although 
the actual commodities are not mentioned in the truce of 377/987, 
as Faraj has pointed out, it is very likely that it was the above 
items that were alluded to here. 27 Availability of these 
commodities would also give impetus to build more ships, 
strengthening Fstimid naval power, as a result. 
As far as the khutba was concerned, it had always been pronounced 
in the reigning cAbbasid Caliph's name. This treaty changed that. 
It recognized the primacy of al-cAziz over his CAbbäsid 
counterpart at Constantinople -a considerable propaganda victory 
for the FRtimids. 
As the Fätimids claimed to have a greater ability than their 
cAbbäsid counterparts to wage "iingd against 
Byzantium) Forsyth 
justifiably questions their motives for concluding a truce with 
the Byzantines - especially when civil war rendered their 
territories vulnerable. 28 He explains that perhaps al-cAzlz's 
action was a counter-measure to the alliance which the Büyids had 




] the Fä. imid Caliph did not want to see 
an Emperor, whose primary loyalty was to Baghdad, ruling at 
Constantinople . 
Another possible factor that must have influenced a1-CAziz's 
decision, concerns Fdtimid activities in southern Syria. As yet, 
Fätimid forces had achieved limited success in that region. 
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Consequently, al-CAzlz may have viewed a temporary ceasefire with 
Byzantium in a favourable light, for it would give him the 
opportunity to consolidate his authority in southern Syria without 
the apprehension of Byzantine attacks on his territories further 
north. Moreover, as is well known, YaCqüb b. Killis, al-CAziz's 
esteemed vizier, played a prominent role in influencing state 
policy. It is clearly evident from the deathbed counsel he gave 
his master in 380/991-2, that he was in favour of maintaining 
peaceful relations with Byzantium. Accordingly, he advised 
al-cAzlz to keep peace with them as long as they kept it. 29 
Both Lev and Kennedy have pointed out that Ibn Killis was 
influenced in his policies over al-Sham by the Ikhshidid model. 30 
This meant making Damascus a power base and letting the Ijamdänids 
rule independently in northern Syria. Accordingly, Ibn Killis 
further advised al-CAziz to be satisfied with the IjamdAnids so 
long as they paid nominal allegiance to him. 31 
Al-cAziz, on the other hand, was eager to pursue a more 
expansionist policy in Syria. He opted for the Tulünid approach, 
according to which it was essential to bring Palestine and all of 
Syria as far as the Byzantine frontier, under Fdtimid control. 32 
Soon after Ibn Killis' death, al-cAziz escalated his military 
manoeuvres in northern Syria. He took every opportunity to 
increase F44imid influence there. Inevitably, that led to 
Fä imid-Byzantine confrontation - especially when al-cAziz tried 
to retrieve the strategically located city of Aleppo from the 
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Byzantine sphere of influence. I 
IV Aleppo - the Coveted City 
The second most important city in Syria, after Damascus, was 
Aleppo. For the first decade and a half of al-CAziz's rule, 
Aleppo was governed by the i3amdänid Abu'1-Macilll Sacd al-Dawla 
(356-381/967-991). It was his policy to try to operate as 
independently as possible. However, Sacd al-Dawla had few 
resources at hand and his territories were coveted by far more 
powerful neighbours such as the Fgtimids, Byzantium and even the 
Büyids; the latter particularly during the reign of cA4ud 
al-Dawla at Baghdad. Said al-Dawla's best bet, therefore,, was to 
play off one power against the other in order to attain his own 
ambitions. 
One of the ways in which Sad al-Dawla sought to maintain his 
autonomy was by continuing the pact with Byzantium. According to 
this pact, the latter would protect his territories from any 
foreign aggression. In return SaCd had to pay them an annual 
tribute. Simultaneously, SaCd had the khutba pronounced and coins 
minted in his territories in either the Fätimid or Büyid name, 
depending on which of the two powers exercised more influence in 
the area at the time. As can be expected, whenever 1 amdänid 
territories were not threatened by the Fätimids and in times of 




Fä'imid interest in Aleppo stemmed from the crucial geographical 
position that the city occupied at the time. Ibn al-Qalänisi 
(470-555/1077-1160) sums up the location of Aleppo aptly, from the 
Fätimid point of view, when he reports in the words of Bakjür34 - 
a Ilamdänid renegade - that, 
Aleppo is the doorway to Iraq. Whosoever conquers it, the 
lands that lie beyond it are his too. 35 
Thus, if the Fätimids were to achieve their political and 
ideological ambitions of advancing eastwards, conquest of Aleppo 
was of the utmost importance. Commercially, Aleppo was a 
prosperous city that lay on the crossroads of the caravan route 
that linked the Mediterranean lands to those of the East. 36 
Unlike the F44imid al-cAziz, his Byzantine counterpart had no 
ambitions to annex Aleppo directly to its own lands. Consequently 
when Basil II was advised by his brother Constantine to take over 
Aleppo and make it a part of Byzantine territories, he rejected 
the sueggestion. 37 He rightly felt that it would serve the 
interests of his state better to maintain Aleppo as buffer between 
Byzantine lands in northern Syria, and those of the Muslim world. 
Byzantine policy towards Aleppo was influenced by two major 
considerations - security and commerce. They felt that Aleppo was 
the gateway to Antioch. Therefore loss of Aleppo would mean a 
step towards the loss of Antioch and other Byzantine territories 
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in Asia Minor. Moreover, by maintaining some influence over 
Aleppo, Byzantium could also take advantage of the flourishing 
trade there. Furthermore, Aleppo would also act as a barrier that 
would check Bedouin raids into Byzantine territories. 
Understandably, it suited Byzantine interests to have a small, 
weak and semi-independent state in Aleppo which relied on their 
succour. Its rulers therefore stubbornly resisted any attempts 
the Fätimids or, for that matter, the Büyids made to win Aleppo 
over. 38 
IV i The Fätimid-Byzantine Confrontation over Aleppo. 
The seeds of Fdtimid-Byzantine discord over Aleppo were sown when 
the Fätimids supported Bakjür in Rabic II 373/ September 983 in 
his attempts to take over the city from Sacd al-Dawla. 39 
Ironically, Byzantium came to the rescue of the very same Sacd 
al-Dawla - now the ruler of Aleppo - whose right to rule over the 
city it had denied him in 359/969-70. It had done so by signing a 
treaty with Qarghüwaih, Saif al-Dawla's b5dib. Qarghüwaih had 
seized power when Saif al-Dawla, Sacd's father, died. According 
to the treaty, Byzantium recognised Qarghüwaih only as the sole 
ruler of Aleppo, with Bakjür, his hul5m, as his successor. 
Bakjiir wrested authority from Qarghüwaih and reinstated Sacd over 
Aleppo. As compensation, SaCd granted Bakjür the governorship of 
Ijims. 40 
The arrival of a Byzantine army at the gates of the city compelled 
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Bakjür to raise the siege of Aleppo and to withdraw even from 
JIim$, which now became a part of SaCd's domain. Bakjür was then 
successful in getting himself appointed as the Ftltimid governor at 
Damascus in Rajab 373/December 983-January 984.41 Hostilities 
between him and SaCd ceased for a while, especially since in 
376/986 Sacd once again recognised Fätimid sovereignty over his 
territories, as opposed to paying allegiance to the now 
considerably weakened Büyids. 
42 
Bakjar's governorship of Damascus led to a clash of policies 
between al-cAziz and his vizier Yacgab b. Killis. Eventually, in 
Rajab 378/October 988 Ibn Killis managed to oust Bakjar from his 
governorship. ' 13 Bakjür once again enticed al-cAzlz with the 
prospect of conquering Aleppo and sought military aid from him. 
Although al-cAziz agreed to support him and so ordered his 
governor at Tripoli, Nazzäl, to assist Bakjür, the Fätimid vizier 
at the time, cIsä b. Nestorius, thought otherwise. He thus told 
Nazzäl, his confidant, to delay his march as long as possible. In 
the meantime, Bakjür besieged Aleppo with as much support as he 
could muster. This time, with Byzantine enforcements at hand, 
Sacd inflicted a severe defeat on Bakjar at Näcara, to the east of 
Aleppo, in 381/991. As was to be expected, Bakjar was captured 
and promptly executed. 
44 
Contrary to a promise he had made, SaCd arrested Bakjür's children 
and claimed all of Bakjür's considerable wealth for himself. 
Bakjür's children appealed to al-cAziz. The latter communicated 
229 
his disapproval to SaCd. 45 SaCd is then reported, in some 
sources, to have threatened to advance against Fätimid possessions 
in Syria and Palestine. 46 However, the mounting tension between 
the F 4. imids and the Ijar rids was defused soon after, due to the 
demise of Sacd al-Dawla in Raman 381/December 991-January 992. 
Bakjür's death marked an end of the era when the Fatimid quest for 
Aleppo was pursued by offering assistance to a third party to 
rebel against the I}amdänids. Henceforth, al-cAziz sent his forces 
to Aleppo with the clear and undisguised motive of seriously 
challenging Vamdänid rule there. The ultimate Fritimid objective 
was to establish its authority over Aleppo. The death of Sacd 
al-Dawla and the subsequent weakening of 1iamd5nid authority acted 
as catalysts for F44imid designs on Aleppo. Consequently, the 
first step that al-cAziz took after the ITamdänid ruler's death was 
to order one of his Turkish ghilmän Manjütakin, who had recently 
been appointed the governor of. Damascus as well, to advance to the 
Aleppan region. 
IV ii Fätimid Cammigns against Aleppo 382-386/992-996 
In $afar 382/April 992 Manjütakin received the reinforcements, 
arms and a substantial sum of money that al-'-Aziz had sent him 
from Egypt. Soon after, he left for Aleppo at the head of a 
strong army. 47 He was accompanied by Abu'1-ijasan al-Maghribi, the 
former kätib of Bakjür. In addition to having administrative 
experience, Ibn al-Maghribi also had sound knowledge of the Aleppo 
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region. He would therefore be most suitable for administering the 
new territories once they had come under Fatimid control. 48 
At Aleppo Abu'l-Fa4ä'il Sacid al-Dawla had succeeded his father 
Sacd al-Dawla. Real power, however, was exercised by his father's 
chamberlain, Lu'1u'. 49 On hearing of the Fätimid advance into 
northern Syria, they at once sought Byzantine protection. They 
wrote to Basil II who was campaigning in Bulgaria at the time. 
Basil advised his governor at Antioch, Michael Burtzes, to assist 
the Vamd2inids. 50 In the meantime in Rabic II 382/June-July 992 
Fätimid troops defeated a FTamdänid force in a skirmish near 
Apamea. In the same month they succeeded in conquering the 
Iamdmnid territories of Ijims, }amit and Shaizar. They then 
advanced to Aleppo, entered the town from the P 5b al-Yahüd and 
besieged it-51 
Sa93d al-Dawla attempted to have the siege raised by promising to 
give allegiance to the Fä, imid al-cAziz together with proclaiming 
his name in the khutba, on the coins and on all the banners in his 
lands. In addition he offered Manjütakin a substantial sum of 
money, but to no avail. 
52 The Fä . imid siege of Aleppo continued 
for thirty-three days. Then developments in Byzantine lands 
necessitated 'Manjütakin appointing lieutenants to continue the 
siege whilst he marched against some neighbouring Byzantine 
territories. 
Prior to setting off from Damascus, Manjütakin had sent an envoy 
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to the Byzantine governor at Antioch to assure him that the 
Fä imid army had no intentions of marching against any of the 
Byzantine territories in northern Syria, but were only concerned 
with the Ilamdänid possessions. Accordingly, neither he nor any of 
his subordinates would intrude on Byzantine principalities. 
Burtzes, the Byzantine governor, ill-treated the envoy, however, 
and had him imprisoned. When Basil II heard of the misdemeanour 
of his governor, he is reported to have been rather displeased. 
He ordered the release of the envoy, treated him well and sent him 
back with a polite but firm message that Byzantium would not 
tolerate a Fätimid takeover of Aleppo. 
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Either in retaliation against the maltreatment meted out to his 
envoy by the Byzantine governor, or in response to Byzantine 
preparations to assist the Vamdänids, or because of a combination 
of these two factors, Manjütakin left Aleppo and attacked some 
Byzantine territories that were adjacent to it. In the meantime 
Burtzes advanced to meet the Fätimid general. 
The two armies met at Jisr al-Iadid. Although the Byzantine force 
was larger than the Fä , imid one, the latter scored a victory. So 
pleased was al-CAzi z that he personally read out the communique 
announcing Fä imid success. Manjütakin took a large number of 
Byzantine soldiers captive and also gained a great deal of 
booty. 54 Manjütakin then pressed forward towards Antioch. On the 
way he overwhelmed the Byzantine-held fortress of CImm where he 
again took a vast aniourit of booty and prisoners. He then advanced 
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further into Byzantine lands until he reached the vicinity of 
Antioch. According to Y4yä, the numerical superiority of 
Manjütakin's army dissuaded Burtzes from opposing him at the gates 
of Antioch. The Fätimid general then pillaged and plundered the 
enemy territories. Consequently, laden with booty and prisoners, 
Manjütakin retraced his steps to Aleppo via Marlash after fighting 
in Byzantine lands for just over a year. 55 
The Fätimid siege of Aleppo continued until the end of 382/992 
when Manjütakin withdrew with his entire force to winter in 
Damascus. The Fä . 
imid general felt the need to lift the siege in 
the winter primarily because it was extremely difficult to supply 
a substantial armed force such as his with provisions over vast 
stretches of land. 
56 This problem was aggravated by the }, iamdänids 
removing as much grain as possible from the vicinity of Aleppo and 
burning the rest, causing shortages of food supply in Filtimid 
ranks. 57 
The Fä4imids appear to have spent the following year consolidating 
territories they had conquered in their previous campaigns and in 
reorganising their forces. Consequently, they did not undertake 
any major military operations in northern Syria at this time. 
58 
There were, however, some significant naval encounters between the 
Fä. imids and Byzantium in 383/993, with Byzantium taking the 
offensive. From al-Magrizl's report it appears that Byzantium 
launched a couple of attacks against Alexandria in 383/993. In 
the first instance, the two powers engaged in naval warfare in the 
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environs of Alexandria. The outcome of this encounter was 
probably in favour of the F&Vimids for they took seventy Byzantine 
soldiers captive. Al-Plagrizi does not mention any Fätimid losses. 
In the second Byzantine appearance at Alexandria the Fätimids 
adopted a two-pronged strategy. They consolidated the city by 
sending some of their armed forces there, and so preparing 
themselves to repulse any intended Byzantine onslaught on land. 
Simultaneously, the Fätimid navy set sail against the invaders. 
The Fä , imid fleet successfully chased the 
Byzantines from Egyptian 
waters and compelled them to retreat to the Syrian coast without 
any actual fighting taking place between the two forces. At this 
time eighteen ships laden with weapons and warriors were added to 
the Faatimid fleet to strengthen it further. 59 
If a motive for Byzantine aggression need be sought, it could be 
either to hamper Fätimid preparations in central Syria by stopping 
their supplies from reaching their base at Tripoli, or 
alternatively to sound a warning to the Fä imids that Byzantium 
would retaliate against attacks on their territories by striking 
back effectively on Fätimid lands. 
The spring of 384/994 witnessed Fätimid determination to besiege 
Aleppo once again. Consequently, Manjütakin set out from Damascus 
in Rabic I 394/April-May 994.60 Once he arrived at Apamea, he 
headed for Antioch, ravaging and plundering the villages that lay 
in its vicinity. He then returned to Apamea and from there moved 
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southwards along the coast to Jabäla. It is most likely that the 
recent arrival at Antioch of a Byzantine general, Leo Mellisenos, 
at the head of a large army, may have proved to be a deterrent to 
any further offensives that the FR timid general may have planned 
to undertake in the area. 
Manjiatakin left for Aleppo and by the summer of 384/994 the 
Fätimid army had once again laid siege to Aleppo. Manjütakin was 
compelled to relax the siege in Shacbän 384/September 994 when it 
came to his attention that a joint Byzantine force under Michael 
Burtzes and Leo Mellisenos had advanced as far as Apamea in order 
to help the }amdänids against the besiegers. 61 Therefore, 
Manjütakin withdrew temporarily from Aleppo to meet the Byzantine 
force. 
Finally, the Byzantine and Fitimid armies advanced until they drew 
up along the western and eastern banks of the Orontes 
respectively. Inevitably, one of the two sides had to cross the 
river in order to engage the enemy. It was the Aailami contingent 
of the Fätimid army that took the plunge on 6 Shaebän/15 
September. The rest of the F44imid force followed suit and 
launched a fierce attack on the Byzantine side. This battle 
proved to be the most decisive one between the two forces. The 
Byzantines were outnumbered and demoralised. Consequently, they 
were completed routed. Both Burtzes and Mellisenos were compelled 
to retreat to Antioch having lost as many as five thousand of 
their men in battle. 62 In the meantime tlanjütakIn marched 
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triumphantly to Aleppo and renewed the siege. S 
As can be anticipated, the news of Fgtimid victory in Syria was 
received and celebrated in Cairo with great jubilation. When some 
two hundred and fifty Byzantine prisoners of war including eight 
patriarchs and eighteen men from the Banü Uamdän eventually 
arrived in the Fä, imid capital in DhuIl-Qacda 384/December 994, 
they were paraded before the Fä4imid Caliph al-CAziz and his young 
son, al-Man§ür. A1-Magrizi depicts the day this event took place 
as "a great day". 63 
Fä%imid success on land appears to have been matched by its navy's 
performance at sea against Byzantium. A1-Magrizi reports that in 
JumMa I 384/June-July 994, a Fätimid naval expedition returned to 
Cairo with a hundred prisoners of war. He adds that both Fust. ät 
and Cairo were decorated most beautifully on that occasion and 
that al-cAziz and his son rode through the streets of the capital 
and then went to al-hags by boat before returning to their palace. 
He then adds the cliche, "It was a great day; Egypt had not 
witnessed its like before". 
64 
In the meantime the Fatimid siege of Aleppo continued through the 
rest of 384/994. Contrary to the usual practice of the F5timid 
army wintering in Damascus, Manjütakin set up permanent camp for 
his troops outside the city walls, complete with markets, baths, 
hostelries and fortifications. 65 As can be expected, the long, 
drawn-out siege had grave consequences for the local populace. 
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Shortage of food led to famine and plague followed in its wake. 
V Basil II's Campaign in Syria in 385/995 
Aleppo was finally on the verge of a Fätimid takeover when the 
IJamdänid ruler Abu'l-Fa4 'il and his chamberlain Lu'lu's pleas for 
assistance to the Byzantine Emperor made the latter realise the 
gravity of the situation. Hitherto, whenever the 1Jamd rids had 
sought Basil II's help in combatting Fitimid attacks, the 
Byzantine Emperor had usually instructed his governor at Antioch 
to aid the I; amdänids. In response to Ijamdmnid appeals in 384/994 
Basil II had ordered his general Leo Melissenos to join forces 
with Burtzes in order to strengthen his forces. But as the 
Fätimid-Byzantine confrontation of 384/994 had revealed, even a 
joint Byzantine force did not prove an equal match to Manjütakin's 
army. Moreover, in their appeal the 1; amd5nids managed to impress 
on Basil II that once Aleppo fell to the Fntimids, Antioch was to 
be their next objective. 66 Their envoy further added that, 
If you were to deal with this matter personally, not a single 
Maghribi army would be able to oppose you. Thus Aleppo would 
be saved and Antioch and its environs protected. If you 
hesitate, they will take possession of all that. 67 
Realising that the situation in northern Syria was critical from 
the Byzantine point of view, Basil II interrupted his successful 
campaign in Bulgaria. He set out in earnest for Aleppo, covering 
a distance of three hundred parasaangs and crossing the whole of 
Asia Minor in less than two and a half weeks. 68 The Byzantine 
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Emperor sought to take the Fätimid general by surprise. 
Consequently, he took stringent measures to keep his march a 
secret. Manjütakin's agents, however, intercepted the Byzantine 
envoys who were on their way to deliver a message to the 13amdänids 
of the imminent arrival of the Byzantine ruler at Aleppo. 
At once Manjütakin made preparations to withdraw. lie gave orders 
that all installations and fortifications that had formerly been 
erected by the Fätimids around Aleppo should be burnt or 
destroyed. On the last day of Rabi I 385/3 May 995, after a 
continuous siege of seven months, the Fiitimid army began a 
precipitate retreat towards Damascus. 
69 
Basil II appeared at the gates of Aleppo just two days after the 
Fätimid withdrawal. The ljamdänid ruler and his chamberlain 
received the Emperor, tendered their allegiance to him and thanked 
him for repulsing the Hi timid onslaught. 70 After a very brief 
stay at Aleppo, Basil II set out southwards along the Orontes. lie 
sacked Apamea and defeated part of Manjütakin's army that had been 
stationed there, in one day. 
71 At Shaizar the Emperor overwhelmed 
the F&Vimid general Man§Ur b. Karrldis, who subsequently professed 
loyalty to Byzantium. 72 The Emperor then proceeded to sack k{img 
and Rafänlya, pillaging and plundering as well as taking many 
captives. 73 Thereafter Basil II turned towards the coast and laid 
siege to Tripoli. 
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VI Tripoli -a Fätimid Stronghold and Naval Base 
f 
The Byzantine Emperor's motives concerning Tripoli were quite 
different from his policies concerning northern Syria. As the 
latter had formed part of the IJamdänid territories in the past, 
and so constituted the land of Byzantine-Vamdänid truce, the 
Emperor sought to merely expel the Fritimids from these 
territories. He did not, however, attempt to place these lands 
under Byzantine occuption. When Basil II laid siege to Tripoli, 
on the other hand, he had every intention of conquering that city 
and placing it under direct Byzantine control. lie had good 
reasons to do so for Tripoli was the main Fdtimid stronghold on 
the Syrian coast and the principal base of their fleet in Syria. 
Because of its strategic location, Tripoli served as the most 
suitable place from which Fgtimid offensives in northern Syria, 
particularly against Aleppo, could be undertaken.? 
' 
Moreover, at the port of Tripoli the Filtimid navy could bring 
essential supplies from Egypt for its forces in Syria. Thus when 
Manjütakin was waging war in northern Syria, Ibn al-Qalänisi 
reports that al-eAziz sent him one hundred thousand bags of grain 
via Tripoli. 75 In addition, from the Byzantine point of view, 
maintenance of a well-fortified port such as that of Tripoli would 
prove neither cumbersome nor costly as would the maintenance of 
some of the localities in the interior of Syria. 
Despite Basil II's great show of strength, the siege of Tripoli 
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dragged on for forty days with success nowhere in sight. In an 
effort to bring Tripoli into the Byzantine sphere of influence, 
the Emperor promised to treat its inhabitants favourably if they 
agreed to a pact with Byzantium. This agreement would place 
Tripoli in a similar category to Aleppo and would give its 
hitherto Fä , imid governor, MuZahhar b. Nazzül, an opportunity to 
become an independent ruler. When Ibn Nazzäl had gone out of the 
city's gates to communicate his approval to Basil II's proposals, 
the inhabitants of the city shut the gates on him and refused him 
entry. 
The main opponent to the scheme which had been suggested by Basil 
II was an influential äI called 'All b. cAbd al-W'al? id b. 
IIaidara. He had thus galvanised resistance within Tripoli. A 
brother of al-MuZahhar then succeeded the latter as the governor 
of Tripoli. In the meantime, the stubborn resistance of the 
Tripolitanians compelled Basil II to lift the drawn-out siege of 
the city. Al-Mu7, ahhar had little choice but to leave Tripoli. He 
therefore decided to accompany the Emperor. 76 
Basil II's determination to challenge the F5timid base at Tripoli 
led him next to the coastal town of An. artus, located some 
fifty-nine kilometres north of Tripoli. Here the Emperor rebuilt 
a ruined coastal fortress and garrisoned the place with a four 
thousand-strong force. 77 He then retraced his steps to Antioch, 
where he dismissed Michael Burtzes and appointed in his place 




VII Fätimid Response - Massive War Preparations 
As soon as the news of Manjütakin's unexpected retreat reached the 
Fa-timid capital, al-CAziz proclaimed a 'iMd against the Byzantine 
empire. A decree was issued in Fustilt and Cairo urging all 
able-bodied men to fight for this noble cause which the Caliph was 
going to command in person. Thousands of civilians enlisted to 
offer battle to Byzantium, in response to this call. 
79 Al-Magriz! 
gives a lengthy account of the preparations that took several 
months. He even mentions details such as the number of horses and 
other beasts purchased, naming the amounts of money that al-cAziz 
sent his various commanders, etc., 
To highlight the scale of the planned operation it suffices -to 
point out that Manjütakin alone received one hundred and fifty 
thousand dinars at this time. On 10 Rajab 385/2 August 995 
al-CAzlz mobilizied his entire army to Muniat al-Asbagh, situated 
to the east of Cairo. He also sent a large force to Syria under 
the Fatimid commander, Jaish b. al-$amYania. 80 
Soon after Basil II's return to Constantinople he sent an embassy 
to the Fä. imid court seeking a renewal of the Byzantine-F5 timid 
accord and apologising for his invasion into Syria. A ijamdnnid 
envoy also presented himself at Cairo seeking forgiveness and 
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requesting the Fätimid Caliph to confirm him in his post. 
Al-cAziz seems to have joined in the charade by agreeing to these 
requests. 81 Meanwhile, preparations for a Filtimid campaign into 
Syria continued unabated. 
Accordingly, soon after the Byzantine Emperor left northern Syria, 
Manjütakin once again set out from Damascus in Shawwi l 
385/December 995. This time it was the recently fortified coastal 
town of An$. artüs that formed the target of his campaign. Although 
he laid siege to it for a month, he failed to achieve any decisive 
results. He therefore returned to Damascus. 
82 The fact that the 
Fa timid general felt the need to challenge the newly-established 
Byzantine base at Antar-ýüs shows that the Fätimids viewed it as a 
serious threat to their interests in Syria, especially their own 
base at Tripoli. 
Despite Basil II's setback in conquering Tripoli, it continued to 
be the focus of Byzantine aggression. Accordingly, in late 
385/995 in the very first year of his term as governor of Tripoli, 
Damianos Dalassenos led a raid on Tripoli and its environs, taking 
many captives with him. Three months later he attacked cArga. 
The following year he undertook another raid on Tripoli and 
plundered Rafaniya, CAuj and al-Lakilma and captured the latter's 
fortress. Each of these military exploits of the new Byzantine 
governor were marked by ruin and devastation. 83 
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By the spring of 386/996 friction between Cairo and Constantinople 
had reached unprecedented heights. The, Fil. imid al-cAziz moved his 
camp on 20 Rabic I 386/12 April 996 from Muni Jacfar, where it had 
been stationed for a while, to Bilbais - the first stop on the 
route to Palestine. 
84 The Fä . imid ruler 
intended to conduct a 
two-pronged campaign to Syria. He personally was to lead his 
armed forces while his fleet was to set sail to Tripoli. 
Accordingly, al-CAzlz ordered his vizier dIsü b. Nestorius to 
build and equip a powerful war fleet to offer combat to Byzantine 
naval forces at sea. 
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VII i The Burning of the Fleet and its aftermath 
However, on the very day that the recently constructed ships were 
to be launched, after the noon prayer on Friday 23 Rab1O II 386/15 
May 996, fire broke out in the Cairo arsenal, destroying the whole 
fleet except six ships. 86 The populace of Cairo suspected the 
Byzantines residing near the arsenal at al-Nags in Cairo of 
starting the fire. A1-Magrizi states that these Byzantines were 
prisoners of war, while Yalaya asserts that they were the Italian 
merchants from Byzantine Amalfi who were actively engaged in 
commercial activity with Egypt. 87 
The mob and the Maghribi soldiers attacked these Byzantines, 
killing well over a hundred of them and looted their lodgings 
which were full of valuables. A couple of churches were also 
plundered and a bishop was severely injured in the incident. The 
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Fätimid vizier CIsä b. Nestorius and the chief of police, Yeinis 
al-Saglabi, eventually restored tranquillity. Most of what had 
been pillaged was restored to its original owners. Of the 
sixty-three plunderers arrested, one third were executed, the 
other third were flogged, and the final third were freed, 
according to a judgement proclaimed by the Fi . imid ruler. 
In the meantime 11sä b. Nestorius was instructed to supervise the 
construction of a new fleet. As Egypt was short of wood at this 
time, wood was taken from every conceivable place including the 
roof beams of the mint at Cairo and a small hospital, and was 
utilised in the construction of the new fleet. The urgency which 
the Filtimids attached to getting a new fleet ready can be seen in 
the fact that within a few months six new vessels were launched. 88 
The Fdtimids were soon to put to use their recently strengthened 
naval force. 
Either in retaliation against Byzantine activity at its newly 
established base at AnVar. üs or as a prelude to the grand campaign 
that the Fä . imid Caliph was to lead into Syria, Manjütakin was 
instructed to set out from Damascus in the summer of 386/990. 
After raiding the environs of Antioch and Aleppo he finally 
approached An. artüs and besieged it. 
Meanwhile a squadron of twenty-four ships equipped with ammunition 
and supplies set sail from Cairo to attack the Byzantine naval 
base simultaneously from the sea. A violent storm, however, 
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destroyed most of the Fätimid vessels and the ones that survived 
the storm were confiscated by the Byzantine forces. A large 
number of the ships' men were taken captive as well. The timely 
arrival of Damianos Dalassenos on the scene compelled Manjütakin 
to withdraw without achieving any concrete results. 
89 This was 
the last Fdtimid-Byzantine encounter in the reign of al-CAziz. 
VIII The death of al-'Azlz 
On 28 Rama4an 386/14 October 996 the Fätimid Caliph succumbed to a 
disease from which he had been suffering for a couple of months. 
The sudden and unexpected demise of the FLtimid ruler who was in 
total command of his state and well experienced in the art of 
warfare and his being replaced by an eleven-year old successor, 
who at the onset of his reign was at the mercy of the various 
elements of the FEVimid elite, transformed the situation 
dramatically. 
For the next few years rival Fä . imid generals were too occupied 
fighting out their own battles for power to pay any attention to 
Byzantium. Consequently, with the death of al-IAziz 
The only full-scale Fätimid attack on the Byzantine empire 
ever planned was permanently postponed. 90 
A1-cAziz's cherished dream of winning over the strategically 
placed region of northern Syria, particularly Aleppo, thereby 
taking one more precious step Cowards the East, could not be 
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fulfilled in his lifetime. In determining the course of events in 
northern Syria, Basil II had managed to have the final word, 
though at a considerable military and monetary expense to 
Byzantium as well. 
IX Evaluation of Fätimid-Byzantine Relations in al-CAziz's time 
From the outset of al-CAziz's reign, the Fatimid Caliph seems to 
have adopted a specific stance on his empire's relations with its 
Christian neighbour, Byzantium. Mtimid diplomacy concerning their 
most virile rival in Syria, Byzantium, was of necessity affected 
by their sovereign's policies concerning Syria itself. As has 
been stated earlier in the chapter, Fa timid control of Syria was 
essential not merely for economic and commercial considerations, 
but for the security of Egypt, the heart of the Fatimid empire. 
The earnestness and the tenacity with which al-cAziz attempted to 
establish Fätimid dominance in Syria, challenging time and again 
the Byzantine presence in the north of the country clearly reveals 
his concern with this issue. 
In fact, so determined was the Fritimid Caliph to maintain his 
hegemony in the region that he personally led his armed force in 
377/987 against Alptegin who had challenged Fatimid authority over 
Damascus. Nor did al-CAziz seem to have hesitated in taking the 
same course of action against the Byzantine Emperor, Basil II, in 
386/996 when he felt that the latter was threatening Fzitimid 
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interests in Syria. By the same token, control of Syria, at least 
the northern part of it, was viewed as essential by Byzantium for 
very much the same reasons as the Fatimids. Consequently, its 
rulers made every possible endeavour to maintain a foothold there. 
The reigns of al-CAziz and Basil II witnessed a crucial et Oct 
in Fätimid-Byzantine relations. It was during their time that the 
mode and extent of hostility on the one hand and diplomacy on the 
other were being tested out by the two medieval powers. This is 
amply evident in the detailed account of warfare and diplomacy 
between the Fätimids and Byzantium presented in this chapter. It 
was in the interests of both these powers to come to some sort of 
a settlement over Syria. Eventually they did so, with Byzantium 
retaining its hold over northern Syria and the FELtimids 
maintaining control over central and southern Syria. That 
compromise, however, was reached after the reign of al-CAziz, 
during the time of his successor, al-Väkim. 
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APPENDIX A 
A collection of Arabic poetry composed on the Fä0mid al- ̀Aziz and 
by him. 
[I] The original Arabic verses of Amir Tamim in praise of a1- (Aziz 
(Cf. Idris, VI) 207) 208 -10). 
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[2]Verses F'omposed by an Egyptian poet contemporary to al- Aziz, Aba Nasr Abd Alläh b. al-Husain al-Qairawani (Cf., Al-K , IX) 06-1? Zii1u itu Kqj 1jL`JÖ). 
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(3] A couplet by Ibn Killis addressed to al cAziz (Cf. all- 30). 
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[4]Verses recited by al-`Aziz at th3 death of ore his sons. (Cf. AL. 
Nu'ü]r , 11,2; 
i -t III, 526) 
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Correspondence xchanged betveen the Fatimid Caliph al-(Aziz bil- 
läh and his contemporary, the Bu-yid Amur, Adud al- Dada. 
[i]The Arabic text of the letter that al 
ýAziz wrote to `Adud al- Dawla 
(Cf, 
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II, 2,13 - 14) 
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[ii] The Arabic text of the memo which 
(Adud al-Dawla wrote to his . envoy, Qädi Abü Mubammad a1-`Ummärü, who was to conduct nego- 
tiations at the Fätimid court. (Cf. Cahen, " Une correspondance", 
93-5) 
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